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ABSTRACT 
This study is concerned with the measurement of the social discount rate (SDR) to be 
used in the evaluation of public sector projects and the application of regional welfare 
weights (RWW) to facilitate the implementation of regional development policy in Turkey. 
The issue of an appropriate SDR and a set of RWW is particularly important for Turkey 
since the country has acquired candidate status for membership of the EU and therefore 
is eligible for EU funds such as the instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. However, 
the EU regulations stipulate that all major investment projects to be considered for a share 
of the EU funds must be supported by a cost benefit analysis which requires the 
application of a discount rate. Moreover, Chapter 21 of the acquis communautaire sets out 
regional development as one of the most important policy concerns for the EU. Thus, it is 
crucially important for Turkey to develop coherent and viable regional policies in the 
context of its negotiations for full membership of the EU. However, Turkey currently has 
neither a consistent and explicit policy regarding the application of a social discount rate in 
the appraisal of its public projects, nor a set of coherent and viable policies with respect to 
regional development. There is also a gap in the literature regarding these issues. 
Therefore, the twin objectives of this study are the estimation of an SDR for Turkey and 
the calculation and application of welfare weights in regional policy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Chapter overview 
Improvement in economic welfare depends on economic growth and development, and 
these in turn depend on investment. Thus, investment decisions are at the heart of any 
growth and development strategy. They also involve weighing benefits against costs, a 
process which is referred to by economists as cost-benefit analysis (CBA). However, 
individuals who benefit from an investment project will not necessarily be the same 
individuals who bear the cost of the project. They will in fact be separated both spatially 
and sometimes generationally. This implies that any investment decision will necessarily 
involve not only the issue of efficiency but also that of equity, i. e. the distribution of 
benefits and costs between different groups of people in the same time period as well as 
between generations. The former involves distributional weights and the latter the 
discount rate. Distributional issues and an appropriate discount rate for public projects 
have been a part of welfare economics in general and of CBA in particular across 
generations (Arrow 1995, Ekstein 1958, Harberger 1978 and 1984, Musgrave 1969, Sen 
1961, Stern 1977 and 2007). More recently, several European governments have 
explicitly stated social discount rates for long term public projects and made references to 
social welfare weights (see Section 1.2). 
This study is concerned with measurement of the social discount rate (SDR) to be used in 
the evaluation of public sector projects and the regional welfare weights (RWW) to 
facilitate the implementation of regional development policy in Turkey. The issue of an 
appropriate SDR and RWW is particularly important for Turkey in the context of Turkish 
candidacy for the membership of the EU. 
The Cohesion Policy regulations of the EU stipulate that all major investment projects 
applying for a share of the Cohesion Funds must contain a CBA (European Commission 
2008). Additionally, Chapter 21 of the acquis communautaire on Regional Policy and the 
Co-ordination of Structural Instruments sets out regional development as one of the most 
important policy areas in the EU. For the period 2007-13, the planned expenditure on 
regional policy constitutes the second largest item in the EU budget with an allocation of 
E348 billion (Europa 2010a). 
Turkey acquired a candidate country status at the Helsinki meeting of the European 
Council in 1999 and began negotiations in October 2005 for full membership of the EU. By 
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October 2010,13 out of 35 chapters of the EU's acquis communautaire had been opened 
for discussion (European Commission 2010). Consequently, Turkey has been eligible for 
the EU funds and the EU annually finances many projects in Turkey from social services 
to regional development. For example, it was envisaged by the preliminary European 
Commission (EC) draft budget for 2007 that Turkey could get over E2 billion from the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD) for the period 2007-2010 (Europa 2010b). 
However, it can be stated that there has been a relative lack of coherent and consistent 
policy regarding the formulation and the implementation of SDR with respect to the 
evaluation of long term projects in Turkey. The State Planning Organisation (SPO) is the 
institution which is charged with the formulation and implementation of public spending 
policies in general and public investment policies in particular in Turkey. Despite 
references in the five-year development plans and associated documents by the SPO to 
the necessity of subjecting public sector projects to financial, economic and social 
analysis, there has been no mention of a specific SDR, unlike the UK and other European 
countries (see, for example, European Commission 2008, HM Treasury 2003, and 
Rambaud and Torrecillas 2006), or even a discussion relating to SDR. In fact a 2004 
study regarding environmental costing in Turkey makes an explicit reference to this issue. 
"For a public investment project or a public investment programme, the appropriate 
discount rate (often called the social or economic discount rate) is ideally set by a central 
planning authority, such as DPT or Treasury. We understand that such a (social) discount 
rate for public investment projects has not been established and published by the 
Government of Turkey. ' (Envest 2004, p 11) 
Turkey also faces serious problems regarding regional development since there are 
significant differences in the level of development between different regions in Turkey in 
terms of per capita income as well as other indicators of development such as 
unemployment levels, demographic indicators, education levels and provision of health 
services (see section 1.3.2). Regional inequalities are particularly challenging since 
relative poverty and underdevelopment of North-eastern, Middle-eastern and South- 
eastern Anatolia regions are regarded as the most urgent issues facing both Turkish and 
EU policy makers with respect to Turkey's integration in the EU (European Stability 
Initiative 2010). Moreover, while the EU and other developed countries approach the 
problem of regional development with policies that are relatively consistent and based on 
sound principles, Turkey appears to be relatively unsuccessful in the formulation, 
implementation and the consequences of regional policies (Pinar and Arikan 2003). The 
relative lack of a coherent and consistent policy framework is not confined to the SDR but 
also applies to the development of viable regional policies. There are also inconsistencies 
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between the Turkish and the European Regional policies in terms of both approach and 
implementation. The biggest problem has been the lack of a regionalist tradition in Turkey. 
This is due, at least in part, to the rather centralist tradition arising from historical reasons 
in governmental and administrative structures. Tentative attempts at introducing 
regionalisation have generally been unsuccessful for fear that they may undermine 
territorial integrity and encourage Kurdish separatism (Reeves 2005). However, Turkey is 
under obligation to undertake, during the accession negotiations, the infrastructural and 
institutional reforms as required by the EU regional policies. These reforms involve 
regional decentralisation and the establishment of democratised regional governance 
structures (Beleli 2005). 
Consequently, the derivation of the SDR to be used in the evaluation of public sector 
projects and of the RWW to facilitate the implementation of regional development policy in 
Turkey appears to be highly relevant in the current economic and political climate. It is 
also likely to fill a gap in the literature since there is a lack of empirical studies devoted to 
the estimation of an appropriate SDR and a set of RWW for Turkey. 
1.2 Academic context 
Discounting costs and benefits over time at a given percentage per year is a long- 
established practice in CBA to estimate the present value of an outcome that is to occur in 
future, such as consumption, income or output. An SDR is the rate which renders society 
indifferent between current and future wellbeing. It reflects a society's relative valuation of 
the current welfare versus the future welfare. Thus, the determination of an appropriate 
social discount rate is crucially important for cost-benefit analysis (Zhuang et a/ 2007). 
Although there are several approaches to what constitutes an appropriate SDR, the social 
time preference rate (STPR) is gaining increasing acceptance among academics as well 
as policy makers as the appropriate approach to discounting (see, for example, Evans 
2007, Evans and Sezer 2005, Kula 2004, Percoco 2008, Rambaud and Torrecillas 2006, 
and Spackman 2008, as well as the European Commission 2008 and HM Treasury 2003). 
The STPR is the rate at which the society is prepared to substitute future consumption for 
present consumption. For that reason it is also called the consumption rate of interest. In a 
two-period analysis this rate relates to the marginal rate of substitution of future for current 
consumption at any point on a given societal Indifference curve. The theoretical basis and 
derivation of the STPR are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5, and empirical estimates 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
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The equation for the STPR, based on Ramsey (1928) is given by 
(1.1) STPR=p+s. g 
where 
p= the pure time preference rate or the utility discount rate 
c= elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
g= average growth of projected per capita real consumption 
As can be seen the STPR consists of two elements. The utility discount rate (p) is the 
cause of much controversy among the economists, which is explored in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.5. The literature regarding estimates of this parameter is examined in Chapter 
4, section 4.2. The utility discount rate reflects individuals' (society's) intertemporal 
preferences when the real per capita consumption is constant, i. e. the growth rate of 
consumption (g) is zero over the discounting period. If, however, g is positive then future 
consumption exceeds current consumption, which implies that the marginal utility of 
consumption is declining and the rate of decline is determined by the growth rate of 
consumption and the elasticity of diminishing marginal utility of consumption (Potts 2002). 
This is reflected in the term (e. g), where £ is the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to consumption. This concept occupies an important place in the 
literature and plays a pivotal role in the estimation of both the STPR and social welfare 
weights. Therefore, the whole of Chapter 3 is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical 
and empirical issues surrounding the concept of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption. As for the average growth rate of consumption, the theoretical issues 
regarding g are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5 and empirical estimates of it in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2. 
In terms of economic policy and practice, several European countries have set an explicit 
discount rate based on the STPR approach. For example, the official SDR based on the 
declining (after 30 years) time preference approach for the UK is 3.5% (HM Treasury 
2003). Similarly, the EU guide to CBA in the evaluation of investment projects stipulates 
that a rate of 5.5% for the Cohesion Countries and 3.5% for the non-Cohesion countries 
would be the appropriate STPR for the EU (European Commission 2008). Other countries 
have also stated explicitly what the SOR ought to be for public sector projects. For 
example, France applies an STPR of 4% (Evans 2007) and Spain applies multiple STPRs 
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of 4% for water, 5% for environmental and 6% for transport projects (Spackman 2008). 
Italy's discount rate is 5% which is also based on STPR (Percoco 2008). 
As for the distributional welfare weights, which are also known as the social welfare 
weights, they are devices that can be used in the allocation of funds to finance public 
spending projects among the different groups of a given population. It could be argued 
that the SDR implicitly deals with the intertemporal distribution of welfare and the SWW 
relate to the interspatial distribution of welfare. However, because the SWW explicitly 
introduce distributional issues into CBA, they are somewhat controversial. Some argue 
that CBA should only be concerned with efficiency issues not distributional ones (see, for 
example, Musgrave 1969). This line of argument assumes that the existing distribution of 
income is optimal. If it is not, then optimality should be achieved by some other way such 
as taxation and subsidy. Thus a social project should, it is argued, be judged according to 
efficiency criteria based on the Kaldor-Hicks principle. Harberger (1978 and 1984), on the 
other hand, argues that distributional weights might be acceptable as long as the extra 
benefits of such weights are at least as large as the cost in terms of efficiency loss. If 
distributional issues are to be explicitly incorporated into CBA, then the use of regional 
welfare weights (RWW) in cost-benefit analysis would be beneficial. 
The analysis of welfare weights is based on the concept of a social welfare function which 
is rooted in the analysis of consumer behaviour. A commonly used social welfare function 
is of the Bergson-Samuelson (B-S) type. The properties of this function and the derivation 
of distributional welfare weights are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. It suffices to 
state here that the distributional weights involve the concept of diminishing marginal utility 
of income (consumption) and are based on welfare -as reflected by per capita income- 
differences between the socio-economic or regional groups concerned. 
In terms of economic policy in practice, distributional welfare weights also seem to be an 
important consideration in the evaluation of social projects and policies where benefits 
accrue to and costs are borne by- different groups of the society whose distinguishing 
characteristic seems to be the net income they receive (Weisbrod 1972). For example, the 
UK government makes explicit use of this concept in its expenditure policy in the latest 
Green Book (HM Treasury 2003). The recent EU Guide to CBA of investment projects 
also refers to the explicit use of welfare weights based on income differences (see 
European Commission 2008, Annex E). 
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1.3 Background to the Turkish economy 
The modem Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 through the leadership of a group of 
Young Turks (Mustafa Kemal -later Ataturk- and his friends) after a political and military 
struggle from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. It first adopted a single-party system and in 
1946 multi-party parliamentary democracy was established based on a constitutional 
regime similar to that of the UK and has continued until today albeit with some 
interruptions along the way (Index Mundi 2010). 
1.3.1 The geography and geo-politics 
Turkey is situated to straddle two continents, Europe and Asia, and constitutes an 
important part of the geography of the Middle-East. Its main religion is Islam (99% of its 
population) and it is the only secular -by Constitution- parliamentary democracy among 
the predominantly Islamic countries of the world. It occupies a geopolitically significant 
location since it borders Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the east, Bulgaria and 
Greece in the northwest and is surrounded by the Black Sea in the north, the Aegean in 
the west and the Mediterranean in the south (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Locatlon of Turkey 
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Its surface area is 778 000 km2 and it has a population of 72 561 312 people. Turkey is the 
second largest country in Europe and, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), 
demographically the youngest with more than half of its population being under 29 years 
old (TSI 2010b). 
Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe, a member of NATO and held a 
non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during 2009-10. Turkey has also been an 
associate member of the European Union since 1963 (then the EEC) with the Treaty of 
Ankara and acquired, as has been mentioned above, a candidate country status at the 
Helsinki meeting of the European Council in 1999. Turkey has undergone a series of 
legal, administrative and constitutional reforms in recent years in order to comply with the 
acquis communautaire of the EU the most important of which is the constitutional reform 
of September 2010 (European Commission 2010). 
1.3.2 The economy 
Turkey is one of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) and had, in 2009, a per capita 
GDP (PPS) of US$ 12,476 (IMF 2010). Its total GDP in PPS in 2009 was over US$ 880 
billion which implies a share of world's total GDP of 1.25%; that makes the Turkish 
economy the 17th largest in the world. 
The report points out the fact that between 1992 and 2009 Turkey's GDP increased by 
263.1% while the same figure was 125.7% for Spain, 115.8% for the UK, 89.6% for 
France, 81.6% for Russia, 71.4% for Germany and 66.1% for Italy. Moreover, Turkey's 
share of Europe's economy increased from 3.4% in 1992 to 4.55% in 2009 and will, 
according to the IMF, be 4.99% by 2014. 
The economic structure of Turkey based on the sectoral distribution of GDP is not very 
different from those of advanced economies with the shares of the services and industrial 
sectors being 70% and 23% respectively (See Table 1.1). However, the employment 
based economic structure presents a somewhat different picture. 
Considering that more than one third of the population still lives in rural areas, it is not 
surprising that the share of agriculture in total employment is 24.7% which is to be 
compared with the agricultural share of 8.2% in total GDP. Similarly, the share of the 
service sector in total GDP is 69.1% while it is only 50% in employment. 
7 
Table 1.2 provides selected indicators for the Turkish economy between 2001 and 2009. It 
shows that private consumption as a proportion of GDP has been fairly stable over this 
period with a figure of around 75% while total investment shows fluctuations between 
15.9% and 22.3% mainly as a result of the variation in private investment 
Table 1.1 Percentage sectoral shares of GDP and employment 
GDP Employment 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture* 8.2 7.6 7.6 8.2 24.0 23.5 23.7 24.7 
Industry 24.9 24.8 24.5 22.7 26.8 26.7 26.8 25.3 
Mining and quarrying 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 - 
Manufacturing 17.2 16.8 16.2 15.0 - 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
1.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 - - 
Construction 4.7 4.9 4.7 3.8 - - - 
Services 66.9 67.6 67.9 69.1 49.2 49.8 49.5 50.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: TurkStat (2010) 
*Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
It also indicates that the general government gross debt has been fairly large, but much 
smaller than some of the European countries such as Greece, Spain and the UK, with 
over 40% of the GDP on average for the last five years. The trade figures indicate that 
Turkish economy is a fairly open economy for the size of the country with around one 
quarter of the GDP being traded which is not very different from countries such as the UK, 
France and Germany. 
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Table 1.2: Selected economic indicators 
Unit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
USD in 
GDP pc current 8 615 8 667 8 789 10 164 11 391 12 585 13 362 13 952 13 115 
PPS 
Real GDP pc Annual % -7.0 4.8 3.9 8.0 7.1 5.6 3.4 -0.5 -5.8 growth , 
Private final % of GDP 74.9 74.0 76.0 75.8 75.6 74.5 74.6 73.2 75.1 consumption 
GFCF % of GDP 15.9 16.7 17.0 20.3 21.0 22.3 21.4 19.9 16.9 
Private GFCF % of GDP 11.7 12.4 13.6 17.4 17.7 18.9 18.0 16.0 13.2 
Public GFCF % of GDP 4.2 4.3 3.4 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.7 
Central 
government % of GDP - - - - 23.5 22.9 22.6 22.1 22.5 
otal revenue 
Central 
government % of GDP - - - - 24.6 23.5 24.2 23.9 28.0 
total spending 
General 
government % of GDP - - - - 52.3 46 1 39.4 39.5 45.4 gross debt (EU . 
definition) 
verage real 
interest rate on % - - - - 4.3 3.5 7.5 2.4 7.9 
public debt 
Gross Interest % of GDP - - - - 7.0 6.1 5.8 5.3 5.6 expenditure 
Unemployment % 8.6 10.6 10.8 11.1 10.9 10.5 10.5 11.1 14.3 
rate 
Exports % of GDP 27.4 25.2 23.0 23.6 21.9 22.7 22.3 23.9 23.2 
Imports % of GDP 23.3 23.6 24.0 26.2 25.4 27.6 27.5 28.3 24.4 
Inflation rate: Annual 54.4 45.0 21.6 8.6 8.2 9.6 8.8 10.4 6.3 
all items growth % 
Exchange TRY per 12 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 rates USD 
Source: TurkStat (2010a); (OECD 2010c); IMF (2010) 
Notes: 
GDP pc: Gross Domestic Product per capita 
GFCF: Gross fixed capital formation 
TRY: Turkish lira 
9 
1.3.3 Income distribution and welfare 
It would be fair to state that the figures presented above and in Table 1.2 point to an 
economy whose performance is fairly erratic in the short run but rather promising in the 
long run. However, these figures are average indicators and thus hide persistent regional 
differences that characterise the Turkish economy with respect to welfare considerations 
(Kdigaslan and Özataijan 2007). An analysis of the distribution of household incomes and 
of economic activity among the different parts of the country shows that there is a clear 
east-west divide and considerable discrepancies of welfare exist among different 
households as well as different regions of the country. The Income and Living 
Conditions Survey for 2008 (TSI 2010a) shows that the ratio of the incomes of the richest 
20% to those of the poorest 20% of society is 8: 1, which implies that Turkey has the 
second worst distribution of income after Mexico among the OECD countries. The ratio of 
the top quintile to the bottom one is 17: 1 to be compared with the OECD average of 9: 1. 
There are also considerable income differences among the different regions of the 
country. 
Figure 1.2: Geographical Regions of Turkey 
Turkey is traditionally divided into seven broad geographical regions containing eighty one 
provinces (see Figure 1.2). However, as part of the reforms to comply with the EU 
regulations, Turkey has adopted the European system of Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
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for Statistics (NUTS) in order to achieve consistency in gathering and presenting regional 
statistical data. 
Figure 1.3: NUTS Level-1 regions of Turkey 
Guide 
Akdeniz Mediterranean 
Anadolu Anatolia 
Bata West 
Do§u East 
Ege Aegean 
Goney South 
Karadeniz Black Sea 
Kuzey North 
Orta Middle 
Thus, by a law passed in 2002,81 provinces were grouped into 26 regions at NUTS 
Level-2 Statistical Units, and these were further grouped into 12 main regions NUTS 
Level-1 Statistical Units (see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.3). For estimation purposes, 
however, the Level-1 regions have been further aggregated into six main regions by 
combining the neighbouring regions of Level-2 classification (see Table 1.3 and also 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1). 
There are sharp regional differences in welfare levels in Turkey indicated by the 
differences in the average income levels of the regions. For example, the average income 
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Table 1.3 Regions of Turkey: NUTS Level-1, Level-2 and Level-3 
Rank Level-1 Level-2 Level-3 
1 Istanbul R10 Istanbul sub-region Istanbul 
R21 ekirdag sub-region ekirdag, Edime, Kirklareli 
Western 
Marmara 5 Marmara TR22 Balikesir sub-region Balikesir, Canakkale 
Region 
R41 Bursa sub-region Bursa, Eski§ehir, Bilecik 
Eastern 
3 Marmara R42 Kocaeli sub-region Kocaeli, Sakarya, DOzce, 
I 
I 
Bolu, Yalova 
R31 Izmir sub-region Izmir 
Ege (Aegian) TR32 Aydin sub-region Aydin, Denizli, Mu§ia 
egian Region 4 
R33 Manisa sub-region Manisa, Afyon, Kutahya, 
Upk 
R61 Antalya sub-region Antalya, Isparta, Burdur 
Mediterranean Akdeniz R62 dana sub -eglon dana, Mersin 
Region 6 (Mediterranean) 
R63 Hatay sub-region Hatay, Kahramanmara$, 
Osmaniye 
R81 onguidaksub region Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartin 
Western Black 82 Kastamonu sub-region Kastamonu, cankm, Sinop 
7 Sea 
Black Sea R83 Samsun sub-region Samsun, Tokat, corum, 
Region asya 
g R90 rabzon sub-region Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, 
Eastern Black Rize, Artvin, 
Sea GOm0$hane 
R51 kara sub-region Ankara 
Western 
2 Anatolia 52 Konya sub-region Konya, Karaman 
Central 
natolian R71 Kirikkale sub-region Kirikkale, Aksaray, Niöde, Region 8 Middle Anatolia Nev$ehir, Kir$ehir 
R72 Kayseri sub-region Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat 
RA1 Erzurum sub-region Erzurum, Erzincan, 
Ba urt 
North-eastern RA2 Agri sub-region ri, Kars, I*dir, 
12 Anatolia Ardahan 
RB1 Malatya sub-region Malatya, ElaziÖ, Bingöl, 
unceli Eastern RB2 an sub-region an, Muo, Bitlis, Hakkarl atolian 11 Middle-eastern Region Anatolia RC1 Gaziantep sub-region Gaziantep, Adiyaman, 
Kills 
RC2 $anhurfa sub-region $anliurfa, Diyarbakir 
10 South-eastern 
Anatolia RC3 Mardin sub-region Mardin, Batman, $imak, 
iirt 
Source: Own compilation 
Note: Ranking is based on average income levels 
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Table 1.4 Poverty Rates 
Regional 
threshold 
(TL) 
National 
threshold 
(TL) 
Poverty 
rate, % 
(regional 
basis) 
Poverty 
rate, % 
(national 
basis) 
Istanbul 4 574 3146 9.9 3.2 
West Marmara 3 369 3 146 12.9 11.6 
Aegean 3540 3 146 15.7 11.4 
East Marmara 3 992 3 146 9.5 4.9 
West Anatolia 3 596 3 146 12.7 9.0 
Mediterranean 2 597 3 146 10.0 16.6 
Central Anatolia 2 867 3 146 12.7 16.3 
West Black Sea 2 795 3 146 11.9 16.8 
East Black Sea 3 318 3146 13.7 11.6 
North East Anatolia 2189 3146 17.7 34.0 
Central East Anatolia 1838 3146 9.3 36.8 
South East Anatolia 1550 3146 12.7 47.9 
ounce: TS/ (2010a 
Notes: Poverty thresholds are calculated as 50% of the median value of equivalised household 
disposable income 
of the Marmara Region, as a proportion of the per capita GDP in Turkey as a whole, is 
equal to 1.44 while the same figure for the Eastern Anatolian Region is 0.46. More 
specifically, the same figures for the western sub-regions of TR10 (Istanbul), TR21 
(Edirne, Tekirdag and Kirklareli) and TR31 (Izmir) are 1.55,1.30 and 1.26 respectively , 
while the corresponding figures for the eastern sub-regions of TRA2 (Aijn, Kars, lodir, 
Ardahan), TRB2 (Van, Mug, Bitlis, Hakkari) and TRC2 ($anhurfa, Diyarbakir) are 0.40, 
0.35 and 0.43 respectively (See Chapter 6, Table 6.5) 
The regional welfare differences In Turkey are also indicated in the figures provided by the 
above-mentioned Income and Living Conditions Survey (TSI 2010a). Table 1.4 provides 
information on regional poverty levels in Turkey based on both the national and the 
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regional poverty thresholds. The figures indicate that there is a substantial gap between 
the western and the eastern parts of the country. In fact the three sub-regions with the 
highest poverty rates happen to be in Eastern Anatolia with Southeast Anatolia 
(GÜneydogu Anadolu) having the highest poverty rate of 47.9% based on the national 
poverty threshold. This is in contrast with the west of the country where the Marmara, 
including Istanbul, the Aegean and the West Anatolia regions have much lower poverty 
rates with Istanbul having the lowest poverty rate only 3.2%. 
Other welfare indicators, such as educational levels and health care, also show sharp 
differences between the eastern and the western regions of the country. For example, for 
the 2009/10 academic year the net secondary schooling ratio for western provinces such 
as Bilecik, Bursa, Edirne and Izmir was 89%, 75%, 79%, 75% respectively. The same 
ratio for eastern provinces such as Agri, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Sirnak, Urfa, Van was 27%, 
34%, 45%, 34%, 32% and 33% respectively. 
Similarly, while in the western cities, for example, of Aydin, Edirne, Istanbul and Izmir 
there are 1.53,2.51,2.03 and 2.47 doctors per thousand of population, respectively, the 
same figure for eastern provinces such as Agri, Mug, Urfa and $irnak are 0.83,0.73,0.75, 
0.68 respectively (TSI 2009). 
1.3.4 Migration 
Given that welfare differences among the different regions in Turkey have a long history, 
migration has been an important fact of life in Turkey. In line with the general 
characteristic of migration all over the world, internal migration in Turkey Is closely related 
to the socio-economic developments in the country and therefore its direction has 
generally been from the less developed eastern and south-eastern provinces to the more 
developed western provinces (Bülbül and KOse 2010). Thus, this section is a background 
to regional welfare weights to be estimated in Chapter 6. 
As an economic phenomenon, migration is influenced by demand and supply factors. 
Supply factors are those associated with the source region such as the desire to improve 
one's standard of living, enhancement of educational and other opportunities for one's 
children, and the attraction of better professional facilities in the case of skilled migrants. 
Demand factors are those associated with the host region such as ageing home 
population, lack of skilled labour, or simply the shortage of labour per se. In a simple 
economic model of two regions with similar skill levels, if one region has plenty of labour 
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and thus low wages and the other region has a labour shortage and therefore high wages, 
then migration will occur from the low-wage region to the high-wage one (Borjas 2000). 
This simple model can explain, at least partially, internal migration in Turkey in that the 
more industrialised western regions with a higher standard of living have attracted 
migrants from less developed eastern and south-eastern regions with a lower standard of 
living. 
However, migration is often a complex issue with political, sociological and cultural 
dimensions, and Turkish migration is no exception. Interregional migration in Turkey 
started in the 1950s, accelerated after the 1980s and is continuing even today. At the 
beginning the nature of this migration was from rural areas to urban centres in parallel 
with the process of industrialisation, but today it is more of the urban-to-urban type. 
Recently, urban to rural migration has also gained importance (BÜIbOl and KOse 2010). 
Turkey experienced different rates of internal migration over the years. The net rural-to- 
urban migration was around 214 000 people in the period of 1945-50 and it jumped to 904 
000 in the period of 1950-55. It then stabilised until 1965 when it began increasing again. 
For example, the ratio of urban population to total population increased from 41.8% in 
1975 to 53% in 1985 and again to 64.9% in 2000. Internal migration, particularly from the 
rural areas of eastern regions to the urban areas of western regions, gained considerable 
momentum after 1985 until the early years of the present century. Over the period 1995- 
2000 internal migration into big cities has reached 6 662 263 people which corresponds to 
more than 10 percent of the total population of Turkey (Kirdar and Saracoölu 2006). 23 
provinces were net receivers of migrants while 58 provinces were net providers of 
migrants. Most of the 23 provinces were in the Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean 
regions while most of the 58 provinces were in the East and South-East Anatolian regions 
(Bnlbüi and Köse 2010). It can be said that, in addition to the socio-economic factors 
mentioned above, the problem of terrorism and the state policies regarding such terrorism 
also played an important role in such large scale displacement of population, since the 
regions with highest negative rate of migration are also the regions that are most affected 
by terror and its repercussions. Therefore part of the migration figures is forced migration. 
Table 1.5 provides details of the net migration rate by region. It can be seen that the 
western regions such as Marmara, Istanbul and the Aegean have positive migration rates 
while the eastern Anatolian regions have negative migration rates. However, it would 
appear that internal migration has slowed down in recent years compared with the year 
2000 since there has been a reduction in both the positive migration rates of the western 
15 
regions and the negative rates of the eastern regions. This is partly due to the reduction in 
the incidence of terrorism. 
Table 1.5: Net migration rate by region 
Rate of net migration 
Region (NUTS Level 1) 2000 2008 2009 
TR1 Istanbul 46.1 2,10 3,06 
TR2 Western Marmara 26.1 9,73 4,03 
TR3 Aegean 22.9 3,70 1,74 
TR4 Eastern Marmara 15.9 12,57 6,37 
TR5 Western Anatolia 15.9 2,98 4,60 
TR6 Mediterranean 0.4 2,15 0,52 
TR7 Central Anatolia -24.9 -9,00 -4,99 
TR8 Western Black Sea -50.3 -4,35 -2,40 
TR9 Eastern Black Sea -26.1 -2,24 0,63 
TRA North-eastern Anatolia -49.8 -26,12 -14,72 
TRB Central-eastern Anatolia -33.4 -10,89 -9,09 
TRC South-eastern Anatolia -36.2 -7,56 -7,12 
Source: TurkStat (2010d) 
Note: Rate of net migration is the number of net migrants per thousand population of the region 
At the beginning, migration from rural areas to urban centres was not regarded as a 
problem; in fact it was positively encouraged. However, in later years, social and 
economic problems experienced by big cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara as a 
result of migration caused the rural-to-urban migration to be conceived as a problem to be 
dealt with. For example, in the three urban centres mentioned above the unemployment 
rate has increased due to migration since the demand for extra labour is far short of what 
is needed to absorb the number of migrant workers. Thus, migration, far from providing 
even a partial solution to the problem of chronic unemployment, aggravates it (Bahar and 
Bingöl 2010). In fact, the mushrooming of shanty towns at the outskirts of big cities, the 
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inability of the infrastructure to cope with increased demand and the pressure on the 
municipal services such as transport, energy distribution and amenities are common 
complaints among the dwellers of these cities even today and are the main reasons for 
the increase in the rate of urban-to rural migration in Turkey. 
Consequently, various plans and projects at national and regional levels have been 
prepared to deal with this problem (GÜresci 2010). One of these projects is 'Returning to 
the Village' which has only recently started. It is designed to encourage those who 
migrated (many forcefully) from the eastern provinces to the western ones to return to 
their homelands. In this context, it is proposed not only that measures must be taken to 
slow down the high rate of population increase, but also that regional resources must be 
mobilised to increase economic activity locally. The responsibility of achieving this has, 
however, been put on the shoulders of the private sector and thus lacks concrete and 
effective mechanisms to achieve the desired outcome. Moreover, this project is the only 
one designed to reduce migration from the east to the west. Most of the other projects 
proposed by the State Planning Organisation (SPO) aims either to improve the 
infrastructure such as roads, sewage facilities and water distribution networks, housing 
and the environment in the regions receiving migrants, or to make educational, health and 
cultural institutions more effective to facilitate the adjustment of the migrant population to 
their new environment (SPO 2001 a). 
In the light of above discussion, it would appear that there Is a lack of appropriate policies 
designed to encourage potential migrants to remain in their regions by making these 
regions sufficiently attractive economically, socially and culturally. What Turkey needs Is 
coherent and viable policies to reduce regional differences in terms of social and 
economic development if large scale migration is to be curtailed. Long term investment 
projects, particularly those which would create enduring employment opportunities and 
therefore 'take work to the workers', are part of such a strategy. Thus, the development of 
coherent and consistent policies regarding the social discount rate and implementation of 
appropriate regional welfare weights are important instruments of such a strategy. 
The next section will briefly explore the existing policies regarding the SDR and RWW in 
Turkey. More detailed evaluation of these policies will be provided in Chapter 7. 
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1.4 Policies regarding the social discount rate and regional 
development in Turkey 
The institution in charge of the formulation and implementation of public spending policies 
in general and public investment policies in particular in Turkey is the State Planning 
Organisation (SPO) known as the DPT (short for Devlet Planlama Teskilati in Turkish) 
which is accountable directly to the Office of the Prime Minister. The responsibilities of the 
SPO cover the evaluation of the projects submitted by public bodies and the allocation of 
public funds to these projects according to a set of priorities. These priorities are set out in 
successive five-year plans. Although the general principles and targets regarding public 
spending and public investment are set out in the five-year plans, specific policies and 
incentive structures are determined by government directives, guides and announcements 
published either by the SPO on behalf of the government or directly by the relevant 
Ministry. There are also special temporary or permanent commissions established and 
charged with the responsibility of gathering information, undertaking research and 
developing appropriate policies (SPO 2001b). These commissions are set up to guide the 
SPO in the implementation of five-year plans, facilitate maximum contribution from 
different sections of society to the success of the plans, and to evaluate the actual and 
potential economic resources of the country. 
Until 1975, the benefit/cost (B/C) ratio was the main method used in the allocation of 
funds to public sector projects. The calculation of labour cost and the exchange rate was 
based on shadow prices and the discount rate was based on the shadow interest rate. 
After 1975 this method was abandoned in favour of a market rates approach due to lack 
of reliable data. In evaluating public projects, factors such as value-added creation, 
contribution to employment, and the impact on the balance of payments were taken into 
account. However, in actual calculations, market prices instead of shadow prices were 
used on the assumption that market prices reflect actual benefits and costs accurately 
(Gdkgöz and cinar 2010). This approach became even more entrenched after 1980 when 
interventionist economic policies were replaced by a more market oriented approach. As a 
result of Turkey starting negotiations for membership of the EU in 2005, the last two five- 
year plans and the associated directives and guides have been prepared with a view of 
compliance with the acquis communautaire of the EU. 
Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that there has been a lack of coherent and consistent 
policy regarding the formulation and implementation of SDR with respect to the evaluation 
of long term projects in Turkey. The SDR would sometimes be based on the market rate 
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of interest and at other times on the success of similar projects. Political considerations 
would, however, always play a role in the allocation of funds to investment projects. The 
inconsistencies and lack of coherence were also present in the application of the discount 
rate. In the ranking of new public sector projects for funding, the SDR differs according to 
the type of analysis implemented. Financial analysis requires that market rates of interest 
be used whilst economic and social analysis necessitates a different SDR on the 
assumption that social time preference is different from private time preference. However, 
the SDR applied in Turkey would also differ according to the way the project was 
financed. If, for example, the source of finance for the project combines public funds, 
domestic commercial credit and international capital in different proportions, the relevant 
discount rate would be a weighted average of the long term government bond rate, the 
market rate of interest for borrowing and the international rate of interest, the weights 
being the shares of the three source of finance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
Most importantly, there has been, unlike the UK and other European countries, no 
mention of a specific SDR, as explained in Section I. I. Thus, there appears to be an 
urgent need for the formulation of appropriate policies regarding the determination and 
implementation of the SDR in the evaluation of long term projects in Turkey. 
As for regional development, it is clear from the discussion in Sections 1.3.3 and . 1.3.4 
that Turkey faces serious regional problems despite several attempts to introduce regional 
development policies. These policies have largely been unsuccessful either because they 
have not been implemented properly or because they were inappropriate policies (see, for 
example, Do§ruel 2006, Elvan et al 2005, Filiztekin 2008, and Pinar and Arikan 2003). A 
detailed discussion on regional development policies in Turkey is provided in Chapter 7. It 
suffices to state here that there are two main reasons for the failure of regional 
development policies in Turkey. One is that maximisation of national income and thus 
sectoral considerations have always had priority over regional considerations, and the 
other is that the Turkish political and administrative structure and hence policy-making and 
implementation process is highly centralised. Thus there is a distinct lack of essential 
infrastructure for regionalisation with no local institutions to acquire the ownership of or the 
power to supervise any policy initiative at the regional level (Elvan et al 2005 and Ertugal 
2005a). 
This centralist character of the Turkish political and administrative structure is the main 
difference and inconsistency between the Turkish and the EU approaches to regional 
development. However, as a candidate country Turkey has undertaken to implement 
certain reforms as part of its regional policy. These reforms have included the introduction 
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of the Preliminary National Development Plan (PNDP) aimed to draw up the guidelines of 
economic and social cohesion policy for 2004-2006, and the establishment of Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA) for 26 new regions in 2005. However, as was stated above, 
these measures have proved to be inadequate partly because they have not been 
implemented properly, e. g. RDAs, and partly because there has been a lack of political 
will regarding the policy of decentralisation. 
1.5 The objectives, the method and the structure of the study 
The discussion above indicates that there is a pressing need in Turkey to develop dear 
guidelines and coherent and consistent policies both for the implementation of a social 
discount rate for government projects and for the formulation and application of viable 
regional development policies. Consequently, this study aims to provide both an analytical 
framework and technical indicators that should be helpful in the formulation and 
implementation of such policies. 
1.5.1 The objectives 
There are two main objectives of the study. One is to provide guidelines for the social 
discount rate by estimating the STPR for Turkey and the other is to calculate regional 
welfare weights which might be useful in the formulation and implementation of regional 
policies with respect to government projects. 
In the process of achieving these objectives, the study will explore and critically evaluate 
the literature regarding both the social discount rate -in particular the STPR- and the 
social welfare weights. The literature review will cover not only the theoretical issues but 
also the empirical studies regarding these two measures. Moreover, since the concept of 
the elasticity of marginal utility of income (e) plays a pivotal role both in the estimation of 
the STPR and that of social welfare weights, a whole chapter, i. e. Chapter 3, is devoted to 
the theoretical and empirical Issues surrounding this concept. 
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1.5.2 The method 
Regarding the estimation procedures, a combination of mathematical and econometric 
models is employed in the calculations. In the estimation of the all important variable, 
namely the elasticity of marginal utility of income (E) for Turkey, this study will use two 
different approaches. The first one is based on a demand model in which the income and 
compensated-price elasticities for a want-independent composite commodity, namely 
food, are estimated in order to calculate the value of E. Secondly, an income-tax model 
combined with a government social valuation function based on the principle of equal 
absolute sacrifice of utility will be employed using the Turkish progressive income tax 
system to provide an alternative estimate of for c. After comparing and contrasting the 
results obtained from these models, an appropriate value for the elasticity of marginal 
utility of income (consumption) will be selected to be used in the calculation of the STPR 
and the RWW for Turkey. 
The Feltner-Fisher-Frisch (FFF) approach 
The demand model developed by Fellner (1967), Fisher (1927) and Frisch (1932) is 
known as the FFF approach. The theoretical construction and development of this model 
is provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. This approach is based on the demand for want- 
independent consumer goods, i. e. food. In this method an approximate estimate of a is 
provided by the ratio of the estimated income elasticity of demand for food, q, to the 
compensated own-price elasticity (absolute), y, (Fellner 1967). 
Using the FFF approach two contrasting demand models are used to estimate the income 
and compensated price elasticities of demand for food. One is the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) involving the estimation of 
complete demand systems (see, for example, Blundell at at 1993, Blundell 1988, Evans 
2004b, and Percoco 2008); and the other is called the Constant Elasticity Model (CEM) 
(see, for example, Evans 2005,2004a, Evans and Sezer 2002, Kula 1984 and 1985 and 
Percoco 2008). Full details of these models are given in Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
The statistical time series data used in these models, which are presented in Appendix A, 
are taken from national income accounts published by the Turkish Statistical Institute and 
can be obtained on line (TurkStat 2010a). However, before such data can be used in 
these models, their time series properties must first be investigated. More precisely, 
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whether the time series is stationary or non-stationary must be established first. This is 
done by subjecting the data to standard tests, including the Dicky-Fuller (DF) and 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests, which are discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. The 
results of these unit root tests indicate that the time series variables are a combination of 
order 1(0) and 1(1). However, the risk of spurious correlation is removed since the error 
correction model (ECM) indicates that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between 
the variables. This means that co-integration analysis is appropriate for estimating the 
long run elasticities. 
The income tax approach 
An alternative approach to the estimation of the elasticity of marginal utility of income (E) 
makes use of the concept of revealed social values of governments. A common method 
relates to government's aversion to income inequality as revealed by the progressivity of 
income tax (see, for example, Cowell & Gardiner 1999, Evans 2004b and 2008, Evans 
and Sezer 2005, Percoco 2008 and Stern 1977). It is based on the assumption of equal 
absolute sacrifice which means that the income tax taken from individuals involves the 
same sacrifice of utility for all tax payers regardless of income levels: This assumption and 
the derivation of the model are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3. The model 
uses the marginal and average tax rates to estimate the value of e. In order to estimate 
the value of E for Turkey according to this model, data on personal income taxation have 
been used (see OECD 2010a). 
The comparison and evaluation of the two alternative approaches to estimating E are 
provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 and 3.3. The results for Turkey obtained from the two 
models are discussed in Chapter 5. It suffices to state here that the E value obtained from 
the tax model is regarded as more appropriate in the estimation of the regional welfare 
weights since the aversion to income inequality by the government (on behalf of society) 
is more relevant than consumer behaviour in this context. 
1.5.3 The structure 
The study is structured as seven chapters including the Introduction. Chapter 2 deals with 
the concepts of distributional welfare weights (in particular of regional welfare weights) 
and social discount rate. It will first explore the properties of an iso-elastic social welfare 
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function and then discuss the theoretical basis for deriving welfare weights examining the 
relationship between per capita income (consumption) and diminishing marginal utility 
(MU). It will establish that regional welfare weights depend not only on per capita income 
(consumption), but also on the value of the elasticity of marginal utility of income (e). It will 
then discuss the issues of the suitability of per capita income to represent welfare and the 
choice of the relevant concept of income when comparing the welfare of different groups. 
The second part of Chapter 2 will first discuss the theoretical basis for a social discount 
rate and then critically evaluate the different approaches to its measurement including the 
market rate, social opportunity cost of capital and the STPR. The discussion of this last 
measure will include its theoretical derivation and the exploration of its components, 
namely the utility discount rate and the growth rate of consumption. The chapter will end 
with a special reference to the importance of the concept of the elasticity of marginal utility 
of income and thus the necessity of covering it in a separate chapter. 
Chapter 3 is, following from the reference at the end of Chapter 2, entirely devoted to the 
concept of the elasticity of marginal utility of income (E). It begins with the examination of 
the relationship of the elasticity of marginal utility of income first to aversion to inequality 
and then to aversion to risk. It then moves on to the critical evaluation of the different 
methods of measuring e. This involves a discussion of first survey methods, then the 
behavioural approach including life-time consumption behaviour and models based on 
demand-for-food analysis, and finally the revealed social values approach which includes 
the income-tax method. The chapter evaluates not only the theoretical aspects of these 
different models but also the empirical studies that use these different models to estimate 
the value of E. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the exploration of the literature regarding empirical evidence on 
social discount rates and social welfare weights. It presents a critical evaluation of the 
studies that provide estimates of the different components of the STPR such as the utility 
discount rate and the growth of consumption and, of course, of the STPR itself for various 
countries. It also provides a discussion on the use of different income measures, such as 
equally-distributed equivalent income (EDEI) and equivalised income, as well as a critical 
evaluation of studies that produce empirical estimates of social welfare weights. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are where the actual values of F, the STPR and the RWW are estimated 
for Turkey. In Chapter 5a value for c is estimated by using two alternative approaches as 
explained in Section 1.5.2 above. Chapter 6 will provide estimates of the utility discount 
rate and the growth of per capita consumption by using data obtained from World Bank 
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(WB 2010), OECD (2010b) and Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat 2010a). The 
projected growth rate for consumption here is the required growth rate if convergence with 
the EU countries is to be achieved. Thus, it will depend on the rate of convergence as well 
as with which countries convergence is sought. Then, combining these estimates with the 
estimate of E obtained in Chapter 5, an STPR for Turkey will be calculated which will be 
evaluated in the context of similar calculations for selected European countries. Chapter 6 
will also provide estimates of the RWW based on both regional per capita income and 
equally-distributed equivalent income (EDEI). The rationale behind using the latter is that 
regional per capita income takes into account interregional welfare differences but ignores 
intraregional differences in welfare, and EDEI reflects both (see Chapter 4, Section 3). 
There will also be a sensitivity analysis of the RWW with respect to different values of E. 
Finally, in Chapter 7a summary of findings on STPR and RWW will be presented. Then 
the SDR policies in Turkey will be explored and critically evaluated. Similarly, the 
framework for Turkish regional policy will be outlined, and it will then be subjected to 
critical evaluation in the context of the EU regional policies. This will be followed by a 
consideration of the practical application of both the SDR and RWW in Turkey. The 
practical application of the RWW will use the twin concepts of equity-adjusted net present 
value and equity-adjusted internal rate of return. Finally, Chapter 7 will ' end with a 
Conclusion section providing a brief evaluation of the aims and objectives of this study 
and how it goes about achieving them. 
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Chapter 2 Regional Welfare Weights and 
Discount Rate Measures: Theory 
This chapter will focus on the concepts of distributional welfare weights (in particular 
regional welfare weights) and social discount rate which are crucial in public sector 
spending decisions. Once funds are allocated to a particular region, then most 
socially/economically desirable projects must be ranked, say, by using net present value 
(NM/), for which we need a discount rate. The chapter will firstly discuss the theoretical 
basis for deriving welfare weights exploring the relationship between per capita 
income/consumption and diminishing marginal utility (MU) and the properties of ! so-elastic 
utility functions. It will then move on to a discussion on the theoretical issues surrounding 
the derivation of the social discount rate. The exploration of the different welfare measures 
and the empirical literature relating to both the regional welfare weights and the social 
discount rate will be examined in Chapter 4. 
2.1 An overview of distributional issues 
Distributional welfare weights, which are sometimes also referred to in the literature as 
social welfare weights (SWW), are devices used in the allocation of public funds among 
the different -groups of a given population. Distributional issues across generations are 
normally handled through the social discount rate and the method of discounting. They 
have been part of welfare economics, and in particular, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
literature for some time. However, distributional welfare weights explicitly introduce 
distributional issues into CBA and therefore are somewhat controversial. Some 
economists (for example, Musgrave 1969) object to them arguing that CBA should only be 
concerned with efficiency issues not distributional ones (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for 
details).. The counter-argument is that CBA is about making choices regarding 
maximisation of welfare. Thus, distributional (equity) issues are very much part of cost- 
benefit analysis and therefore should be considered alongside the efficiency issues in 
evaluating projects and social policies. Some argue that the twin objectives of equity and 
efficiency can be achieved by specific use of welfare weights (Kula 2002, Prest & Turvey 
1965, Salon 1972 and Stem 1977). Moreover, even if one holds that the equity issues are 
better dealt with by way of taxation or subsidy, welfare weights will still be a useful tool in 
judging to what extent public spending meets given social objectives (Layard and Glaister 
1994). Finally, there is the view held by some economists that the orthodox economic 
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thinking has by and large focused exclusively on the issue of efficiency and ignored the 
issue of equity far too long. It is time that economic analysis gave greater prominence to 
equity issues (Blue and Tweeten 1997 and Potts 1999). 
However, even if one accepts that distributional issues should be incorporataed into CBA, 
there is a large debate regarding how this should be done. Social welfare weights are one 
of the methods of dealing with the spatial (interpersonal) equity issues of project 
evaluation and shadow prices are another. Shadow pricing as part of the social 
opportunity cost of capital approach to the determination of the social discount rate is 
discussed in Section 2.3.4, but here we briefly mention shadow prices as an alternative 
method to social welfare weights in project evaluation. Shadow prices are commonly used 
in the valuation of benefits and costs as part of CBA of investment projects where market 
prices fail to reflect the true costs and benefits of a projects. Such a failure is due to a 
variety of reasons such as public goods and externalities, economies of scale, multiplier 
effects due to unemployment, and market imperfections, e. g. monopolioes, or simply the 
lack of a market, e. g. defence. However, the derivation of shadow prices are somewhat 
difficult and arbitrary and thus some economist and practitioners shy away from using 
them (Dasgupta and Pearce 1978). 
The alternative to shadow prices is social welfare weights. In a regional context, the 
regional welfare weights are estimated and incorporated into the CBA in the evaluation of 
public projects, with higher weights being applied to projects in poorer regions. The 
practical application of the regional welfare weights are discussed in Chapter 7, Section 
7.5.2. The theoretical aspects of distributional weights in general will be discussed in the 
next section. 
2.2 Distributional issues and welfare weights 
As popinted out in the previous chapter, social welfare weights seem to be an important 
consideration in the evaluation of social projects and policies where net benefits accrue to 
different groups of the society whose distinguishing characteristic seems to be the net 
income they receive. For example, the UK government makes explicit use of this concept 
in its expenditure policy in the latest Green Book (HM Treasury 2003). The recent EU 
Guide to CBA of investment projects also refer to the explicit use of the welfare weights 
based on income differences (see European Commission 2008, Annex E). 
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The use of social welfare weights (SWW) in evaluating the distribution of benefits and 
costs from a project or expenditure policy in general requires the determination of the 
distributional criteria. In the literature relating to the application of SWW a number of 
possible criteria have been identified such as, gender, religion, age, region, etc. (see for 
example Weisbrod 1972 and HM Treasury 2003). As long as the groups concerned can 
be differentiated on the basis of real income per capita received, SWW can be applied to 
any type of social grouping in a given population. 
At the heart of the analysis of welfare weights lies the concept of the social welfare 
function. The SWF may be viewed as expressing the planners' social valuation of income 
(see, for example, Creedy and Guest 2008). A commonly used social welfare function is 
of the Bergson-Samuelson (B-S) type. The B-S social welfare function can be defined as 
(2.1) SWF=1:, U; (Y,. )
where 
SWF = social welfare function 
U, = utility of P individual 
Y, = income of i"' individual 
Thus 
(2.2) ASWF=E, U, (t1Y. ) 
where the utility of the i"' individual is expressed as a function of income. Issues relating to 
the definition of income are discussed below. 
It is assumed that 
(2.3) U, (Y) =U2(Y2) -U3(Ys) =... =Uý(Y. ) 
That is, individuals are assumed to have the same utility functions. It is also assumed that 
interpersonal comparisons are possible, i. e. Y1 .Y for all i and j. From a government's 
point of view, interpersonal comparisons are not a problem for social valuation. Normally, 
the demand theory is based on ordinal utility, i. e. ranking of individual preferences and 
therefore the measurement of the intensity of preferences is not relevant. However, the 
social welfare function refers to society's preferences and thus the aggregation of 
individual preferences would be necessary and somewhat problematic (see, for example, 
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Dasgupta and Pearce). Fortunately, it is possible to view the SWF in equations (2.1) and 
(2.2) as a function perceived by the social planner (government) as opposed to a simple 
aggregation of individual utility functions (Creedy and Guest 2008), which enables us to 
make the assumption that interpersonal comparisons are possible. 
Differentiation of (2.1) gives 
(2.4) 
d (SWF) 
=Emu. 
: 
where MUj is the first derivative of Uj (l); which is equal to the marginal utility of income 
for the ith individual which would be declining as income increases. 
It is appropriate to discuss several issues related to the social welfare function before we 
progress further. 
2.2.1 The properties of the social welfare function 
Let us assume that the society to which the SWF applies consists of n individuals with n 
different utility levels. Then 
a) The SWF is non-decreasing: This implies that in comparing the welfare levels in two 
different states, WA and WB, , if U, 
" 
. UIB then SWFA z SWFB which implies that the social 
welfare in state A is at least as good as it is in state B. 
b) The SWF is additive: This implies that if individual utility is a function of income only, 
then we can write 
SWF=ZU, (Y, ) 
This additive separability is based on the assumption that individual utilities are 
independent of each other, i. e. intra-regional externalities, greed, altruism and envy are 
assumed away. [Coy (U1, U2.... U°) = 01. (The issue of additive separability is discussed in 
detail in Cahpter 3, Section 3.5.2b). 
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c) The SWF is symmetric: This, also referred to as impartiality principle (Cowell and 
Gardiner 1999), means that the level of welfare is neutral between individuals, i. e. 
exchanging a given level of income between two individuals with identical income -and 
hence utility- levels does not alter the total utility of the society. 
2.2.2 The shape of the SWF 
Given the general characteristic and properties of the SWF, it is possible to simplify the 
underlying assumptions of the function. 
a) The SWF is strictly concave. This is implied by the diminishing marginal utility. In 
conjunction with the additivity property it produces an important result since it 
means that redistributing a given amount of income from a high income individual 
to a low income individual would increase total welfare. In other words, from a 
viewpoint of distributional policies high incomes are associated with low weights 
and vice versa. 
b) The SWF is iso-elastic. This is based on the argument that, given the property of 
concavity, a restriction of constant elasticity of utility implies that the rate of change 
in utility for a given percentage change in income (consumption) remains constant 
for all income levels. However, the iso-elasticity property may be seen as too 
restrictive where incomes diverge by a large margin, but this is an empirical matter 
(see below). 
An 'so-elastic utility function is given by 
(2.5) U =1 
1ý 
Y(1-e) 
which has the following properties. 
U increases with Y, 
MU declines with Y 
£ is, of course, the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income (consumption). 
If E>1, U is negative but becomes smaller in absolute value as Y increases, 
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if c<1, U is positive. 
Thus, we re-write (2.5) as 
(2.6) U= 
1-s 
so that U would be positive whatever the value of c except where E=1 
Differentiating (2.5) with respect to Y we obtain 
(2.7) MU = Y-E 
Equation (2.7) implies that MU declines as Y increases. 
However, if E=1, then equation (2.5) changes to 
(2,8) U= LnY 
which would mean that 
(2.9) MU = Y-1 
The rationale for the restriction of ! so-elasticity, i. e. the constancy of c, and hence the 
justification for equation (2.5) are provided by the Atkinson Inequality Index in which E is a 
parameter representing the societal weight attached to the inequality of income 
distribution, a high value of E indicating a greater weight attached to inequality (Atkinson 
1983). 
It is now easier to see why r is also called the inequality aversion parameter. It indicates 
the societal attitude to inequality. The Libertarians would assume that E=0, so the 
distributional issues would be ignored. The Rawlsian position, where the society is only 
concerned with the poorest group, would imply that E_-. 
The iso-elastic property of the SWF also reduces the necessity to rely on the cardinal 
concept of utility (Fellner 1967) since what matters in equation (2.5) is the level of average 
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income and the rate at which marginal utility varies when income level is altered. Thus a 
constant E implies that the rate at which marginal utility increases remains the same 
whether we shift a given percentage of income from the very rich to the not so rich or from 
the fairly well off to a poor person. Thus, all we need (and measure) then is a kind of 
cardinal index as opposed to the levels of utility. 
However, the assumption of iso-elasticity is more than just a mathematical convenience 
since there is also empirical support for the constancy of E (Blue and Tweeten 1997 and 
Evans 2005). 
A more detailed discussion on the concept of E involving the methods of estimation and 
the associated empirical evidence will be considered in Chapter 3. 
2.2.3 Regional welfare weights 
The economic rationale for attaching a greater weight to poor regions is based on the idea 
of diminishing marginal utility of income, which is one of the oldest theories in economics. 
Stigler (1972) argued that this concept has been seriously under-utilised despite its great 
potential in economic analysis. 
Let us assume 2 regions, A and B. From (2.7) above we have 
(2.10) MU,, = YA-6 and MUB = Y, 0-6 
where 
YA = per capita income or consumption in A, and 
Y8 = per capita income (consumption) in B. 
Then the welfare weights for the two regions are 
"_ Ya (2.11) WA =4M-U"=Y 
s 
MUe YB - 
(Y4) 
where 
Y= GDP per capita or per capita consumption 
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Equation (2.11) implies that the social welfare weight for a region depends not only on per 
capita income (consumption), but also on the value of £. 
It should be noted that there is the issue of intra-regional income distribution, which is 
assumed to be similar among the different regions. The validity of this assumption is a 
question of empirical verification, which would need to be investigated separately and we 
do so in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. It suffices to state here that intra-regional income 
differentials can be taken into account by using the concept of equally-distributed 
equivalent income (EDEl). This concept was introduced in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3 and 
will be further developed theoretically in Chapter 4, Section 3 and empirically in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3.2. 
There are two further issues which need to be addressed here. 
The first one concerns the suitability of income to represent the wellbeing of an individual. 
For example, some economists argue that per capita income is an inadequate measure of 
welfare and hence cannot be relied upon as reflecting welfare fully. There is a wide range 
of literature already developed discussing this issue which could be brought under the 
umbrella term of economics of happiness (See, for example, Boarini et al 2006, Deaton 
2008, Easterlin 1974, Easterlin 2003 and Layard 2005). The economics of happiness 
approach does not necessarily replace per capita income as an indicator of welfare but 
rather complements it with other factors such as social cohesion, inequality, health, job 
satisfaction, environmental harmony, etc. Studies indicate that people do get happier as 
their income level rises but only up to a point, and that there does not seem to be a one- 
to-one relationship between average income and average happiness even in the poor 
countries (Graham 2006). However, the earlier Easterlin (1974) study exposed a 
conundrum referred to as Easterlin paradox that is still to be resolved. The paradox is that 
within countries wealthier people are, on average, happier than the poorer ones but that 
this relationship does not seem to hold across countries or over time. Another point is that 
according to some people it is not the level of income but its distribution that matters. They 
argue that more equal societies are happier (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010). This is not surprising when considering the fact that many people would not feel 
very happy if they are surrounded by poverty even if themselves are well-off. This is also 
borne out by empirical studies regarding the value of the parameter of aversion to income 
inequality (see Section 3.3, Chapter 3). 
Nevertheless much research finds that income is still the most important factor 
determining happiness/utility. For example, Deaton (2008) refers to the findings of the 
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Gallup/World Poll of people in 150 countries which display a strong relationship between 
GDP per capita and several different measures of well-being. Similarly, Blue and Tweeten 
(1997) employ 28 single indicator variables to construct a quality of life index (QLI) to be 
used as a proxy for utility and then regress this QLI variable on a group of independent 
variables including income, health, age and education. They find that income, age and 
health have the greatest impact on the QLI. Interestingly, they found that QLI increases as 
income increases but at a decreasing rate, which is consistent with the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility of income. 
The second issue is the choice of relevant concept of income when comparing the welfare 
of different groups. Comparing incomes across different family or household types is 
made possible by use of an equivalence scale. There are several different equivalence 
scales employed in literature (DWP 2006) such as OECD Equivalence Scale also known 
as Oxford Scale (OECD 1982), OECD-modified scale (Hagenaars et al 1994), and Square 
Root Scale (OECD 2008). The process of adjusting the total household income for the 
size or some other attribute of the household is called 'equivalisation' and the adjusted 
income is called equivalised income. The latter reflects the fact that, for example, a 
household of four members would require higher income than a household of two, and 
hence enables us to make meaningful comparisons of welfare across households that 
vary in size and composition. The basic assumption here is that all members of the 
household derive equal benefits from the total equivalised income (Cowell & Gardiner 
1999 and HM Treasury 2003). 
2.3 The social discount rate: alternative approaches to 
its measurement 
In this section we will discuss the theoretical issues relating to the SDR and different 
approaches to its measurement. 
2.3.1 An overview 
A social discount rate (SDR) is the rate which renders the society indifferent between its 
current and future wellbeing. It reflects a society's relative valuation of the current welfare 
versus the future welfare. Thus, the determination of an appropriate social discount rate is 
crucially important for cost-benefit analysis. It also has significant implications for 
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resource allocation. If the SDR is too high, it could exclude the consideration of many 
socially desirable public projects, and if it is too low, it will allow for the possibility of 
financing economically inefficient investments (Zhuang at al 2007). 
Moreover, a relatively high SDR favours projects and policies with short-run benefits and 
long-run costs, e. g. nuclear power, and discriminates against projects with short-run costs 
and long-run benefits, such as policies regarding climatic change. In short, it favours the 
current generation at the expense of future generations. However, the extent of this bias 
in favour of the current generation is a matter of ethical value judgment (OXERA 2002). 
Thus, the SDR has an ethical as well as an economic dimension. 
The SDR is an important concept in CBA and is gaining increasing importance in the 
context of the evaluation of social projects. It has assumed particular importance recently 
in the distribution of Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund among the countries of the 
EU. Also several European countries have set an explicit discount rate based on the 
STPR approach such as France, Italy, Spain and the UK, (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 
and 1.2). 
As for Turkey, there appears to be a relative lack of coherent policy regarding the 
application of SDR in the evaluation of long term projects. The SDR normally varies 
according to the nature of the analysis regarding the project. For example, if the project is 
subject to 'commercial and financial analysis' the SDR would reflect the market interest 
rates despite their inadequacies in this context. On the other hand if, economic and social 
analysis is applied in the evaluation of the project, the SDR would be higher reflecting the 
arguments discussed in 2.3.2 below. However, SDR applied in Turkey would sometimes 
be based on the market rate of interest on time-deposits and at other times on the 
success of similar projects. It would also be varying according to the different cost 
components in the financing of the project (Ayano§lu, at al 1996). Let us assume that a 
public project is, for example, financed from three different sources, and that 40% comes 
from the consolidated budget, 20% from commercial credit and 40% the international 
capital market. Further assume that the rate of interest paid to the long term government 
bonds is 4%, the rate of interest for commercial borrowing is 10%, and the international 
rate of interest is 8%. The relevant SDR would be calculated as the sum of the weighted 
average of these three different cost elements. In this case, as the following calculation 
shows, the SDR is 6.8%. 
SDR = (0.4 x 0.04) + (0.2 x 0.10) + (0.4 x 0.08) = 6.8% 
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2.3.2 The theory on the social discount rate 
It is a long-established practice to discount costs and benefits over time at a given 
percentage per year. Discounting is a procedure used in CBA to estimate the present 
value of an outcome that is expected to occur in the future, such as the present value of a 
given level of consumption, output, or income that is to accrue in a given future period. 
Why the present values of these magnitudes should be different from their values 
expected to occur in future, i. e. the presence of a positive discount rate, is a somewhat 
philosophical but a highly controversial issue in economics which will be taken up in 
Section 2.3.5 where we examine the social time preference rate (STPR). We are mainly 
concerned here with the fact that investment projects involve future benefits and costs the 
present values of which involve discounting. 
For the private sector the discount rate is conventionally based on the cost of capital for 
the project in question. Apart from the minor controversies regarding the calculation of the 
cost of capital it has been a relatively uncontroversial area. However, the same could not 
be stated for the public sector. Controversies surrounding the theoretical basis for 
discounting public sector projects have been around for some time and given to much 
heated debate (Kula 1997). 
The problem of choosing an appropriate discount rate involves two separate questions. 
One is a conceptual question: what is the appropriate discount rate for public sector 
projects. The other is a practical one: how do we derive such a rate? The answers to the 
second question will be explored and evaluated Chapter 4, Section 4.2. Here we will 
concentrate on the issue of selecting a suitable SDR. 
The role of the SDR relates to the nature of the issue of discounting. Discounting can be 
considered from two different angles, one from the viewpoint of the consumer (saver) and 
the other from that of the producer (investor). The first one is that consumers prefer a 
given amount of consumption now to the same consumption level in the future; and there 
are two reasons for it. One is that consumers appear to have a positive pure time 
preference (which is discussed in Section 2.3.5 under utility discount rate), either because 
they have 'impatience' (or 'myopia') or because the future is uncertain, i. e. the risk of not 
surviving. The other reason why consumers prefer current consumption to future 
consumption is that incomes (consumption levels) are expected to be higher and hence 
the marginal utility to be lower in the future. Thus one unit of consumption now will be 
equal to more than one unit of consumption in the future (Zhuang et al 2007). Put 
differently, the consumer needs to be paid more than one unit in the future for the act of 
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sacrificing one unit of current consumption (saving). Consequently, the SDR looked at 
from the consumers' point of view will be equal to the marginal social time preference rate 
(STPR), which is also called the consumption rate of interest. In other words, the social 
time preference discount factor is the marginal rate of substitution between current and 
future consumption. 
The second consideration is that of the producer or investor. It is argued that since capital 
funds are not unlimited, there is an opportunity cost involved in each public investment in 
terms of foregone private investment (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972). Therefore, a public 
investment project should bring a return which is at least equal to the return which would 
be brought by the foregone private project (Baumol 1968). This return is the marginal 
social rate of return on private investment and is referred to as the social opportunity cost 
of capital (SOC) rate which is also called the investment rate of interest. 
If markets are perfect and Pareto optimality conditions prevail, these two rates will, of 
course, be the same. In fact, the prevailing rate would be equal to the market rate of 
interest which would be equal to the rate of return to savers [the private rate of substitution 
between consumption and savings] and the rate of return to investors [the rate of 
transformation for investment] (Young 2002). Thus, the SDR will act as an indicator of the 
social time preference rate, STPR, on the one hand and social opportunity cost (SOC) 
rate of discount on the other. 
However, imperfections, externalities, other market failures and government intervention 
such as a corporation tax, drive a wedge between these two rates. For example, if the 
reason for the imperfection is the presence of monopoly (or the corporation tax), the rate 
of return to the investment would include the economic rent earned by the monopolist (or 
the corporation tax to be paid by the investor), and thus the discount rate reflecting this 
would be different from the one that reflects the optimal choice of consumers between the 
current and future consumption. Under these circumstances it becomes necessary to 
decide which rate is the appropriate discount rate to evaluate the investment decision; a 
choice must be made between the STPR and the SOC. Most economists today would 
agree that in a world of mixed economy, market imperfections and multiple interest rates, 
looking for a single SDR as a measure of both the STPR and the SOC would be futile. 
According to Dasgupta and Pearce (1978), there is almost a consensus that the STPR will 
generally be lower than the SOC rate]; and yet a substantial amount of the CBA analysis 
is devoted to the search of a single SDR. 
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In the light of the preceding discussion one could state that there are at least three main 
approaches to public sector discounting. One is the market rates approach based on the 
assumption that markets are efficient and thus market outcomes are optimum, therefore 
the appropriate discount rate to be applied to public sector projects is the market rate of 
interest. There are two versions of this approach: one is the efficient market hypothesis 
and the other is the government borrowing rates. These are discussed in Section 2.3.3 
below. The other two approaches arise out of the discussion above and are based on the 
observation that market outcomes are not necessarily optimum outcomes; financial and 
other markets are riddled with externalities, failures and other forms of imperfection such 
as inadequate information, monopolies, and government interventions. Thus, the market 
rate of interest would be an inappropriate discount rate to be used for social projects and 
therefore an alternative discount rate must be calculated. One alternative to the market 
rate approach is the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) approach of which there are 
two versions (see Section 2.3.4) and the other is the social time preference rate (STPR). 
We explore and contrast all three approaches below. 
2.3.3 The market rate approach 
The basis of this approach is that public sector capital projects involve, like any other 
project, foregoing current consumption (saving and subsequently investment) to finance 
them in order to have a higher level of future consumption. Thus, the interest rate 
determined in the capital market is the appropriate discount rate (Kula 1997). There are, 
however, two versions of this approach. One is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and 
the other government borrowing rate. 
a) The efficient market hypothesis 
Many argue that the appropriate discount rate for government investment projects is the 
market rate of interest. In particular, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) school argues 
that financial markets provide the correct discount rate even for government projects; an 
argument which is based on the analysis of a model in financial economics widely known 
as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). According to this model the cost of capital for 
an asset comprises of two elements: a risk-free rate of return, e. g. the rate on government 
bonds, and a risk premium. The latter is equal to the difference between the expected 
market rate of return and the risk-free rate of return multiplied by a factor known as beta, 
ß. (Note that ß is simply the ratio of covariance between the asset and the expected 
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market returns to the variance of the expected market returns, that is, it reflects asset- 
specific sensitivity to non-diversifiable, i. e. market, risk). According to the model, any 
portfolio (consisting of different assets) is subject to two types of risk: the systematic or 
market risk which applies to all assets and which cannot be diversified; and the specific or 
diversifiable risk which is associated with individual assets in the portfolio (Howells and 
Bain 2007). 
The argument of the EMH school is that a government-financed project is the equivalent 
of a privately own asset, and the 'market risk' associated with this 'asset' is the variability 
of GDP fluctuations in an economy. Thus, the risk premium described above provides a 
measure for the social cost of the systematic risk of any government project (Spackman 
2004 and 2007). The argument of the EMH approach has, however, been criticised on 
several grounds. First of all, the several of the assumptions on which the CAPM is based, 
such as that asset returns are normally distributed random variables; that financial 
markets make efficient use of all the available information and therefore reflect true cost of 
financing projects; and that all investors have access to the same information and agree 
about the risk and expected return of all assets (homogeneous expectations assumption) 
are strongly challenged. For example, large swings do occur in the financial markets so as 
to violate the assumption of normally distributed returns (Russell and Torbey 2000). 
Moreover, financial markets crash every now and then followed by instability and chaos 
before normality is restored. For example, the financial crisis of 2007/08 may have caused 
doubts regarding the hypothesis that all participants have appropriate information and 
they value asset prices correctly. 
b) Government borrowing rate 
Some of those who go for the market rate argue that the appropriate discount rate for 
government projects is the government bond rate (see, for example, HM Treasury 1973 
and Lind 1990). One reason for this is the fact that public sector projects are, it is argued, 
virtually risk free and therefore what is needed is a risk-free interest rate. It is true that 
some of these projects would have returns less than anticipated and some might even fail 
altogether, but others might exceed expectations and thus on average these projects will 
be 'successful'. Besides, even the not-so-successful projects might be 'saved' by rescue 
packages. 
However, this argument is subject to several criticisms. One issue here is: which 
government bond rate, the long-term bond rate or the short-term one? Moreover, 
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government bonds are also subject to the capricious behaviour of the capital markets and 
hence are not entirely risk-free (Kula 1997). The counter-argument to this criticism is that, 
from the point of view of the government, it is risk free in the sense that it just pays the 
rate of interest, and that is the end of it. What happens to the bond is not relevant. 
A rationale for using the government-bond rate is that it represents the cost of capital used 
in financing the public sector projects (Somers 1971). The objection to this argument is 
that not all public sector projects are financed by borrowing; some would be financed out 
of taxation. 
Another criticism of using the government bond rate as the discount rate is that it is also 
subject to market imperfections. In fact, as a significant borrower, the government itself 
would distort the market rate of interest when it borrows substantial quantities as 
suggested by the loanable funds theory. 
Despite the criticisms above the government bond rate has been used in the evaluation of 
government projects in the US in the past and Germany has, in recent times, used the 
average real long term bond rate as its official social discount rate (see Kula 1997, Preez 
2004 and Spackman 2008) 
c) Criticism of the market rate approach 
A more general criticism of the argument that the private rate of return should be used to 
evaluate public sector projects is that private cost ignores externalities such as pollution 
and congestion and also that the private rate of return may be artificially high due to 
imperfections in the market such as monopolies and oligopolies (Kula 2006). 
Moreover, even if it were possible to find the private rate of return arising out of perfect 
market interaction, it would only be measuring the private productivity of the investment 
schedule, whereas what is needed is a rate that would measure the social productivity of 
capital. Investment increases the productivity of all factors of production including labour 
and hence raises the return to it, is. wages. This is an Increase in costs to the private 
investor who estimates her rate of return net of payments to other factors, but from the 
society's point of view an increase in factor incomes should be regarded as a gain. 
Therefore, the social rate of return on an investment project, that is to say, the reciprocal 
of the marginal capital-output ratio is likely to be much greater than the private marginal 
productivity of capital (Feldstein 1964b). In fact, in countries with chronic unemployment 
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such as a typical developing economy, the opportunity cost of labour will be zero, 
particularly of the unskilled labour. Thus, the only cost associated with any increase in 
output as a result of public sector investment would be that of capital. This would make 
the capital-output ratio appropriate for public investment much lower. 
Furthermore, even if markets were perfect, one might wish, for public sector investment, 
to replace the evaluation of future consumption based on market-determined criteria by a 
politically determined social time preference function. Additionally, it has been shown that 
individuals are likely to express a different time preference rate in the context of collective 
saving-consumption decisions from the rate that they would choose in the context of 
unilateral decisions (See, for example, Feldstein 1964a, Marglin 1963a and Sen 1961 and 
1967). This phenomenon is known in the literature as the 'isolation paradox'. That is, 
individuals' saving rates might be higher than the saving rate that they would choose in 
isolation, if they knew that other members of the society would also save for future 
generations. This means that a government can, based on such an argument, justify the 
use of a SDR that is lower than the long-term market rate of interest on retail savings. 
2.3.4 The social opportunity cost (SOC) approach: 
As stated above, ther are are two versions of the SOC approach to the social discount 
rate for public sector projects. One is to take the weighted average of SOC and STPR and 
apply this as the SDR. The other is a more sophisticated version of using the STPR but 
applying shadow prices to public investment (Eckstein 1958 and 1961, Feldstein 1964b, 
Marglin 1963b and Spackman 2007 and 2008). We will first explore and evaluate these 
two versions of SOC approach to discounting before we consider the STPR approach. 
a) SOC/STPR weighted discount rate 
A simpler version of the SOC approach uses either a social opportunity cost discount rate 
or a weighted average of SOC rate and STPR. Several economists, Including, among 
others, Baumol (1968), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Feldstein (1964b), Marglin (1963a), 
and Mishan (1967), have suggested the use of the marginal social opportunity cost of 
capital as the SDR. The underlying principle governing the SOC approach is that 
resources in any economy are scarce, therefore any public investment has an opportunity 
cost in terms of the returns which would be earned by the private investment it replaces. 
Thus the discount rate should reflect the economic (social) opportunity cost of capital. 
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Marglin (1963b), for example, argues that the appropriate basis for comparisons between 
public and private investment that compete for scarce resources is the present value of 
their net benefits to society discounted at the marginal social rate of discount since it 
reflects the community's marginal weight on consumption at different times. According to 
Dasgupta and Pearce (1978), even if there was no direct competition between public and 
private projects it is still possible to regard the government to compete with the private 
sector in the capital market for funds in which case the public investment must yield as 
least the same return as that of its alternative in the private sector. Similarly, Potts (2002) 
states that the SOC approach is based on the implicit assumption that the use of 
investment funds for any one project removes the possibility of using these funds for any 
other project. However, he argues that the economic opportunity cost of capital should be 
based on shadow prices and suggests that it can be obtained in four different ways. One 
way is to consider the successful projects in the recent past and obtain a range of 
economic internal rate of return values which would provide a reasonable indication of the 
possible range for future projects. Another is the estimation of the value added that can be 
attributed to capital by using macroeconomic data, which is discussed below. A third way 
is the use of the real cost of borrowing in the international capital markets as the 
opportunity cost of capital, provided that the country is able to borrow on commercial 
markets. Finally, it is possible to use the trial and error method by selecting an initial figure 
for the discount rate, e. g. 10%, and then adjusting this figure in the light of experience. 
Assuming that public investment replaces private investment, then the SOC rate would be 
used as the SDR and the calculation of the SOC rate would be relatively easy since the 
appropriate discount rate would be equal to the marginal internal rate of return to the 
foregone investment (Dasgupta and Pearce 1978). It is also suggested that the SOC rate 
could be based on the marginal rate of return on riskless private investments before tax; 
and this could be approximated by the real pre-tax rate on top-rated corporate bonds 
(Zhuang 2007) 
However, we cannot a priori assume that public sector projects replace only private sector 
projects. It is possible that public sector investment is wholly or partly funded by a 
reduction in private sector consumption rather than private sector investment (Eckstein 
1961, Marglin 1963b and Feldstein 1964a). If it is the former, then the source of finance 
for public investment is taxation in which case the appropriate discount rate would be the 
STPR. However, if public investment is funded partly by a reduction in private 
consumption and partly by a reduction in private investment, then a weighted average of 
the STPR and the SOC rate would be used as the SDR. In that case the SOC rate will, 
according to some, be equal to the weighted average of pre-tax return to reflect the cost of 
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displaced investment; post-tax return to reflect the opportunity cost of foregone 
consumption; and the marginal cost of foreign borrowing on the international capital 
markets to reflect the cost of external financing (see, for example, Burgess and Zerbe 
2011, Harberger 1969, Sandmo and Dreze 1971, Sjaastad and Wisecarver 1977). The 
weights would be the proportions of these three elements, namely the displaced private 
investment, postponed private consumption and the relative importance of foreign finance 
in the total cost of the project. Similarly, Marglin (1963b) expresses the SOC of public 
investment as a function of the displaced private investment, reinvestment and yield rates; 
and Feldstein (1 964b) argues that the SOC of any public investment must reflect both the 
direct and indirect effects and thus states that the SOC is equal to the discounted (at the 
social time preference rate) value of the consumption stream that is foregone. 
The common element of these suggestions is the possibility of reinvestment. The idea 
here is that the private investment that is displaced would have generated an income 
stream which would have been partly consumed and partly invested. This new investment 
would also been partly consumed and partly invested, and so on. The end-result of this 
process would have been an aggregated consumption stream over time. Therefore, any 
measurement of the SOC of any public investment should include the present value of the 
consumption stream that would have been generated by the private investment it 
displaces. However, distinguishing between foregone investment and foregone 
consumption is regarded as slightly odd by some since the foregone consumption could 
have been invested which would have change the calculation of the SOC (see, for 
example, Mishan 1967 and Dasgupta and Pearce 1978). 
Ignoring the reinvestment issue would lead to overdiscounting of project benefits which 
will get worse the further in the future the benefits occur. Thus, the weighted average 
approach could be biased against projects with long-term benefits (Zhuang 2007). 
Another criticism of the weighted average approach is that the SOC approach Is based on 
rather restrictive assumptions. Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen (1972) note that the argument 
for using SOC as the social discount rate is based on a two-period model where the total 
amount of capital available for investment is fixed independently of project choice in the 
public sector. In this case, the public investment crowds out private investment and the 
marginal rate of return on private investment (inclusive of taxes) provides an adequate 
measure of SOC. But when either assumption (two-period model or fixed amount of 
capital) is dropped, the argument would not hold anymore. If capital needed for financing 
public projects is partially satisfied by consumers postponing their current consumption, 
the return required by consumers usually is less than the marginal rate of return on private 
investment; hence, the social discount rate should be lower than SOC. 
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There are also empirical difficulties involved in the estimation of the weighted average of 
the SOC rate. Not only the rates of return from each source of finance must be estimated 
but also the relative importance of each source of funding must be determined. The 
opportunity cost of displaced investment could be approximated, as was suggested 
above, by the pre-tax rate of return to private capital and this could be obtained from 
National Accounts data as the ratio of the total income accruing to capital divided by the 
stock of capital. One advantage of this would be low level of volatility compared with 
financial rates of return (Burgess and Zerbe 2011). However, using macroeconomic data 
also has its problems since the estimates for the opportunity cost of capital would tend to 
be overestimates and hence would be highly unreliable (Potts 2002). For example, the 
return to capital would need to be estimated as the residual value added after the value 
added for labour and other inputs is estimated by use of shadow prices. In this method all 
technical progress is assigned as a return to capital and therefore tends to exaggerate the 
return to capital. Also any estimate obtained this way would be an average figure and thus 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital since the latter is a marginal concept. Finally, 
historic cost data on the value of the capital stock understate its value and thus the return 
to it would be overestimated. 
b) Shadow pricing 
A more sophisticated version of the SOC approach involves shadow pricing. The need for 
shadow-pricing public investment is that private investment is 'crowded out' by public 
investment but the opportunity cost of public investment cannot be measured by the 
market price. Shadow prices are prices that reflect the opportunity cost of resources and 
thus they measure the economic cost or benefit of inputs and outputs (Potts 2002). They 
are sometimes called economic prices and sometimes accounting prices. Feldstein 
argues that shadow pricing is necessitated by the fact that markets are not perfect and 
consequently it is not possible to apply a single rate of interest that would fully reflect the 
SOC of public funds. "The S. O. C. depends on the source of particular funds and must 
also itself reflect the S. T. P. function. It is best therefore to allow for the S. O. C. of funds 
directly by placing a 'shadow price' on the funds used in the project and to make all 
intertemporal comparisons with an S. T. P. rate or function" (Feldstein 1964a, p 362, ). [For 
the development of this idea see Feldstein 1963b, Eckstein 1958 and 1961, and Marglin 
1963a]. According to this version, the relevant discount rate for long term public projects is 
the STPR but an appropriate shadow price must be attached to public investment. Thus, 
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the shadow price would be equal to the STPR-discounted present value of the benefits 
arising from a unit of private investment (Spackman 2007 and Felstein 1965). 
Two of the most discussed methods of estimating the shadow price of benefits and costs 
that enter the calculation of the net present value are UNIDO (1972 and 1980) Guidelines 
and the OECD Manual (see Little and Mirrlees 1969 and 1974). Both methods involve 
industrial projects in a developing country whose main national objective is the 
maximisation of aggregate consumption benefits. Both methods recommend the use of 
shadow prices to calculate the net present value on the assumption that the saving rate is 
sub-optimal and that the optimal rate of savings cannot be achieved by fiscal measures 
and therefore must be addressed at the project level. However, the UNIDO Guidelines 
uses consumption as the unit of measurement discounted by the social rate of discount 
whereas the OECD Manual uses investment (expressed in free foreign exchange units) 
as the unit of measurement and thus applies the accounting rate of interest for 
discounting. Thus, the Guidelines revalues investment in terms of consumption using a 
shadow price for investment, whereas the Manual revalues consumption (by unskilled 
labour) in terms of investment using a shadow price for consumption. In other words, the 
UNIDO approach discounts aggregate net benefits in terms of consumption while the 
OECD approach discounts net benefits expressed In terms of investible resources. 
The UNIDO approach divides the components of a project into three broad categories, 
namely direct present benefits (consumer goods, producer goods and foreign exchange), 
direct present costs (producer goods and foreign exchange) and indirect future benefits 
and costs, e. g. unskilled labour. All items are valued in terms of present aggregate 
consumption measured at shadow prices. Some of these shadow prices, e. g. unskilled 
labour, foreign exchange and investment, are given by the government. For a given 
project the algebraic sum of the present values of the direct and indirect benefits and 
costs for the years of Its lifetime yields the present value of the net aggregate 
consumption benefits. If it is positive, the project is accepted, if it is negative, the project is 
rejected. 
A particularly interesting point here is the valuation of indirect benefits and costs. Due to 
the assumption of sub-optimal aggreagate national savings, the shadow price of 
investment exceeds unity, i. e. the social rate of discount is judged to be less than the 
social rate of return to investment. This implies that, if there is an increase in saving 
(investment) by one unit at the expense of a decrease in consumption by one unit, the 
society gains. Therefore, the higher the proportion of the net benefits (of a project) that are 
reinvested, the higher the value of that project to the society. 
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The OECD approach also divides the components of a project into three broad 
categories, i. e. the traded goods and services, non-traded goods and services and 
unskilled labour. The shadow prices for the first category take into account the full impact 
of exports and imports in terms of foreign exchange. That is, they are valued at world 
prices. The shadow prices for the category of non-traded goods are estimated by 
calculating the marginal social cost of these goods by using the shadow prices of the 
inputs involved in the production of these goods and then treating these marginal social 
costs as the shadow prices of these goods. That is, they are valued in terms of their 
contribution to earning or saving foreign exchange. The shadow price of unskilled labour 
depends on labour's opportunity cost (the shadow price of the agricultural output forgone), 
the industrial wage rate, and the shadow price of investment. [Incidently, the shadow price 
of unskilled labour in the UNIDO approach is calculated in exactly the same way]. For a 
given project the algebraic sum of the social value of the inputs and outputs for the years 
of its lifetime is the total social profit (or loss) of that project. If a project yields social profit, 
it is recommended, and if it yields social loss, it is rejected. 
It should, however, be noted that reinvestment is also an important aspect of the OECD 
approach. Since projects concerned are in the public sector, all social profit is assumed to 
be reinvested. In fact, any part of the social profits that is consumed is treated as a cost. 
Although the two approaches use different procedures and apply different rates for 
discounting and therefore might come up with different recommendations with respect to 
projects, they do, in fact, converge in terms of the issue of reinvestment. The UNIDO 
approach penalises projects to the extent that a project uses resources which would 
otherwise have been invested and credits projects to the extent of the reinvestment of net 
benefits. Similarly, the OECD approach uses investment as unit of measurement and 
penalises a project to the extent that it commits the economy to consumption. Both 
approaches, however, penalise project that encourage employment and hence 
consumption due to the way the shadow price, of unskilled labour is estimated. 
c) The criticism of the SOC approach 
Whichever version of the SOC approach is considered, there are some difficult issues 
surrounding this approach. Firstly, there is a degree of arbitrariness involved in the 
calculation of shadow prices since the quantification of externalities and merit and demerit 
goods is far from being precise. The same applies to the quantification of some inputs 
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such as skilled labour and capital. Also, shadow pricing presents difficulty at the practical 
level. While discounting has long been routinely accepted in the public sector, an 
investment shadow price is regarded as an extra unfamiliar complication. (Spackman 
2004). In the application of the SOC approach, the implicit assumption is that the SOC 
rate, which is taken to be above the STPR, could be compounded indefinitely into the 
future. However, indefinite compounding is not possible at a rate that is above the growth 
rate of the economy, and the economy's growth rate is normally less than the currently 
acceptable STPR for the UK and the EU. Moreover, the crowding out argument does not 
hold in a world of international capital mobility since public and private projects would not 
be competing with each other for limited funds. An additional criticism relates to the 
application of the concept of risk premium in the estimation of the social opportunity cost. 
Opportunity cost is the cost of the next best alternative and thus is applied to benefits. 
However, the risk premium in private investment returns is a cost not a benefit and 
foregoing of a cost does not incur a positive opportunity cost (Arrow and Lind 1970). 
Nevertheless, the risk premium is usually treated as an opportunity cost in the public 
sector discount rate literature. A possible rationale for this could be the assumption that 
public investment is subject to the same risk of variability as equity financing. Under such 
an assumption, it would be correct to take into account the risk factor but the cost would 
not be an opportunity cost (Spackman 2004, Appendix B). 
Despite all these criticisms, the SOC approach has an intuitive appeal especially for the 
public sector bureaucrats. It was influential in the determination of the SDR in the UK until 
the late 1980s and is still influential in several countries and international institutions. For 
example the US Ofice of Management and Budget (OMB) applies a kind of SOC 
approach. The OMB issues discount rates for federal programmes in Circular A-94, 
Appedix C. These rates are based on cost effectiveness rate equal to Federal borrowing 
rate. Until recently this rate was 7% but has been reduced to 2.3% for programmes with 
duration longer than 30 years by a revision to Circular A-94 Appedix C in December 2010. 
In Australia, most State government Treasury departments publish a prescribed real 
discount rate based on the cost of capital rate to reflect true opportunity cost of capital and 
to ensure an efficient use of resources in project/proposal evaluation. The New South 
Wales Treasury currently directs that a 7% real discount rate be used in CBA while the 
Victorian Government advises the use of a 6% real rate (NSW Treasury 2007). The Office 
of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) in its publication, the Best Practice Regulation 
Handbook, suggests the use of an annual real discount rate of 7% (Australia Government 
2007). The New Zealand government formally applies 10% as a standard rate based on 
private sector comparators although It accepts STPR 'in principle'. Canada uses 10% rate 
based on the SOC approach. Some Asian countries such as India (12%), Pakistan (12%) 
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and Philippines (15%) also use SOC-based discount rates (Zhuang et al 2007). The World 
Bank's approach to discounting, however, is based on the weighted average method (Belli 
et a/ 1998), while the UN suggests that the rate be based on the SOC approach 
(Spackman 2007). The approach adopted by the Asian Development Bank (1997) also 
follows the World Bank approach of a weighted average of the SOC and STPR. 
2.3.5 The social time preference rate (STPR) 
The STPR is the rate at which the society is prepared to substitute future consumption for 
present consumption. For that reason it is also called the consumption rate of interest. In 
a two-period analysis this rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption 
at any point on a given societal indifference curve. 
1) The derivation of the STPR 
The equation for the STPR, based on Ramsey (1928) is given by 
(2.12) r=p+e. g 
where 
r= STPR 
p= the utility discount rate 
e= elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
g= average growth of per capita real consumption 
It is possible to demonstrate that in a two-period model this rate is equal, as stated above, 
to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption at any point on a given societal 
indifference curve relating to the time periods t and W. 
The assumptions of the model are as follows. 
a) The society aims to maximise utility from consumption over the two periods, Co and C,, 
subject to current income Yo and expected future income Y1. 
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b) In each time period, consumption is subject to diminishing marginal utility and 
therefore the marginal rate of substitution between Co and C, changes as the 
combination of possible consumption levels in the two periods, consistent with a given 
level of utility, changes. So, the inter-temporal consumption indifference curves are 
convex to the origin, just like ordinary a-temporal indifference curves. If the utility 
discount rate were zero, i. e. p=0, then 
(2.13) MRS =I dC 0 
MUCO MRS=-1 where Co=C, MULI 
c) The society can save or borrow, subject only to income capacity, at the same 
proportional real rate of interest (r) in order to achieve its optimal consumption levels 
for the two time periods. Income is assumed to be the only resource available for 
consumption. The maximum possible consumption in period 0 is 
(2.14) Yo+1+r 
and the maximum possible consumption in period I is 
(2.15) Y, +Yo(I1+r) 
Joining these two points on an indifference curve diagram gives the relevant budget 
constraint with the slope of the budget line equal to -(1+r). 
Mathematically, the budget constraint can be expressed in terms of the present value of 
expected lifetime income, YL. In our simple two-period model this constraint is 
(2.16) YL =Yo+1+r 
So, the society will aim to maximise utility with a present value consumption combination 
CL that matches YL. This can be expressed as 
(2.17) CL = Co + 
Cl 
1+r 
A suitably simple inter-temporal consumption-utility function can be written as follows: 
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(2.18) UC=° 
where 
U= the total utility obtained from total consumption over the two periods 
Co = current consumption 
C, = future consumption 
and p and E as defined above. 
Equation (2.18) directly follows from equations (2.5) and (2.6) whose properties were 
discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
Optimisation of 'lifetime' consumption behaviour would require the maximisation of U in 
equation (2.18) subject to the present value budget constraint expressed in equation 
(2.19) below: 
(2.19) Yo+ Y =Co+ 
C 
1+r 1+r 
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) can be combined into a single Lagrangian function U* for the 
purpose of using a relatively simple mathematical approach to determine the optimal 
consumption conditions. The derived equations for optimal 'lifetime' consumption 
behaviour can then be used to calculate Co and C, for different income levels, Y, different 
rates of pure time preference, p, and different values of r. Thus 
(2.20) U- 
}_e+ 
+. i, Yo+- - Co+- " 1-s(1-s)(1+pý C l+r) 
( 
1+ýr)] 
Differentiating U" with respect to Co, C, and A and setting each of the partial derivatives to 
zero we can determine the utility-maximising conditions: 
(2.21) =Co E-ý. =0 . dC 0 
(2.22) dU = 
cl-' 0 
dC, l+p 1+r 
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(2.23) 
d. t -(Y°+l+r)-ýCO+l+l r)=0 
From equations (2.21) and (2.22) we have the following optimisation conditions for inter- 
temporal consumption: 
(2.24) MUco = 
Pco 
MUc, "Cl 
That is, dividing equation (2.21) by equation (2.22) 
. dU 
ýr r -e (2.25) / ý",. 0 = `"° = (1 + r) dU ( C, -E 1 
C, 1+, 0) 
It is more convenient to express equation (2.25) as follows: 
(2 26) Cl 
f +(Co1+p 
By definition, C, = Co (1+ g) and therefore (Cl / Co) in equation (2.26) can be replaced by 
the term (1+g). In our model, this gives the following relationship between r, p and g. 
(2.27) (1+g)E = 
1+r 
l+p 
Therefore, 
(2.28) (1+r)=(1+p)(1+g)e 
Taking natural logs we have, 
(2.29) Ln(1+r)=Ln(1+p)+e. Ln(1+g) 
s 1 r 
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By making use of the approximation rule Ln (1 + X) =X where X is a small number, we 
obtain 
(2.30) r= p+e. g 
where r is the STPR, which gives the same equation as in (2.12) 
2) Components of the social times preference rate (STPR) 
As can be seen from equation (2.30), the STPR consists of three elements. The utility 
discount rate, p, reflects individuals' (society's) inter-temporal preferences when the real 
per capita consumption is constant, i. e. the growth rate of consumption, (g) is zero, over 
the discounting period. If, however, g is positive, then future consumption exceeds current 
consumption, which implies that the marginal utility of consumption is declining. This is 
reflected in the term (E. g), where E is the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to consumption., 
In the following sections we will explore the issues related to the use of the STPR as the 
discount rate for public sector projects. 
a) The utility discount rate (p) 
The term p in equation (2.30) is supposed to reflect a preference of what Is available now 
over what is promised in future. It measures the rate at which society discounts future 
(marginal) utility, thus it indicates the extent to which society prefers current to future utility 
(Spackman 2007). Time preference has, however, caused much controversy among 
economists (see for example, Arrow 1995, Evans 2004, Harrod 1948, Kula 1984 and 
1985, OXERA 2002, Pearce and Uiph 1999, Potts 2002, and Ramsey 1928) mainly 
because there are no empirical studies to inform us what it might be due to its subjective 
nature (Spackman 2004). It has also been a source of confusion in the literature since it is 
not always absolutely clear whether p refers to the pure time preference rate or the 
catastrophe rate (see below). 
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Discounting the future has an ethical dimension since it involves the present generation 
making decisions affecting future generations. Thus, there is a wide ranging debate on 
this which is explored below. However, first we will clarify the relevant concepts in order to 
avoid possible confusion. 
The term p in equation (2.30) is called the utility discount rate which itself consists of two 
elements. One is the pure time preference rate, b and the other is the rate of decrease in 
life chances, L. Thus we have 
(2.31) p=S+L 
Then equation (2.30) becomes 
(2.32) r=(S+L)+s. g 
Confusingly, the term 'the pure time discount rate' is sometimes used to represent only Ö 
and at other times both ö and L! Thus, sometimes we are not sure which one of these two 
possibilities is being discussed. 
Before exploring the arguments for and against discounting the future, we must first say 
something about L representing 'life chances'. 
`Life chances, L 
Several studies accept the argument for a zero pure time preference rate, ö, but still 
derive a positive rate for p on the basis of individual risk of death (see, for example, Azar 
2008, Evans 2007, Evans and Sezer 2002, Kula 2004, Lopez 2008 and Percoco 2008). 
Mortality-based measures of L, using average death rates, have been estimated for 
various countries (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). However, the rationale for mortality 
based estimates of L has been criticised by Spackman (2004) arguing that the assumption 
of 100% altruism on the part of people would render individual mortality irrelevant while 
the assumption of zero altruism is plainly unrealistic since people do care, to some extent, 
about future generations. There is also the issue of individual versus societal life chances 
(catastrophe risk). The term 'life chances' makes sense In the case of an individual: it 
reflects the risk of death whatever the method of measurement. It is not, however, all that 
easy to define life chances for a whole society. If one assumes that society is nothing but 
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the sum of its individuals, then the average death rate (the number of deaths divided by 
the population figure) may represent life chances of an average person; or alternatively, 
this would reflect, over a longer period, the average annual survival probability. However, 
societies are not mortal in the sense that individuals are, and therefore life chances for a 
society would be different from the simple aggregation of the risk of death for its 
individuals. 
A more relevant concept of life chances relates to the concept of catastrophe risk. It can 
be defined as the risk that future generations may not be able to enjoy the returns of the 
intended investment due to natural or man-made disasters such as a war, a nuclear 
disaster, a major and devastating earthquake, etc. However, a distinction must be made 
between a local disaster such as an earthquake which would result in the destruction of 
local capital and a global disaster such as a nuclear war which might eliminate the human 
race. In the former case the catastrophe risk would be much higher. Although some 
studies attempt to quantify the catastrophe risk and use it to represent life chances (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1) it must be stated that all the figures relating to catastrophe rate 
are rather arbitrary since it is not possible to determine the value of the catastrophe rate 
from actual observations. However, since catastrophe risk is an additional risk over and 
above normal loss of human life and relates to the probability of the destruction of capital 
which can be considered as non-insurable risk, it should be regarded as a wider measure 
than life chances based on mortality rates. 
The pure time preference rate, 6 
The other element of the utility discount rate (p) is the pure time preference rate, b, (see 
equation 2.31). However, utility discount rate (the time preference rate), p, and the pure 
time preference rate, b, are sometimes confusingly used interchangeably. This is due to 
the fact that some studies ( see, for example, Azar 2008, Evans 2007, Evans and Sezer 
2002, Kula 2004, Lopez 2008 and Percoco 2008) ignore life chances in which case the 
two terms in question become synonymous, that is, in equation (2.31) p becomes equal to 
ö. Thus, some of the arguments for or against discounting the future are made with 
reference to p meaning b. It should also be stated that much of the controversy regarding 
the pure time preference rate (S) revolves around the issue of intergenerational equity. In 
this context, if it is considered ethically indefensible to weight the welfare of different 
generations unequally, then p=0. However, allowing for catastrophe risk, then 
discounting the future is still justified. 
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Arguments for zero time preference (utility discount) rate (p) 
One of the oldest arguments for zero-time preference rate is that a positive time 
preference rate is not rational, nor is it ethical for a government to discount the future on 
the basis of present marginal utility of individuals. What is argued here is that the pure 
time preference rate (3) is zero by stating that it might be perfectly rational for an 
individual to discount her future utility but it is not legitimate to discount across generations 
since it means discounting someone else's utility (Broome 1992, Harrod 1948, O'Neill 
1993, Parfit 1984, Pigou 1932, Price 1989 and 1993, and Ramsey 1928). In other words, 
intra-generational discounting is allowed but intergenerational discounting is not. 
This type of objection to positive discounting finds its expression in the 'no waiting' 
argument. Although an individual might prefer a bar of chocolate now to a bar of chocolate 
at some future date, an individual born in the future would have no such problem. In other 
words individuals have no time preference before they are born since they do not have to 
wait before they receive the benefit. A variation on this theme is the 'impartiality' argument 
which states that the utilitarian approach to discounting requires 'impartiality' which means 
that there should be no discrimination not only between different commodities but also 
between different time periods (Broome 1992). 
Another argument against a positive time preference rate arises out of the consideration 
that the intergenerational discount rate is not an exogenous variable. That is, a discount 
rate that optimises the distribution of consumption between generations is a function of 
the intergenerational resource allocation. Therefore the interest rate which is supposed to 
optimise intergenerational consumption patterns under Pareto conditions is Itself 
determined by the intergenerational allocation patterns (Norgaard and Howarth 1991). 
The argument certainly has some validity in the sense that it points out to the erroneous 
assumption that well-functioning markets will achieve both an efficient and optimal 
outcome. The efficiency might be achieved by perfectly competitive markets but there 
would be an optimal outcome (discount rate) for each given resource allocation. However, 
the social time preference rate of discount is not so much about optimal market outcomes 
as it is about providing the social planner with a criterion - and more desirably a set of 
alternative criteria- to be applied in the selection of long term social projects. 
A further argument for zero discounting is that although it might be possible to discount 
commodities and hence utility, it is not possible to discount wellbeing, partioularly if it 
remains constant over time (Broome 1992). The argument is that some natural resources, 
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such as a fishery, can change their value over time by increasing in quantity (size), but 
others such as a rain forest or ocean view, do not change through time and therefore have 
a zero own interest rate. As a rule, if something generates constant wellbeing it should not 
be discounted. As a proponent of zero discounting Price (1993) states that the use of a 
uniform negative exponential function to discount future goods, resources, and 
experiences cannot be justified. He argues that increasing the quantity of one product or a 
resource does not necessarily mean an improvement in all aspects of wellbeing and 
therefore trade-offs between products cannot be made at constant marginal rate of 
substitution or transformation. He also states that the most frequent used argument for 
discounting is the concept of diminishing marginal utility of income. He concedes that this 
is a very important concept in economics but argues that diminishing marginal utility is 
only an argument for marginal effects, whereas most important effects are intra-marginal. 
In fact, Price (ibid) is firmly against discounting future arguing that discounting is based on 
mistaken premises and its underlying logic is misconceived. He concedes that discounting 
is a practical reality but urges us to be rational and altruistic so that we can pass all the 
good thing we have today . to 
future generations. However, in a later publication (Price 
2008) he argues that there should be a separate discount rate applied for environmental 
projects (see the section on dual discounting below). 
Arguments for a positive time preference (utility discount) rate (p) 
There are many economists who argue that there is nothing irrational or unethical about a 
positive time preference rate (see, for example, Arrow 1995, Bohm-Bawerk 1888, 
Eckstein 1961, Fisher 1930, Koopmans 1960, Kula 1985, Nordhaus 2007, Parflt 1971 and 
Stem 1977). For example, Bohm-Bawerk (1888, V. 1.16) argues that "As a rule present 
goods have a higher subjective value than future goods of like kind and number. " This 
implies that there is diminishing marginal utility to consumption in an intertemporal 
context. He further argues that we feel less concerned about future joy or sorrow than 
about the present joy or sorrow and that our concern diminishes with the remoteness of 
that future. This in turn implies a positive rate of pure time preference. Similarly, Arrow 
(1995) argues that a generation will maximise, in line with agent-relative ethics, the sum of 
its own utility and the sum of utilities of all future generations but weighting the former 
more heavily than the latter. However, each generation is Its own agent and thus 
successive generations will do the same. This implies that the pure time preference rate in 
an intergenerational context will be positive. Parfit (1971) argues that even if we put 
ourselves in place of future generations we would still consider our future selves less 
importantly than our present selves, which implies a positive pure time preference rate. 
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Moreover, objecting to discounting the future amounts to ignoring the main function of a 
positive time preference rate. Let us assume that the future generation, A, has the same 
utility function for a given level of income as the current generation, B, but is richer due to 
technical progress which also reduces prices. Thus, B is poorer but faces a higher set of 
prices so that an addition of £1 to its income would create less extra utility (since it would 
buy fewer goods) than it would if it were added to A's income. In this situation the 
utilitarian approach would dictate that the extra income be given to A rather than B, so that 
the total utility would be maximised. This, however, would be clearly against any equity 
considerations since it would involve shifting resources from the poorer current generation 
to the richer future generation. The principle of inequality aversion would require some 
sort of correction which is arguably provided by time preference discounting (OXERA 
2002). 
A somewhat pragmatic but compelling argument against the zero-time preference rate is 
that it has an absurd implication regarding saving and investment behaviour (see Arrow 
1995, Hayek 1936, Koopmans 1960, Ramsey 1928). The higher the discount rate, the 
less future consumption matters. Thus lowering of the discount rate implies that each 
future generation matters more than the one preceding it, which implies that more and 
more saving and investment should be undertaken by the current generation. The logical 
extension of this is that current generation should keep its consumption at the subsistence 
level and save and invest as much as possible (Lopez 2008 and Olsen and Bailey 1981). 
Moreover, this would apply to each successive generation, thus leading to the 
impoverishment of successive generations! However, it should be borne in mind that 
positive discounting also allows for an absurd possibility of future generations being worse 
off than the current one (see, for example, Olsen and Bailey 1981, OXERA 2002, 
Spackman 2004, Evans 2008). 
Finally, one could argue that zero discount rate does not realistically reflect the 
preferences of the present generation which might have genuine concern for the future. 
Both Eckstein (1957) and Marglin (1963a) make this point arguing that a social welfare 
function determined by a democratically elected government would reflect people's tastes 
including their intertemporal preferences. 
Discounting for the very long term 
This study is primarily concerned with the evaluation long term public projects which 
would normally have a time horizon of 20-30 years. Thus, issues relating to discounting 
56 
for the very long term are outside the domain of this study. However, it is felt that a brief 
discussion on the subject would complement and shed further light on the arguments 
presented in the previous section. 
The mechanistic way of applying a social discount rate to government projects is to 
multiply future values (benefits and costs) by a discount factor that is derived from a given 
social time preference rate (see, for example, Treasury 2003). The relationship between 
the two is given by 
(2.33) DF, _ (1+r)t = 
(1+r)"r 
Alternatively, 
(2.34) DF = e-", if the discounting is applied instantaneously 
where 
DF = the discount factor 
r= STPR 
t= time period 
The application of a single discount factor -derived from a single discount rate (STPR} 
does not pose much of a problem for medium and long term projects, but is problematic 
for very long-term projects. It can be shown that even a modest discount rate, say 4%, 
would render future costs (and benefits) almost zero over several hundred years. Since 
some government projects involve time horizons well beyond a given generation In excess 
of 50,100 or even 500 years such as forestry investment, nuclear power and projects 
involving climatic change, some argue that the ordinary or the time-constant (exponential) 
discount rate is inappropriate in the evaluation of such long term projects. For example, 
Pearce et at (1990) criticise the conventional method of discounting as being a 
discriminatory practice against future generations. They state that discounting is a biased 
tool which should be constrained since the process of discounting works against 
intergenerational justice and that the burden of defending the interests of future 
generations should not fall on the discount rate. 
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Kula (1981 and 1997) also argues that the use of traditional exponential discount rate 
discriminates against future generations since it is based on the implicit assumption that 
individuals live forever. He instead allows individuals to discount within their own lifetimes 
but not discount utility accruing to future generations. Individuals are divided into cohorts 
according to their age, one year apart. As time passes, the older cohorts die off and are 
replaced by new cohorts, for whom the ongoing benefits and costs of the project are 
discounted to their respective birth dates. The aggregate discount factor for any year is 
the average of all cohorts then living. Eventually the older cohorts disappear completely 
and the conventional discount factor gives way altogether to one which is no longer 
influenced by the historical Year Zero of the project. The result is much higher discount 
factors in a period of life expectancy (80 years) than the conventional method. An 
important characteristic of Kula's modified discount method is that in the early years the 
discount factors are similar to those in the conventional method and the high discount 
factors only kick in after a certain number of years. This is criticised by Price (1993) by 
arguing that present generation gets away with small sacrifices expecting the next 
generation to make much bigger one; however, this applies to each generation and thus 
the sacrifice would never get to be made. 
Others argue that a declining (hyperbolic) discount rate would be a more appropriate 
method for evaluating such projects rather than the conventional (exponential) discount 
rate (OXERA 2002). For example, the UK government In its Green Book recommends 
that, for projects whose benefits and costs accrue within 30 years, appraisers should use 
a discount rate of 3.5%. However, for projects Involving time periods exceeding 30 years, 
it suggests declining discount rates (HM Treasury 2003, Annex 6). Following the 
procedure outlined in OXERA (2002) based on the Weitzman (1998 and 2001) approach, 
it uses the step schedule of discount rates which produces the discount factors given by 
equation (2.33). It considers five different discount rates to be applied for five separate 
time periods. More specifically, for a period of 31-75 years the discount rate would be 3%, 
for 76-125 years 2.5%, for 126-200 years 2%, for 2001-300 years 1.5%, and finally 
beyond 300 years it would be 1%. However, although the Treasury followed the 
recommendations of OXERA (2002), it has applied the Weitzman approach 
inappropriately in its calculation of relevant discount factors. Thus, the decline in the 
discount rate is too gradual compared to standard exponential discounting to make any 
real difference to the discount factors applied. In fact the discount factors beyond 200 
years become negligible (HM Treasury 2003, Annex 6, p 100) which have the implication, 
for very long term investment such as nuclear energy, that the costs (e. g. the risk 
regarding nuclear waste) are discounted away. 
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Arguments providing a rationale for the time declining (hyperbolic) discount rates can be 
divided into three groups. The first group is based on empirical observations of how 
individuals actually discount the future (OXERA 2002). There is a growing body of 
evidence that individuals discount values in the near future at a higher rate than values in 
the distant future (Heal 1997). For example, Percoco and Nijkamp (2006) argue that the 
intertemporal preferences of individuals present some anomalies and one of these 
anomalies is that individuals display behaviour indicative of time-decreasing discount 
rates. Recent experiments over the last couple of decades also suggest that humans 
employ a declining discount rate in making intertemporal choices. For example, some of 
these studies (Newell and Pizer 2000 and Weitzman 2001) employing the survey method, 
ask the subjects to make a choice between delayed rewards such as durable goods or 
reduced pollution levels. The resulting discount function indicates that people discount the 
current consumption trade-offs more heavily than the future ones displaying a hyperbolic 
discounting pattern (Hepburn & Koundouri 2007 and Weitzman 2001). Thus, the society 
would also have, on the assumption that individual preferences are additive-separable, a 
hyperbolic discounting pattern. Moreover, Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) show that even if 
all individuals have exponential time preferences, providing that they have decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, then the representative individual would have a hyperbolic time 
preference. Therefore, a government, acting on behalf of the representative individual, 
uses declining discount rates. Furthermore, Hubem and Runkelnn (2008) argue that the 
median voter has a hyperbolic time preference. Consequently, governments would tend to 
use hyperbolic discounting. 
An additional point is that a time-constant discount rate arising from a constant positive 
utility (pure time preference) discount rate implies certain axiomatic conditions regarding 
the intertemporal welfare function. Koopman (1960) shows that the relevant welfare 
function must be continuous and stationary over time and must comply with the condition 
of period independence. The latter implies that intertemporal preferences for benefits and 
costs are Independent of each other. However, it is unlikely that future preferences would 
be independent of past decisions (Groom et al 2005). 
The second group involves the role of uncertainty in the discount rate. As we go further 
into the future, uncertainty about everything increases. As Weitzman (1998) argued, 
relative to the near future, the far distant future involves much higher uncertainties 
regarding technical progress, the speed of capital accumulation and environmental 
factors, and therefore the pure time preference rate as well as the growth rate. 
Consequently, there is a wide range of possible discount rates from which a probability 
distribution for the associated discount factors can be constructed. The result would be a 
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hyperbolic path for the discount factor and thus a certainty-equivalent discount rate which 
will be declining over time (Hepburn & Koundouri 2007). This occurs because the 
marginal discount rate relating to the hyperbolic path for the discount factor, continuously 
declines through time towards its lowest possible value . For example, Weitzman (2007) 
and Spackman (2004) provide numerical examples to demonstrate how a certainty- 
equivalent discount rate would. follow a hyperbolic path. There are also theoretical and 
empirical studies that aim to quantify the nature of this decline (Newell & Pizer 2000, 
Gollier 2002, and Weitzman 2001). 
The third group of arguments is not based on empirical observations but on an ethical 
stand relating to the social choice approach (OXERA 2002). The recent concern over 
environmental problems in general and climate change in particular has resulted in 
renewed interest in long-term discounting. This group is led by the environmental and 
sustainable development economists, who argue that a time-constant (exponential) 
discount rate cannot solve the issue of intergenerational equity since it puts undue burden 
on the future generations. They also point out that the values of present value weights 
over very long periods are highly sensitive to the choice of the discount rate (Zhuang et al 
2007). For example, Chichilnisky (1997) reiterates the argument that the time-constant 
discount rate establishes the 'tyranny' of the present generation over the future ones. This 
is because for a fixed discount rate the discount factor will approach zero in the very long 
term which means the interest of future generations are essentially disregarded. Similarly, 
Heal (1997) criticises the time-constant discount rate for being biased against 
environmental preservation and thus introduces a method of evaluating social projects 
which places more weight on long-run benefits. Li and L6fgren (2000) also criticise the 
conventional approach to discounting and suggest a model which introduces 
intergenerational equity explicitly. However, these models have themselves been criticised 
by, among others, Dasgupta (2001) for their lack of a proper criterion for choosing the 
relevant weights for the near and the distant future and thus their lack of relevance for the 
policy maker. 
More recently, the Stem Review, commissioned by the UK government (Stem 2007), 
argued that the investment decision taken in the next decade or so will have a profound 
effect on the climate in this and the next century. More specifically, if no action is taken, 
the present levels of the emission of greenhouse gases would produce catastrophic 
results for future generations and therefore immediate action is required. Among its 
proposals is an STPR of 1.4% for discounting the damages of global warming based on 
the following values of the variables in equation (2.30): p=0.1% (catastrophe rate), c=1, 
and g=1.3. Thus, the Stem Review suggests a very low discount rate in order to tip the 
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balance of intergenerational equity in favour of future generations. The Review created a 
great deal of heated debate and has been subject to much criticism. For example, 
Nordhaus (2007) claims that the Review is more in the nature of a political document 
rather than an economic one since it emphasises the studies supporting its policy 
recommendations and ignores those that oppose them and since it was not reviewed 
externally, which is a standard practice for scientific economic studies. He also criticises 
the Review for employing a very low discount rate (as a result of a near-zero utility 
discount rate based on ethical assumptions), which results in magnifying impacts in the 
distant future and justifying immediate deep cuts in carbon emissions. He also regards a 
unitary E value as too small and the growth rate on the conservative side. 
Dasgupta (2007) also criticises the Review for basing its recommendations on value 
judgement rather than economic facts. He argues that the strong immediate action the 
Review demands regarding a reduction in carbon emissions is based on the authors' view 
of intergenerational equity rather than climatic facts. Moreover, he points to a paradoxical 
stance on the part of the Review arguing that a near-zero utility discount rate the Review 
adopts indicates a highly egalitarian attitude regarding intergenerational equity but a 
unitary value for E indicates a very inegalitarian attitude towards intragenerational equity. 
Weitzman (2007) praises the Review for taking on board such a political and highly 
controversial issue as carbon emissions and making uncompromising recommendations 
and for popularising the idea that CBA can be a legitimate tool for evaluating the policies 
of mitigating global warming. However, he also makes the point that a near-zero value for 
the utility discount rate and a unitary value for the inequality aversion parameter are on 
the rather low side and do not compare with the empirical estimates of these parameters 
in the literature. He also criticises the Review for creating the impression that its highly 
radical conclusions and recommendations are the result of robust economic analysis 
rather than being based on controversial assumptions and unconventional discount rates. 
The low discount rates suggested by the Review are also criticised by Gollier of a! (2008) 
by arguing that the high estimates of climate change damages in the Review are driven by 
an arbitrarily chosen low constant discount rate. They employ a univariate model, which 
allows uncertainty in the behaviour of long term interest rates, to estimate a schedule of 
declining discount rates for nine representative countries. Then these schedules are 
aggregated into one schedule of declining discount rates to be used in the evaluation 
global climate change mitigation policy. They argue that the consideration of uncertainty 
makes the case for declining discount rates compelling and that their method of weighted 
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declining discounting suggest much lower estimates of climate change damages than 
those derived in the Review. 
However, one of the major problems regarding the time-varying (hyperbolic) discount rate 
is that it results in time-inconsistency which means decisions regarding future events 
made at a point in time are contradicted by a later action that revises that decision. Let us 
assume that the current generation, C, makes a decision involving future generations, F, 
and F2, and then this decision is reversed by F,. This would mean that C would be 
prevented from optimising its behaviour. However, Heal (1997) argues that time 
consistency in individual behaviour is not essential since social decisions need not be 
time-consistent. Therefore, the requirement of time-consistency, from the planners' point 
of view, is rather stringent. Others object to this by arguing that if the rules of time- 
consistency are not observed in government decisions, then private-sector agents will 
lose confidence in government policies (Zhuang et al 2007). 
Hepburn (2003) also draws attention to the time-inconsistency aspect of hyperbolic 
discounting. He does not reject hyperbolic discounting as such but warns, by examining 
the resource collapses of the Peruvian anchovy and Atlantic cod, that if hyperbolic 
discounting is employed naively, problems of dynamic inconsistency might result in a 
renewable resource being completely exhausted. He also argues that further research into 
the issue of time-inconsistency is necessary and suggests that may be logarithmic 
discounting -a form of declining discount rate which is time-consistent- might provide a 
basis for long-term policymaking. In logarithmic discounting, time is measured in equal 
proportional increments as opposed to in equal absolute increments, which places much 
more weight on the distant future at a given discount rate (see Heal 1997 for detailed 
explanation). 
The problem presented by the time-consistency principle for long-term discounting led to 
some suggesting that intergenerational equity should not be addressed by a lowering of 
the discount rate but by producing separate analysis for different scenarios as well as a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to different discount rates so as to provide choices and 
room to manoeuvre for the policy maker. The main idea is that if it is possible to separate 
certain consumption goods, such as environmental services, from private consumption, 
then there might be a case for adopting what is known as the dual discounting procedure. 
For example, Cropper and Laibson (1998) argue that a lower discount rate for 
environmental projects is justified if three conditions apply. The first is the condition of 
separability in production. This implies that the production process of an environmental 
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good, e. g. a forest, is a separate process from that of an ordinary private output. The 
second is the separability in consumption which implies that the environmental good and 
the private good are based on different utility functions. The final condition is that the 
government can control the rate of consumption of the environmental good. Price (2008) 
argues that hyperbolic discounting may lead to indefinite postponement of worthwhile 
investment and therefore different discount rates should be applied to different categories 
of projects. It might be possible to differentiate projects according to several criteria, such 
as, for different kinds of individuals, e. g., the 'aesthetes' and 'materialists', for different 
ethical views of time preference, for different products, etc., in which case different 
discount rates should be applied. For example, he shows that the application of the UK 
Treasury's discount schedule (HM treasury 2003) to landscape projects might result in the 
rejection of a worthwhile project due to the rate of decline in the discount rate not being 
sufficiently fast. Thus he argues that such projects should be evaluated separately, or 
indeed possibly not discounted at all. Kula and Evans (2011) also suggest projects with 
substantial environmental impact should be evaluated by using a different discount rate. 
They argue that the conventional parameters in the STPR based on the growth rate of 
income are not applicable to the environmental benefits of investment projects since they 
are actually undermined by economic growth. Thus the environmental benefits of a project 
should be treated separately. In fact, they distinguish between two approaches to dual 
discounting. One is to apply a separate and different discount rate to environmental 
projects and the other is to do the same to environmental impacts instead. They opt for 
the latter partly because it is easier, they argue, to identify environmental impacts than 
environmental projects and partly because discounting the impacts is more transparent 
and informs the decision maker better with respect to issues of sustainability and 
environment. Similarly, Henderson and Bateman (1995) state that a lower discount rate 
would, for at least some environmental projects, be a better approximation to the true 
social discount rate than exponential discounting. In fact, they argue that if project-specific 
discount rates are allowed, so must be multiple-discount rates. However, they do admit 
that there might be a problem with the practicality of multiple discount rates and suggest 
instead that the use of hyperbolic discounting might be advantageous in the case of 
intergenerational projects. 
b) The growth rate of consumption 
The rationale for including the growth rate of consumption in the discount rate is that p in 
equation (2.30) represents egalitarianism, i. e. one unit of consumption Is traded off with 
one unit of future consumption. If, however, real incomes grow over time, future 
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generations will be richer than the current generation and therefore one -for-one trade-off 
would not be appropriate. Moreover, since future consumption will be higher than current 
consumption, it will have lower marginal utility (Potts 2002). Thus the discount rate will 
depend upon the future growth rate and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
(Lopez 2008). This effect is represented by the composite term of (E. g) in equation (2.30), 
that is, the product of c and the annual growth in per capita consumption, g. 
The theoretical and empirical issues relating to E are discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, all of 
Chapter 3 is devoted to these issues. The significance of the concept the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption is explained in Section 2.4. But first we will focus upon the 
issues surrounding the growth rate of consumption. The associated empirical evidence on 
g is presented and discussed in, Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4. 
It suffices to state here that the standard and conventional method of representing g is to 
generate the expected growth rates of consumption per capita over the next few decades 
based on the growth rates of consumption (Evans 2004, Evans and Sezer 2004 and 2005, 
Kula 2004, Lopez 2008 and Pearce and Ulph 1999) or the GDP (European Commission 
2008, Evans 2007 and Percoco 2008) of the past few decades, and then take an annual 
average of these projected figures to represent g. 
However, such representation is not free of problems. One of the problems is that the 
projected figure will be an overvaluation if there are social costs of consumption such as 
pollution, etc. during the projected period. Similarly the figure will be an under estimation if 
leisure is substituted for income (OXERA 2002). Pearce and Ulph (1999) argue that these 
problems may be overcome by using data covering a very long period but Spackman 
(2004) is sceptical of this stating that even if the scale and the timing of such deviations 
are known, they are not relevant to the time preference rate for marginal income. 
Another problem is related to the issue of endogenisation of the growth rate. The STPR in 
equation (2.12) depends on the growth rate of per capita consumption (g), but g in turn will 
depend upon the distribution of investment over time, which will in turn be determined by 
the particular discount rate implemented (Dasgupta and Pearce 1978). Thus, it would 
appear that the growth rate of consumption can no longer be treated as an exogenous 
variable. However, this is not a serious problem as long as the projects in question are 
marginal in the sense that their contribution to the growth of the GDP of the country is 
relatively small and thus the impact on the growth of consumption is insignificant. 
However, for mega projects or large programmes containing a series of projects, this 
would be an important consideration. 
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There is a long standing debate, which goes back to J. S. Mill, over whether simple 
consumption (or GDP) levels adequately represent welfare. More recently, Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1972) constructed an index, called the measure of economic welfare, MEW, in 
order to measure human wellbeing more accurately than indicated by the GNP figures. 
The MEW uses the GNP figures but excludes from it certain items such as defence and 
security spending, sewage disposal, commuting, etc., while leisure time and housework 
are added on. This measure gives a lower growth rate for human welfare in the US 
between 1939 and 1965 than the ordinary GNP growth. Similarly, Daly and Cobb (1989) 
have constructed an index of economic welfare (IEW) which is still based on income 
figures but which makes allowances for the adverse effects of environmental damage and 
pollution. According to this measure economic welfare increased in the US in 1950-59, 
remained constant in the 1970s and has fallen in the 1980s and early 1990s. This finding 
can be contrasted with the GNP figures which grew steadily throughout the period (Kula 
1994). 
Thus, higher growth rates of consumption would indicate that future generations would be 
better off except that growth brings its own problems. This has particular Importance for 
the social discount rate for very long term social projects since uncertainty increases as 
we go further into the future. Thus, we would face the types of problems similar to those 
discussed in the previous section regarding the impact of uncertainty upon g and hence 
on the STPR (Gollier 2002). 
In the light of the debates that have been explored above, there appears to be a general 
agreement that a positive STPR should be used In discounting both inteagenerational and 
intergenerational projects. This would be the case even if the utility discount rate (p) is 
assumed to be insignificant provided that incomes grow over time thus making (c. g) and 
therefore STPR positive. However, there are also compelling reasons, as discussed in 
Section 2.3.5, for assuming that p is also positive. One is that a zero rate would imply 
strong altruism leading to subsistence level of consumption and unreasonably high saving 
and investment ratios on the part of the current generation, which is clearly highly 
unrealistic. Another is that, however small, catastrophe risk must exist which would give 
rise to a positive time preference rate. Finally, democratically elected governments must 
make decisions on the basis of the preferences of the current generation although they 
might moderate these decisions in the name of intergenerational equity. 
However, the use of the STPR as the social discount rate is not free of criticism. The 
discussion regarding the SDR so far revolved around the intertemporai equity issues 
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leaving the distributional impact of projects among different individuals or groups 
(interpersonal equity) aside. The distributional impact of a project or a series of projects 
can be dealt with in two different ways. One is to derive systematic and specific income 
distribution weights at the macro level and apply them to adjust the net present value 
(NPV) of projects (see Chapter 7, Section 7.5.2). This method is known as the social 
welfare weights (SWW) which has been discussed, at least at the theoretical level, in 
Section 2.2 and will be further discussed in chapters 4,6 and 7. However, the application 
of the SWW requires the differentiation of the individuals or group of individuals, who are 
affected by the project, on the basis of per capita income. The other method involves the 
direct applicationof the CBA by use of shadow prices (Londero 1987, UNIDO 1972 and 
1980 and Potts 1999). In this method the distributional impact of a project is assessed by 
identifying the major stakeholders and then estimating the direct income effects and the 
indirect effects of externalities that impact upon these stakeholders This procedure 
involves dividing the economic NPV of a project among the different recipients of benefits 
and then estimating the NPV associated with each recipient by placing a shadow price on 
the income flow going to each recipient (Potts 1999 and 2002). It should be noted this 
method still requires a discount rate, preferably an STPR, to calculate the NPV but 
shadow prices are used in the valuation of individual costs and benefits. The use of this 
method of project appraisal is not confined only to adjusting the project's impact on 
income distribution; it can also be used for adjusting the project's Impact on saving and 
investment (see Section 2.3.4b), for obtaining the net benefit at economic (efficient) 
prices, or for the analysis of merit goods (Londero 1987 and UNIDO 1972). However, the 
application of this method requires comprehensive and disaggregated data at the micro 
level. For example, to estimate the distributional impact of a project would require the 
disaggregation of costs and benefits into primary factors on an annual basis, such as 
domestic resources, foreign exchange, skilled and unskilled labour, and so on. Then 
transfer payments would have to be categorised according to recepients, and finally a 
shadow price would be attached to each component (Potts 2002). In this method a 
different shadow price would be applied according to for which purpose the method Is 
used, which would inevitably involve a degree of arbitrariness. This method also requires 
comprehensive disaggregated data which may not be readily available. 
Another issue regarding the STPR relates to the capital rationing problem. It is generally 
accepted that the STPR would be lower than the market rate or the SOC rate (Dasgupta 
and Pearce 1978). Therefore, its application in the ranking of public projects would imply 
that more projects would be regarded as acceptable compared to other methods of 
discounting. This does not constitute a problem provided that there are no funding 
constraints. However, most governments work with a budget for public expenditure and 
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therefore funds for financing public projects are not unlimited. This means that some 
projects will not be financed even if they are associated with a positive NPV. Under such 
budgetary constraint, the appropriate method of ranking projects would be the method of 
internal rate of return (IRR) rather than a positive NPV. Thus the projects would be ranked 
according to their IRR and the cut off point would be where the funds are exhausted. 
2.4 Concluding comments 
As a general comment one can state that it is rather difficult and would be highly 
presumptuous to pretend that one can provide a definitive resolution to technical problems 
and ethical issues that divide professional economists and philosophers alike. On the 
other hand, solutions to real-world problems cannot afford the luxury of waiting for 
academic consensus. What is important is that the policy-maker is aware of the issues 
and the trade-offs and has the necessary information to make informed decisions. In this 
respect, CBA can be viewed as a technique that provides such information and clarifies 
such trade-offs (Faber & Hemmersbaugh 1993). 
Thus, due to the theoretical superiority of the STPR over the long-term government bond 
rate as a choice of social discount rate, we observe that various national governments and 
international bodies have issued explicit guides instructing the appraisers to use, to 
varying degrees, a positive STPR in their evaluation of social investment decisions such 
as the two Green Books by the UK government and the two CBA Guides of the EC (see 
HM Treasury 1997, HM Treasury 2003 and European Commission 2002 and 2008, 
Spackman 2004 and Evans 2007). 
What is missing, however, from the discussion relating to the choice of the social discount 
rate above is the evaluation of the empirical studies that aim to estimate a particular value 
for the STPR. The empirical evidence and the various methods employed will be explored 
in Chapter 4. 
Also missing from this chapter is a discussion of the third element of the Ramsey formula 
in equation (2.30), namely, the elasticity of marginal utility of income, E. This concept plays 
a very significant role in the estimation of the social discount rate. Most people would 
expect positive growth rates and hence higher levels of income per capita in the future. 
This implies diminishing marginal utility of consumption (income) derived from net benefits 
over time. However, the extent of this decline depends on the elasticity of marginal utility 
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of consumption, e. Thus, high values of a imply, given positive growth, a high value for the 
SDR. The issues relating to the empirical evidence on the SDR will be discussed in detail 
in chapter four. The importance of a in the estimation of the SDR has been considerably 
enhanced by the UK Treasury's decision to focus entirely on the STPR (HM Treasury 
(2003) and the decision of the EU to adopt STPR as the basis of SDR for Europe 
(European Commission 2008). 
E also has a central role in the estimation of distributional welfare weights for application in 
the appraisal of social projects and policies impacting on different regions or 
socioeconomic groups. Since the size of E determines the extent to which marginal social 
utility declines as income rises, the knowledge of its value permits a comparison of 
relative marginal utilities for regions with contrasting per-capita real incomes as can be 
observed from equation (2.9). Welfare weights could be used by governments in reaching 
decisions on the allocation of funds to social projects and policies on a regional basis or 
any other basis such as gender or ethnicity (Weisbrod 1972). The issues relating to the 
empirical evidence on the RWW will also be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Consequently, the appropriate measurements of E are a crucial policy concern for the 
purpose of estimating values of both social discount rates and regional welfare weights for 
countries. There have been many attempts to estimate E, employing several different 
approaches and often resulting in widely differing values. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the critical evaluation of the theoretical and empirical issues 
surrounding the concept of the elasticity of marginal utility of income since this welfare 
parameter is an important component of both discount rate and welfare weight measures. 
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Chapter 3 The Elasticity of the Marginal Utility of 
Income (e): Theory and Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
The third element of the Ramsey formula, i. e. equation (3.1) below, is the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of income (consumption) denoted by E. 
(3.1) r=p+s. g 
This chapter will explore the issues surrounding a in detail and critically evaluate the 
different methods of measuring a value for this parameter. For the relationship between r 
and the social welfare function to be maximised see Chapter 2, Section 2.2, and for the 
derivation of equation 3.1 above see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 
As has already been pointed out, measurement of z is a crucial policy concern for the 
purpose of estimating appropriate values of both social discount rates and social/regional 
welfare weights for countries. In fact, knowing how far the marginal utility of income 
declines as income increases is very important not only for CBA but also for the 
measurement of inequality and optimal taxation (Layard at a/ 2007). There have been 
several studies aiming to estimate a value for E, employing different approaches. Cowell 
and Gardiner (1999), Evans (2005) and Stem (1977), cover a range of methods for 
estimating a value for E in detail, with particular attention paid to the underlying theory and 
its deficiencies. 
3.2 Marginal utility as a welfare weight 
The different approaches to the estimation of z relate to the different but interrelated 
perceptions regarding E. In Chapter 2, it has been stated that estimation of the SDR and 
SWW involves the Bergson-Samuelson (B-S) type of social welfare function (SWF) which 
relates welfare to utility as a function income. 
(3.2) SWF = z'U, (Y, ) 
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It was established that the SWF is concave as well as additive in nature. The concavity of 
the SWF implies diminishing marginal utility, which in conjunction with the additivity 
property (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), produces the result that redistributing a given 
amount of income from a high income individual to a low income individual would increase 
total welfare. In other words, from a viewpoint of distributional policies, high incomes are 
associated with low weights and vice versa, the weights being indicated by the marginal 
utility of income (Cowell and Gardiner 1999). 
Moreover, the SWF is also iso-elastic implying that the rate of change in utility for changes 
in income (consumption) by a given percentage remains constant for all income levels. 
This can be demonstrated by assuming an iso-elastic utility function which is widely used 
in the literature (see, for example, Cowell and Gardiner 1999, Evans 2008 and 2005, Kula 
2007 and 2004, OXERA 2002, Pearce and Ulph 1999, and Stern 1977). 
(3.3) Ui=11Cy1-s 
The differentiation of (3.3) gives the marginal utility of income 
(3.4) MUl = 
dU 
= Y-E 
Taking logs 
(3.5) LnMUI =-E. LnY, 
and differentiating with respect to LnY gives 
(3.6) 
d(LnMU"ý 
' 
d(LnY, ) 
This implies that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income is constant. That is, 
a given percentage increase in income will result in the same percentage reduction in 
marginal utility whatever the income level. 
The above analysis implies that marginal utilities associated with different individuals, 
groups or regions can be used as relative welfare weights regarding a redistribution of 
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income. For example, if (i) represents an individual or a group of individuals or a region, 
we will, from (3.4), have, 
(3.7) MUl = Y, --' and 
where 
Y. =i's income 
MUY = Y`s 
Y=a numeraire such as the national income per capita 
Then we have 
-s- e 
(3.8) 
YYY 
which represents the relative welfare weight for group/region i. Note that the magnitude of 
the weight depends on the ratio of the national income per capita to the average income 
of im group concerned, which is variable, and the value of c, which is constant. 
However, the above analysis is based on the implicit assumption that these weights are 
applied to projects which are marginal in the sense that the impact of the project is 
confined to the groups or regions with which they are associated. In other words, no spill- 
over effects are assumed. Some projects however, such as infra-structural and transport 
projects, will have impacts on more than one group or region. In the presence of such 
spill-over effects, welfare weights can still be applied in CBA but these spill overs would 
need to be explicitly taken into account. For example, if a project has cross-regional 
implications, then a weighted average of the relevant regional welfare weights can be 
applied on the basis of the relative importance of per capita benefits with respect to each 
region. If the project is financed from central government funds, then the cost implications 
are simple. However, if the regional government is bearing some or all of the costs, then 
the costs should also be distributed across the regions benefiting from the projects in 
accordance with the benefits received by each reagion. (See, the end of Section 7.2 in 
Chapter 7). 
Another point to bear in mind is the case where a project is located in one region but the 
benefits largely accrue to another region. In this case the relevant welfare weight would be 
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the one associated with the region receiving benefits rather than the one where the project 
is located. What is important is the marginal utility of the beneficiaries. Thus, if the project 
is not region-specific, then the regional welfare weights where the beneficiries are located 
should apply (Evans and Kula 2011) 
3.3 Aversion to inequality 
As we have seen, the SWF of equation (3.2) contains an inequality-regarding dimension, 
if we can assign to it the properties that have been discussed in 2.2 (Cowell and 
Gardiner). In the context of the classic utility approach, it is represented by the concept of 
the elasticity of marginal utility of income. When we consider utility under uncertainty 
(where income is the expected income), the relevant concept is the concept of aversion to 
inequality of income. The correspondence between the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income and the coefficient of aversion to inequality can easily be seen if we consider the 
Atkinson Inequality Index in which E is a parameter representing the societal weight 
attached to the inequality of income distribution, a high value of E indicating a greater 
weight attached to inequality (Atkinson 1983). 
r 
I=1- 
"( 
\Yl 
ý 
where 
1 
1-E 1-E 
r 
i=1,2,3...... n 
I= Atkinson Inequality Index 
Y, = the income of those in the i"' income range 
Y= the mean income 
f; = proportion of the population with incomes in the lb' range 
The functional form used to derive constant relative aversion in the context of the Atkinson 
Inequality Index is given by equations (3.9) and (3.10), [see Amiel at al 1999], noting that 
(3.9) is the same as (3.3) . 
(3.9) U(Y) =1 
I6Y, -e for ' e>0, c01 
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or 
(3.10) U(Y) = log Y for E=l 
The parameter E in equation (3.9) indicates the concavity of the total utility function U, i. e. 
the rate of change of the slope of the total utility curve. In other words, it shows how 
quickly marginal utility declines as income increases, which is the definition of the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income. It also indicates the convexity of the indifference 
curves which show the combinations of (Y; )and (Y; ) for persons i and j with identical 
welfare functions. The marginal rate of substitution between (Yi )and (y, ) is given by 
(3.11) -ýýj _ 
Y. 
yy 
Yj 
)-E 
The value of a is determined by the so-called leaky-bucket experiment in which a scenario 
is created where there is a redistribution of income between two individuals, A and B. A 
has, for example, twice the income as B. One unit of income is taken away from A, and a 
proportion x of this is given to B, the rest (1-x) being lost (leaked! ) in the process. Then the 
subject of the experiment is asked: At what level of x would the desirability of redistribution 
disappear (the overall welfare remain unchanged)? (Atkinson 1983). 
The answer would determine the value of E according to the formula 
(3.12) E= 
2x 
For example, if the subject accepted 50% 'leakage' then the value of z would be equal to 
1, but if only 25% were deemed sufficient to make the redistribution worthwhile then the 
value of E would be 2. That is, the higher the values of E, the higher the aversion to 
inequality. It ranges from zero, which implies that the society is indifferent to equity, to 
infinity, which implies that the society is only concerned with the poorest section (Atkinson 
1983). 
A constant relative inequality aversion is considered to be reasonable in certain 
circumstances (Cowell and Gardiner 1999) and therefore the Atkinson Inequality Index 
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also provides the rationale for the restriction of iso-elasticity and hence the justification for 
equation (3.3). 
3.4 Aversion to risk 
An alternative interpretation of E would be as a coefficient of relative risk aversion. The 
social welfare function is based on the concept of social utility which is built on the 
structure of consumer preferences under certainty provided that certain restrictive 
conditions apply (see the discussion on the properties of SWF in Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.1). However, it is possible to use an equivalent SWF even if the structure of consumer 
preferences faces uncertainty. Thus, the equivalent to equation (3.2) can be written as 
n 
(3.13) SWF ='w, U, (Y 
where 
w, =1 and i=1,2,..., n 
Under the condition of uncertainty, utility becomes 'expected' utility associated with 
expected incomes. That is to say that a representative individual is to expect to receive 
any one of the expected incomes, Y,, Y2,.. -, Y, with equal likelihood. 
In this approach social attitudes to inequality are obviously linked to the attitudes to risk. 
Thus risk aversion becomes the determining factor regarding aversion to inequality and 
thus measures of inequality can be regarded as being related to the risk associated with a 
given distribution of income (Cowell and Gardiner 1999). 
3.5 Different methods of measuring E 
It is possible to group the approaches to the estimation of s into 3 main types: survey 
methods, behavioural evidence and revealed social values via public policy decisions. 
Behavioural approaches can further be grouped into those based on lifetime consumption 
and the ones based on the market demand for want-independent goods. A critical 
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examination of the theoretical and empirical issues regarding these approaches is 
presented below. 
3.5.1 Survey methods 
This approach is based on direct evidence and uses information obtained from surveys 
concerning risk or inequality aversion and involves measures of s based on assessment 
of either the risk or inequality aversion of members of the public. 
Barsky et al (1995) focus on a group of. Americans aged between 51 and 61 years and 
use the questions from the Health and Retirement Survey to extract information about 
attitudes to risk. The questions mainly relate to gambling lifetime income in hypothetical 
situations. They define relative risk tolerance as the reciprocal of the coefficient of risk 
aversion and provide estimates of it for the persons in different quintiles in the income 
distribution. The arithmetic average of these estimates is 0.24, which means an implied 
estimate of the elasticity of marginal utility of income, c is 4.2. This high value Implies a 
considerable amount of aversion to risk which might be associated with the particular age 
group to which the survey applies. It is possible that for such an age group factors such as 
potential for regret would normally put an upward pressure on risk aversion (Spackman 
2007). In any case, a value of 4.2 for E would imply an unrealistically high number, for 
example, for the UK social discount rate. Using equation (3.1) above and typically 
assuming a value of 1% for p, and 2% forg ,a figure of more than 9% would be obtained 
for the STPRI Thus, the study is criticised for being based on a non-representative sample 
which would have an upward bias on the estimates as well as having unrealistic estimates 
(Evans 2005). 
Amiel et al (1999) focus on a group of students, who are subjected to the leaky-bucket 
experiment described above, in order to estimate the coefficient of aversion to inequality, 
s, which is a parameter that represents the weight attached by society to inequality in the 
income distribution. 
They assume that the social welfare function takes the form 
N 
(3.14) W=1N X-U(Y ý 
e 
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where 
W =welfare 
Y; = person i's income 
U(Y1) = the value attached to i's income. 
N= the number of people 
Using the theoretical structure set out in equations (3.9) - (3.12), their questionnaire is 
designed to elicit information regarding the value of x in equation (3.12) from which the 
values for r can be discerned. In fact, their estimates of c vary between 0.2 and - 0.8. 
Such low values might reflect the attitudes of the student group to inequality but cannot 
represent the society at large. 
Survey methods are criticised for having high opportunity cost attached to them because 
they are time consuming and expensive and regular follow-ups are required to update the 
information obtained. Moreover, the estimates are sensitive to both the nature of the 
questions asked and the types of respondents targeted. Finally, they are also criticised for 
not being comprehensive enough in their coverage of a more representative cross-section 
of the general public in order to obtain appropriate c values. Consequently, there appears 
to be a need for evidence from alternative approaches (Evans 2005). 
3.5.2 Behavioural approach 
This approach is based on indirect evidence obtained from household behaviour and the 
studies adopting this approach can be grouped under two categories. 
a) Models of life-time consumption behaviour 
This method of estimating E is well-regarded theoretically and favoured by, Attanasio and 
Browning (1995), Besley and Meghir (1998), Blundell at al. (1994), Cowell and Gardiner 
(1999), OXERA (2002) and Pearce and Ulph (1999). In fact, Blundell at al (1994) has 
been highly influential on both government policy and the subsequent literature. The UK 
Treasury adopted a unitary value in its latest project appraisal guidance for the calculation 
of the social time preference rate (STPR) [see HM Treasury, (2003, Annex 6)]. This 
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guidance drew on surveys of empirical evidence provided by the Cowell and Gardiner 
(1999), Pearce and Ulph (1999), and OXERA (2002), which themselves emphasised the 
study by Blundell at al (1994). 
The approach is based on micro models of consumption behaviour over the life cycle in 
which an estimate of E is provided by the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution (EIS) of household consumption which is defined (Cowell and Gardiner 1999, 
Appendix A. 3) as 
(3.15) EIS= 
ölnCo 
ö In(1 + r) 
where 
EIS = elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 
Co = consumption in period 0, and 
r= the rate of interest in period 0 
This interpretation of a as a measure of relative risk aversion requires certain simplifying 
assumptions but avoids the controversy surrounding utility as an ordinal concept in the 
utility-under-certainty approach. The relevant theory and the underlying algebra are set 
out in Cowell and Gardiner (1999), Creedy (2006) and Pearce and Ulph (1999). Empirical 
estimates are provided by Attanasio and Browning (1995) Besley and Meghir (1998) and 
Blundell at al (1994). 
Let us assume a standard inter-temporal choice model in which individuals try to 
maximise consumption over two periods, 0 and 1, based on an additive utility function 
given by 
(3.16) Ur= (1 + p)'IU(Ci ) 
where 
U, = utility at t 
p= utility discount rate, and 
C, = consumption at t 
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Then the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) in the two periods is the absolute value of 
the slope of the indifference curve representing the trade-off between consumption levels 
in periods 0 and 1. This will be given by the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in 
one period over the marginal utility of consumption in the other period (Creedy 2006). 
aUo MU 
t= 
(3.17) , C. c. ai9co U mu l r 
ac, ýý 
However, if the utility function is of the usual iso-elastic type 
(3.18) U(C1) = (1-s)-' Ct'-s 
Then the utility in period 0 will be equal to 
(3.19) U(C0)=(1-E)-1 COI-'O 
and in period I to 
(3.20) UPI =(1+p)-I (1-E)-' CI 
Therefore 
(3.21) MRS 
Co -£ 
C ,CtE 01 (]. } p) CI- 
Rearranging we get 
lE 
(3.22) MRSCo C1 
CC-, ` 
(l+p) 
0 
However, the MRS is equal to the relative price regarding the two consumption levels, i. e. 
(1 +r), which is given by the slope of the budget constraint (Creedy 2006) 
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Thus 
le 
(3.23) MRSco cl =I 
C' 
I (l+p)=(l+r) 
l of 
Logging and rearranging 
(3.24) In(1+r)=s(1nC, -InCo)+In(1+p) 
Differentiating with respect to Co 
(3.25) aln(1+r)_`E 
alnCo 
However, from (3.15) we have 
i12ee1 sTo _ö 
ln Co 
ýJ. GVj GLJ = 
Thus, 
ä1n(1+r) 
(3.27) EIS =-1 
9 
Empirical evidence (Table 3.1) 
Pearce and Ulph (1999) criticise the official social discount rate for being too high and 
instead suggest a value of 0.88 for S. 
Besley and Meghir (1998) point to several studies which estimate values for EIS all of 
which are less than unity. Thus they argue that the value of E must exceed unity. 
Attanasio and Browning (1995) in a similar study also suggest a value just over unity for C. 
The Blundell at at (1994) study uses two alternative models based on panel data obtained 
from large samples of Family Expenditure Survey data taken over many years. In the 
basic model, the estimates of E range from 1.2 to 1.4 across the household Income 
distribution expressed in terms of deciles. This very modest rise in E with income level 
does appear to comply with the claim of approximate constancy of E made in the literature 
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(see, for example, Blue and Tweeten 1997, Evans 2004a and 2005 and Kula 2004). The 
second model used by the study provides much lower estimates of s with a much wider 
range, namely, 0.35-1.05 displaying a much sharper rise with income. This contrast could 
be attributable to the use of dummy variables to adjust for high levels of the UK real 
interest rates in the 1980s. 
The OXERA study suggests, after considering various studies that the most reasonable 
value would be within the range of 0.5-1.2. 
Stern (1977), using a model in which a lifetime utility function is maximised subject to 
saving constraint, provides an estimate of 5 for E. However, Scott (1989) criticised this 
figure as too high on the grounds of a misspecified equation and suggested that the 
correct figure would be 1.5. 
The life-time consumption models are criticised on several grounds. They usually specify 
a single long-term government bond rate which is not very plausible since it ignores the 
fact that there are significant differences between the rates of interest on bank loans and 
those applied to saving deposits. The Blundell at al (1999) study comes under specific 
criticism not only because of the single interest rate issue mentioned above but also the 
fact that its data period of 1970-86 is very different from the current economic and 
financial environment. The data period was subject to several external shocks such as the 
oil price hike in the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangement and the EU 
membership of the UK. The period was also characterised by high inflation rates and 
highly regulated and thus less competitive financial markets (Evans 2005 and 2007). 
b) Models based on demand analysis 
An evaluation 
The second behavioural method of estimating a is based on demand analysis. This 
method, which was developed by Fellner (1967), Fisher (1927) and Frisch (1932) and 
thus is also known as the FFF model, has a long history and is based on the demand for 
preference-independent consumer goods, e. g. food. Although the assumption of 
preference-independence is present in all the models using the behavioural approach, It Is 
a subject of contention. Preference-independence, also known as additive separability, is 
often assumed to simplify the analysis of consumer behaviour (Fleissig and Whitney 
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2007). In single-period utility functions, for example, consumption and leisure are 
commonly assumed to be additively separable. 
If separability of preferences holds then the goods can be partitioned into groups so that 
intra-group preferences would be independent of the inter-group quantities. That is, the 
intra-group marginal rate of substitution between any pair of goods is independent of the 
quantity consumed of other goods (Fleissig and Whitney 2007 and Pollak 1971). More 
specifically, let us assume that there are six consumer goods, namely, groceries (x, ), non- 
groceries (x2), textiles (x3), shoes (x4), TV (x5) and watching sport (x6) and that they are 
divided into three separable groups, namely, food, clothing and entertainment. The 
assumption of separability in general terms can be expressed as follows. 
(3.27a) U=v(xI, x2, x3, x4, xs, x6)=. 1ivF(xI, x2), vc(x3ýx4), vE(x5x6) 
where f is an increasing function of the sub-utility functions vF, vc and VE. 
Equation (3.27a) implies that the preferences of a consumer regarding, for example, food 
would be independent of the quantities she consumes of clothing and entertainment. That 
is, the marginal rate of substitution between groceries and non-groceries would be 
independent of quantities consumed of textiles, shoes, TV and sport. The quantity 
demanded of food, for example, would be a function of spending on and the price of 
groceries and non-groceries only. Thus, a change in the price of say shoes or TV would 
only have an indirect effect on demand for food via its impact on the expenditure on food 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a). This is a form of two-stage budgeting: the consumer first 
decides how much to spend on each category of goods, i. e. on food, clothing and 
entertainment, and then allocates the expenditure between goods within a category, i. e. 
on groceries and non-groceries. 
However, equation (3.27a) relates to what is known as weak separability which means 
that quantities demanded are a function of group utility and intra-group prices. Another 
form of separability is implicit separability or quasi separability which means that intra- 
group budget shares are a function of total utility and intra-group prices. This implies that 
a change in compensated price outside the group such as shoes will alter all antra-group 
expenditures, i. e. expenditures on groceries and non-groceries, by the same proportion. 
The third and most commonly assumed form regarding preferences is the strong form of 
separability which is also referred to as additive separability. In this case equation (3.27a) 
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becomes a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Additive separability means not 
only that the underlying utility function comprises sub-utility functions, but also that the 
latter enter the total utility function in an explicitly additive form as in equation (3.27b). 
(3.27b) U=. f[vF(xl, x2)+vc(x3, xa)+vE(xsx6) 
The necessary and sufficient condition for additive separability for a more general case, 
i. e. the one involving n number of goods, is the axiom of "nth order cancellation". The proof 
of this condition is provided by Debreu (1960). 
If there are only two goods without any sub-groups, such as food and non-food, as is the 
case in this study (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2 and Chapter 5, Section 5.2), then 
additively seaparable preferences can be represented by 
(3.27c) U(xi, x2)=v, (xi)+v2(x2) 
where x, and x2 would denote the consumption of food and non-food respectively, and 
vl(xl) and v2(x2)would represent the utility functions relating to food and non-food 
respectively. The necessary and sufficient condition for additive separability in the case of 
two commodities is the axiome of 'double cancellation'. (See Bergstrom 2011 for a proof 
of this condition). 
Although the condition of additive separability as expressed in equation (3.27b) looks 
rather strong, in the case of two groups of commodities such as food and non-food, It 
would appear that the assumption is not so stringent and hence too unrealistic. It is 
reasonable, in the case of broad categories of food and non-food, to assume that both 
inferiority and complementarity are absent or at least, even if complementarity existed, it 
would be rather weak. Therefore, it is fairly reasonable to assume that, if the quantity of of 
food were kept constant while the quantity of non-food were varied, the marginal utility of 
food would remains constant. 
Nevertheless, Stem (1977) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) regard this assumption 
unreasonably stringent for the reason that if additive separability is absent, then r would 
have no meaning since for each monotonic transformation of the underlying preference 
function, E would assume a different value. However, Fellner (1967), Evans (2004a and 
2005), Evans and Sezer (2002), Kula (2004) and Selvanathan and Selvanathan (1993) 
have all argued that preference Independence, at least in the case of food, is a plausible 
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assumption. Furthermore, empirical testing of the preference-independence assumption 
for broad aggregates appears to be valid (see, for example, Selvanathan 1987 and 
Clements et al. 1997). So the approach does seem worthy of some attention. 
The model 
In this method an approximate estimate of E is provided by the ratio of the estimated 
income elasticity of demand for food, rf, to the compensated own-price elasticity, y, 
(Feltner 1967) provided that the budget share of food is sufficiently small. 
(3.28) s=I 
Y 
where 
e= the elasticity of marginal utility of income 
n= the income elasticity of demand for food 
y= the compensated own- price elasticity of demand for food 
An additively-separable utility function based on a want-independent product group such 
as food can be expressed as follows. 
(3.29) U=U, (F)+U2 (NF) 
where 
F= food product group 
NF = non-food product group 
The first-order maximisation condition is 
ö ýiNF, 
) (3.30) 
öVOF 
=A= PF PNF 
where 
ova 
.F= 
the marginal utility of food 
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a a(NF) = the marginal utility of non-food 
PF = the price of food 
PNF = the price of non-food 
A= the marginal utility of income, (consumption) 
Now if the price of food, i. e. PF in (3.30), increases by x%, then consumers will normally 
substitute non-food for food and thus aY 
, 9(NF)will 
decrease by the same proportion so 
as to make (3.30) hold. Let us assume that we wish them to consume as much food as 
before at the new relative price which would result in lower 
0U 7F 
but with aUaF , i. e. 
F 
the marginal utility of food, unchanged. For (3.30) still to hold it is necessary that their 
income be increased so that they will be able to buy more non-food which would also 
lower ö j(NF) and hence the value of /P(Y) accordingly. However, the marginal 
a a 
PNF 
utility of income, A, will also decline as a result of the income rise involved (%AY), and 
this decline is associated with percentage rise in the price of food, (%APF. ) . 
Therefore 
(3.31) (%&, )=-(%&PF) 
Dividing both sides by(-%E Y), we obtain 
(3.32) - 
(%AA) 
- 
(%APF 
F/., &-Y) ) (%, &Y) 
However, the left hand side of (3.32) is the elasticity of marginal utility of income, E. Thus 
(3.33} _ 
(%A. ) (%APF ) 
(%t Y) (%AY) 
If we divide both the numerator and the denominator of the term on the right hand side of 
(3.33) by (%OF), which is the common response in the quantity demanded of food to the 
changes in both the price of food and the income of the consumers of food, we obtain 
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(%OPF" 
/ 
(ýioý') (3.34) e= (%DY) 
(%AF) 
where the numerator is the absolute value of the reciprocal of compensated price 
elasticity of demand, and the denominator is the reciprocal of income elasticity. Thus we 
have 
(3.35) e=1 or e=q 71, y 
which is equation (3.28) 
However, if the budget share of the want-independent consumer good is significantly high, 
then the value of t will have an upward bias. Therefore an adjustment is required for the 
budget share and the correct expression is given by the following elasticities formula (see 
Frisch 1959, equation 64). 
(3.36) 8= 
where 
ý(i-w, ý) 
.r 
w= the budget share of food 
Empirical Estimates (Table 3.1) 
The advantage of models based on demand analysis is the availability of reliable data in 
sufficient quantities for empirical estimation. In general, the empirical studies using the 
demand-for-food method display a fairly wide range of estimated c values. For example, 
Stern (1977) provides a survey of results that vary between I and 10. Another survey by 
Brown and Deaton (1972) covering different countries and data periods also displays a 
wide variety of c values averaging out at around 2 but their own estimation using a model 
of linear expenditure system (LES) produces a figure of 2.8. Parks and Barten (1973) 
study, also using a LES model, produces £ values in excess of 7 for both France and The 
Netherlands. 
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Table 3.1 The different methods of estimating a 
METHOD STUDY COUNTRY MODEL c 
Surve ethod 
Amiel et al 1999 0.50* 
ym s Barsky et al 1995 US 4.20 
Attanasio and Browning 1995 UK >1.00* 
Besley and Meghir 1998 Various >1.00* 
Life-Time 
consumption 
Blundell et al 1994 UK 0.88* 
models Cowell and Gardiner 1999 UK 1.00* 
Oxera 2002 UK 0.5-1.2 
Stem 1977 UK 4.0-5.0 
Banks et a11997 UK QUAIDS 1.07 
Blundell 1988 UK AIDS 1.97 
Blundell et al 1993 UK QUAIDS 1.06 
Demand models Brown & Deaton 1972 UK LES 2.80 
Evans 2004a UK CEM 1.60 
Evans 2004b France AIDS 1.33 
Evans, Kula and Sezer 2005 UK CEM 1.60 
Kula 1984 Canada CEM 1.56 
Kula 1984 US CEM 1.89 
Kula 2004 India CEM 1.64 
Parks and Barten 1973 FR & NL LES 7.05 
Percoco 2008 Italy CEM 1.28 
Stem 1977 Various Various 0-10 
Cowell and Gardiner 1999 UK 1.41 
Income T x 
Evans 2004b FR 1.33 
- a 
models Evans 2005 OECD (20) 1.40* 
Evans 2008 UK 1.97 
Evans and Kula 2009 Cyprus 1.0-1.3 
Evans and Sezer 2004 6 major countries 1.3-1.7 
Evans, Kula and Sezer 2005 UK 1.63 
Lopez 2008 9 LA countries 1.50` 
Percoco 2008 Italy 1.35 
Sezer 2007 Turkey 1.25 
Stem 1977 UK 1.97 
Source: Own compilation 
* Average values 
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The variety of these estimates indicates that the results are sensitive to the particular data 
period chosen, the sample size, the level of aggregation in the data and the particular 
specification of the model employed (Evans 2007). For example Kula (1984), using a 
constant elasticity model (CEM), estimates a to be 1.56 for Canada and 1.89 for the US. 
Using a more sophisticated demand model such as the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), the Blundell (1988) study produces 
a figure of 1.97 for the UK, but a later study by Blundell et al (1993) estimates the same 
figure, using a quadratic extension of almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS), to be as 
low as 1.06. Banks et al (1997) also employing a QUAIDS model arrives at a similar result 
of 1.07. More recent studies produce a more consistent value for E. For example, both 
Evans (2004a) and Evans et al (2005), using a CEM, estimate r to be 1.60 for the UK in 
both studies. Evans (2004b) also uses an AIDS model to estimate E for France and 
arrives at a figure of 1.33. Kula (2004) and Percoco (2008), both using a CEM, estimate 
the value of E as 1.64 for India and 1.28 for Italy, respectively. 
3.5.3 Revealed social values based on government policies 
The third approach concerns the estimation of r by considering social values of 
governments as revealed in their economic policies. A popular method is to regard E as 
the parameter for income inequality aversion (see Section 3.3) and to measure its value 
by considering government's aversion to income inequality as revealed by the 
progressivity of the income tax structure. The method is based on two major assumptions. 
One is that the tax system concerned reflects the principle of equal absolute sacrifice 
which means that the income tax taken from individuals involves the same sacrifice of 
utility for all tax payers regardless of income levels. The other is the assumption of an iso- 
elastic utility function The latter has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Section-2.2-2, 
and the former will be discussed below. 
The concept of equal absolute sacrifice is related to the generally accepted dictum that 
taxation must be fair (Brown and Jackson 1990). However, what constitutes 'fair' is a more 
controversial issue. The concept of horizontal equity, for example, relates fairness to 
different individuals in similar circumstances being treated similarly, i. e. those with the 
same amount of income and wealth should be regarded in the same light. However, this 
does not mean that persons with identical income and wealth should pay the same 
amount of tax, e. g. polluters may pay more tax. Vertical equity implies that those 
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individuals with high levels of income and wealth should pay more tax than those with low 
levels. In general there are two competing approaches to the issue of fairness in taxation. 
One is the benefit principle which is based on the concept of taxation being a voluntary 
payment for a public good received by the taxpayer. This principle dictates that an 
individual's tax payments should be determined by the benefit she receives from 
consuming public goods. Apart from the obvious problem of free riding, this principle 
ignores the equity dimension of taxation. Thus, John S. Mill rejected the benefit principle 
and instead introduced the principle of ability-to pay (Brown and Jackson 1990). Implicit in 
the principle of ability-to-pay is the concept of equality of sacrifice associated with income 
tax paid. 
The principle of equal absolute sacrifice implies that each taxpayer experiences the same 
amount of loss out of total welfare (utility). This features prominently in public sector 
economics; see, for example, Richter (1983), Vitallano (1977) and Young (1987). The tax 
model based on the principle of equal absolute sacrifice, which is also called the basic 
model, is a simple mathematical model. This simplicity perhaps accounts for its popularity 
in the literature (see, for example, Cowell and Gardiner 1999, Evans 2005, Evans and 
Sezer 2004, Evans and Kula 2009, Lopez 2008, Percoco 2008 and Stern 1977). However, 
the use of this principle is criticised by Creedy (2006) on the grounds of being rather 
simplistic. He questions whether it is a good idea to model the tax structure as if it arose 
from equal absolute sacrifice indicating that other principles, such as the principle of 
proportional equal sacrifice, produce an even more progressive tax structure. Stem 
(1977), on the other hand, argues that the equal absolute sacrifice model fits the data 
better and thus statistically out-performs models using more complicated income tax 
structures. Evans (2005 and 2008) also claims that the basic model's simplicity is Its virtue 
and that the model has strong statistical support compared with alternatives. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the basic model, i. e. the one based on the assumption of 
equal absolute sacrifice, are as follows. Let us assume that 
Y= taxable income and 
T (Y) = the tax function 
The principle of equal absolute sacrifice requires that the absolute difference between the 
pre-tax and the post tax welfare (utility) be the same for all taxpayers (levels of income). 
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Thus 
(3.37) U(Y)-U[Y-T(Y)]=k 
where 
U (Y) = an iso-elastic utility function that is the same for all taxpayers 
That is 
(3.38) U(Y) = 
Y(1-s) -1 
1-s 
Substituting (3.38) into (3.37) gives the following equation: 
Y(1-ý) -1 
ýY -T (Y)](1-E) -1 (3.39) 
Taking the total differential of equation (3.39) gives 
(3.40) Y -E -[Y-T (Y)]-E 
[1-t (Y)]= 0 
After re-arranging terms and simplifying, the relationship becomes, 
s 
(3.41) [1-t(Y)]= 1-TýY) 
Taking logs in (3.41) gives, 
(3.42) ln[l-t(Y)]=slnýlTýY) 
1 
By re-arranging we obtain 
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(3.43) s= 
In l-T 
(Y) 
Y 
I 
where 
t (Y) = the marginal tax function 
It is worth pointing out that the value of E will vary according to which definition of the 
average tax rate is used in equation (3.43). For example, Stem (1977) uses the 
conventional definition and calculates the average tax rate as the ratio of tax liability to 
pre-tax income before the deduction of standard personal tax allowances. However, 
Evans (2005) argues that this particular definition introduces a strong upward bias into the 
calculation of E at relatively low income levels. Thus, his definition of the average tax rate 
is the ratio of tax liability to pre-tax income after the deduction of standard tax allowances. 
He admits that this method would produce a unitary c value at low levels of income where 
only a single tax rate applies. However he justifies the procedure by arguing that people 
do not start paying tax on income until they have at least reached a subsistence wage 
level and that it is reasonable to assume that diminishing marginal utility applies to 
incomes over and above the subsistence level. We will follow Evans (2005) In the 
calculation of r for Turkey using the basic tax model in Chapter 5. 
Empirical evidence (Table 3.1) 
Empirical estimates of r arising from the tax-based evidence show similar variation to 
those based on demand-for-food models. The highest one is given by Stem (1977) who 
estimates c for the UK, without including the employees' social security contributions 
(ESSC), to be 1.97. The high value of E is partly due to the definition of average tax 
represented by the ratio of average tax liability to pre-tax income before the deduction of 
personal tax allowances. The Cowell & Gardiner (1999) study estimates two values of E 
for the UK, one with the ESSC and one without. Not surprisingly, the former, 1.28, is lower 
than the latter, 1.41 since the inclusion of the ESSC raises the average tax rate relative to 
the marginal rate. However, the study is ambiguous in the definition of pre-tax income 
regarding the deduction of personal tax allowances. 
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Both studies employ regression analysis to derive a value for c based on equation (3.33) 
but suppress the constant. This constitutes the imposition of the underlying theory on the 
model specification. It would have been more desirable to include the constant in the 
equation to see if the theory is empirically supported since a small and statistically 
insignificant constant would provide such support. The appropriateness of regression can 
also be questioned for both the size of the sample and the direction of the causation. 
(Evans 2007). It would appear more plausible to regress the average tax rate on the 
marginal tax rate arguing that the causation would be from the latter to the former, not the 
other way around as presumed by equation (3.42). The relatively high value obtained by 
the Stem (1977) study is partly due to the fact that the pre-tax income is calculated before 
the deduction of standard tax allowances. In fact, reworking of the Stern data taking into 
account the tax allowances reduce the value of c to 1.58. (See Evans 2008). 
Evans (2004b and 2005) estimates E to be 1.33 for France, 1.24 for the UK and an 
average of 1.40 for twenty OECD countries. Both studies are based on income tax data 
without the ESSC and pre-tax income after the deduction of standard tax allowances, and 
make use of equation (3.43) without regression. The pre-tax income is represented by the 
average production wage in manufacturing industries and the value of z is calculated at 
four different points of the gross wage distribution in order to arrive at an average c value. 
The use of the pre-tax income after deducting standard tax allowances is justified by 
arguing that diminishing marginal utility would apply only for income in excess of 
subsistence level. A similar study by Evans and Sezer (2005) provides estimates of E for 
the EU-15 plus the 2004 entrants with a range of 1.10-1.81 
Finally, Percoco (2008) employs a model based on Income tax data provided by the 
OECD Taxation Statistics that Include the employees' social security contributions 
(ESSC), and estimates an average c value of 1.35 for Italy. However, the study does not 
explicitly state whether the pre-tax income is before or after the deduction of standard tax 
allowances. 
The advantages of the basic tax model for estimating the c value are its conceptual 
simplicity, its concern regarding fairness, its relation to marginal utility and Its 
measurability (Spackman 2007). However, it is criticised on the grounds that the results 
obtained for E are sensitive to tax coverage. For example, E measures would be lower If 
employees' social security contributions are included in the tax rates. They would also be 
lower if average tax rates were measured relative to income after the deduction of basic 
allowances rather than before since both would increase the value [t (Y) / YJ In equation 
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(3.43). The method as used in the literature could also be criticised for ignoring the 
weighting. For the purpose of estimating E in the context of calculating a country's STPR, 
it is important to weight the data according to the number of individuals paying tax at each 
different rate, since changes in per capita national income (consumption) over time are 
the relevant consideration. In most countries, only a small number of different income tax 
rates apply with a relatively small proportion of tax-payers paying high marginal tax rates. 
Taking this fact into account would reduce the value of c for use in social discounting. 
Moreover, concentrating on income tax rates alone provides a somewhat distorted picture 
regarding a government's aversion to income inequality. For example, a government 
might shift the tax structure in favour of indirect taxation for reasons other than concerns 
for equity such as convenience; or because the government might worry about the 
incentive effects of a highly progressive tax system. In either case the actual income tax 
structure would be less progressive than otherwise, which would under-reveal the 
government's aversion to inequality and therefore give rise to the under-estimation of the 
value of E (Spackman 2007). 
These concerns led Evans (2006) to consider alternative ways in which governments 
might reveal social values that might be indicative of implied values of c. One possibility is 
the arrangements for foreign aid. Currently, the internationally agreed target for foreign aid 
is 0.7% of the gross national income (GNI) of the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD which consists of 22 rich countries and the European 
Commission (UN 2008). Although the achievement of the 0.7% target is a hotly debated 
topic in the development literature, the actual proportion itself is not the issue here. On the 
assumption of a constant proportion of the GDP for all developed countries, in conjunction 
with the principle of equal absolute sacrifice, equation (3.34) would mutatls mutandis 
produce a unitary value for E since the marginal and average rates of foreign aid 
contributions would be the same over time. 
The other alternative is income related fines for minor offences. A new law proposed by 
the government in The Management of Offenders and Sentencing Bill, January 2005, 
brings in income-related fines for certain traffic offences. The fine structure is based on 
the seriousness of the offence and the income of the offender. For example, a relatively 
minor offence, such as a child passenger not complying with the seatbelt regulations, 
incurs a fine of ten times the offenders' daily disposable income, subject to a maximum 
fine of £750. Whereas a more serious offence, such as driving without insurance incurs a 
fine of 200 times the offenders' daily disposable income with a maximum fine of £15 000. 
The definition of disposable income is the after-tax income minus basic living costs such 
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as expenditure on food, housing and utilities. Again, the underlying assumption here is 
that diminishing marginal utility of income only kicks in after basic human needs are met 
(see Evans 2008). 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
A comparison of the values estimated by the different methods explored above reveals a 
fairly wide range of values for t (see Table 3.1). 
The survey methods show a wide variety of estimates of c and little else needs to be said 
about this method for the reasons stated in section 3.1.1, but in particular for the fact that 
the estimates are highly sensitive to the nature of the questions asked and that it is not 
very easy to obtain a truly representative cross section of the whole population reflecting 
all the cultural characteristics which might be influential in the determination of risk 
aversion. 
As for the life-time consumption models, they display a fairly high degree of variation with 
respect to the value of E due to the high value estimated by Stem (1977). However, the 
figure of 5.00 by the study was criticised by Scott (1989) for being unduly high (see 
Section 3.5.2). In fact, if one excludes the Stem figure, this group contains the narrowest 
figures for e varying from 0.88 to just over unity. 
The demand models covering various countries and several different models also appear 
to produce a wide variety of figures for r ranging from just over unity to 101 However, If 
one ignores the earlier studies of the 1970s, the figures seem to be much closer to each 
other for different countries ranging from 1.28 for Italy to 1.89 for the US (see Table 3.1). 
The estimates of F obtained from income-tax models show a degree of consistency with a 
range of 1.24-1.97. It is worth noting in this context that the average figure of 1.4 for 20 
OECD countries in a study by Evans (2005) belies a remarkable degree of consistency 
since the variation of estimates of c is confined to a fairly narrow band averaging from 1.3 
for France to 1.6 for Germany. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. One is that there is a fair 
degree of variation regarding the value of E not only between the four different methods 
employed but also between different studies within the same method. The other is that 
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after a critical evaluation of the methods of estimating e, it would appear that the least 
controversial and the most commonly used method of estimating the elasticity of marginal 
utility of income are demand-for food analysis (the FFF model), and the income tax 
models 
The survey model is highly problematic firstly because of the logistics of setting up a 
reliable representative sample to obtain direct evidence, secondly because of the 
subjective nature of eliciting information about the concept of risk aversion, and finally 
because of the sensitivity of the estimates to the nature of the questions asked. 
The life-time consumption behaviour method is also empirically problematic because of 
the criticism of using a single bond rate, particularly, if the spread between the lending and 
the borrowing rates is reasonably wide. Another empirical issue is the interruption to the 
time series data when there is a restructuring of the financial system and/or financial 
crises occurring in the middle of the data period. 
This is particularly important for Turkey since the country suffered two financial crisis, one 
in 1994 and another in 2000/01, the latter being followed up by a substantial restructuring 
of the banking system. The average interest rates were almost four times as high at the 
end of December 2000 as they were at the beginning of November (Ozatay and Sak 
2002). Thus, it would be very difficult to construct an inter-temporal consumption model to 
estimate the EIS for Turkey. An additional data problem would be the lack of a reliable 
time series regarding a reasonable measure of wealth. 
Consequently, this study will use two approaches in order to arrive at an estimate of a for 
Turkey in Chapter 5. Firstly, a suitable demand model such as CEM or AIDS will be 
employed to estimate the income and compensated-price elasticities for a want- 
independent composite commodity, namely food, in order to calculate the value of C. 
Secondly, an income-tax model based on the assumption of equal absolute sacrifice will 
be employed using the Turkish progressive tax system to provide an alternative estimate 
for E. The results of these two methods will be evaluated to select an appropriate value for 
the elasticity of marginal utility of income (consumption), e, to be used in the calculation of 
the social discount rate and the regional welfare rates for Turkey to be applied In long- 
term project evaluation in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 Evaluation of Empirical Evidence on 
Social Discount Rate and Social 
Welfare Weights 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we discussed the theoretical basis for and the issues surrounding the 
derivation of the social discount rate (SDR) and social welfare weights (SWW) and 
examined the relationship between per capita income (consumption) and diminishing 
marginal utility and the properties of iso-elastic utility functions. Also in Chapter 2 we 
established that the preferred SDR for long term government investment projects is the 
social time preference rate (STPR) which Is defined as the rate at which the society is 
prepared to substitute future consumption for present consumption. For that reason It is 
also called the consumption rate of interest. In a two-period analysis, this rate is equal to 
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption at any point on a given societal 
indifference curve. Mathematically, it is derived by imposing a budget constraint involving 
consumption choices over two periods on a suitably simple inter-temporal consumption- 
utility function and treating it as a constrained-maximisation problem (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.5). Thus, the STPR is given by equation (4.1) below 
(4.1) STPR = p+s. g 
where 
p= utility discount rate 
c= elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
g= average growth of per capita real consumption 
A proper understanding of STPR requires the exploration and discussion of the issues 
surrounding the separate components of equation (4.1) 
The theoretical issues surrounding p and g were discussed in Chapter 2 and both the 
theoretical and the empirical considerations with respect to E were discussed in Chapter 3. 
What remains to be done is a discussion of the empirical results concerning p and g. 
Thus, this chapter will examine the empirical literature relating to the social discount rate 
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(SDR) focusing on the different components of the STPR, i. e. the utility discount rate, p 
and the growth rate, g. It will also explore the empirical literature on the different welfare 
weights, especially in a regional context. 
4.2 Social time preference rate (STPR) 
In this section the focus will be on surveying the empirical studies regarding the utility 
discount rate (the time preference rate), p, and the growth rate of consumption, g, and on 
the evaluation of the estimated values of these parameters in different studies. Then, 
combining this survey with the empirical estimates of E, we will evaluate the empirical 
studies that provide the estimates of STPR for various countries. 
4.2.1 The utility discount rate, p 
The term p in equation (4.1) is supposed to reflect a preference of what is available now 
over what is expected in the future. It defines the valuation of future marginal utility by the 
current society and is referred to as the utility discount rate. However, the utility discount 
rate itself contains two conceptual elements. One is the pure time preference rate, b and 
the other is the rate of decrease in We chances, L which includes the concept of the 
catastrophe risk (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5). 
Thus we have 
(4.2) p=S+L 
It should be noted that some studies ignore life chances, L, In which case the utility 
discount rate (the time preference rate), p, and the pure time preference rate, 5, become 
synonymous, that is, in equation (4.2) p becomes equal to ö. Conversely, other studies 
assume the pure time preference rate, b is zero and hence equate the utility discount rate, 
p with life chances, L. 
Several studies have, using average death rates, estimated mortality-based measures of 
L, for various countries. For example, Kula (1984) estimates p, based on life chances, to 
be around 1% for the US and Canada. He rejects the argument that the pure discount rate 
is based on irrational and myopic behaviour on the part of individuals (see Chapter 2, 
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Section 2.3.4) and makes the assumption that individuals discount their future utility by the 
probability of being alive at a given future date. He, thus, calculates the annual average 
survival probability for Mr Average' on the basis of the average annual death rates. 
However, Kula (1985) also estimated the average annual survival probability in the UK 
during 1900-1975 to be 2.2%. In a later study he revises this and provides a figure of 
1.2% for the average annual probability of death in the UK in 1975 (Kula 1987). 
Pearce and Ulph (1999) argue that for long-term projects the appropriate concept of risk 
would be the life chances of whole generations -even though they employ a method of 
calculation that is similar to that of Kula- and produce a figure of 1.1%. Using a similar 
argument to that of Kula, Evans and Sezer (2002) estimate the probability of survival of an 
average consumer to be very close to 1% in the UK. Evans (2004b) makes the point that 
the pure time preference rate is hardly amenable to empirical analysis and that the 
literature suggests, nevertheless, that it is within the range of 0.0 - 0.5%. So he uses an 
intermediate figure of 0.2 for S for France without further justification. He also stipulates 
that the death rates in France are similar to those in the UK and other developed countries 
and suggests, based on the figures provided in the literature, a figure of 1% for L. Thus, 
his estimate of p for France is 1.2. 
Kula (2004), in another mortality-based estimation, produces a figure around 1% for p for 
India. Evans and Sezer (2005) also employing the mortality-based. approach use the 
annual average death rates in 2003 and 2004 for 19 European countries (with a range of 
0.8% to 1.3%) to calculate p to be 11%. Moreover, Evans (2007) also uses a figure of 11% 
based on the approximate average annual death rate in 2002-2004 in 15 countries of the 
European Union. Percoco (2008) reports that 60% of the respondents opted for a zero 
rate pure time preference in The Survey of Households Income and Wealth' conducted in 
2000 by the Bank of Italy but the weighted average figure is 5.87%. He argues not only 
that this is too high but also that it is a statistical anomaly, and reasons that both ethically 
and statistically a value of zero for 5 would be the appropriate rate. Moreover, using 
recent mortality rates for Italy he also estimates L to be 0.98-1 %. Thus, his figure for p Is 
around 1%. Lopez (2008) also bases his estimate of p for nine Latin American countries 
on mortality rates and opts for a figure of 1% by arguing that most of the empirical studies 
regarding developed countries suggest a figure between 1% and 1.5% with a mid-point of 
1.25%. He 'corrects' this figure downwards to 1% by arguing that Latin American countries 
have lower mortality rates than developed countries. However, he bases his argument on 
a dubious procedure which involves comparing the average death rate (0.6%) of nine 
Latin American countries with the average death rate (0.8) of selected nine developed 
countries. Azar (2009), following Evans and Sezer (2004), allows the pure time preference 
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rate, 5 to be equal to 0.5% and estimates L to have a value of 1.0% and therefore assigns 
a value of 1.5% to p for the US. In a similar fashion, Evans and Kula (2009) assume that 5 
must be around 0.3%. They add to this the estimated value of L, based on crude death 
rate figures, of 0.7% and thus produce a figure of 1% for p for Cyprus. The EU Guide to 
CBA of investment projects states that mortality-based statistics would indicate a 1% 
death rate for the majority of the countries and thus stipulates I% as the overall value of p 
(European Commission 2008). In fact, the value of p varies between 1.0% and 1.4% for 
Cohesion Fund (CF) countries and between 0.9% and 1.1% for the non-Cohesion Fund 
(NCF) countries. 
A variant of the concept of life chances is the concept of catastrophe risk. It is the risk 
associated with the fact that future generations may not be able to enjoy the returns of the 
intended investment due to natural or man-made disasters such as war, a nuclear disaster 
or a major and devastating earthquake, etc. Despite the fact that the quantification of such 
risk is not easy by its very nature, Scott (1989) stated that the changing life chance due to 
the risk of total destruction of a society was 1 %. He also considers myopia (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.3.5) and attributes a value of 0.5 to 6. Newbery (1992) suggests a figure of 
1% which is supposed to be consistent with 'perceived risk of the end of mankind in 100 
years'. 
HM Treasury's Green Book defines the catastrophe risk as the occurrence of an event 
which would wipe out most of the benefits of projects and policies at a future date. It 
assumes, based on some sort of average of various estimates in the literature, 1% for 
catastrophe risk and 0.5% for pure time preference and thus suggests an overall value of 
1.5% for p (HM Treasury 2003). OXERA (2002) also uses the averaging method and 
assumes the risk of death to be 1.1% in the current period with a projected change in the 
near future to 1.0%. Evans and Sezer (2004) stipulate a catastrophe rate of 1% for 
European countries and 1.5% for countries such as Japan (earthquakes), Australia 
(bushfire) and the US (terrorism). More recently, the Stem Review refers to the risk of 
extinction of the human race, possibly as a result of random events such as an outbreak 
of an epidemic, a nuclear war, or even a collision with a meteorite, which is supposed to 
be 0.1 % (Stem 2007). It must be stated that all the figures relating to catastrophe rate are 
rather arbitrary since it is not possible to determine the value of the catastrophe rate from 
actual observations. 
Table 4.1 shows the empirical estimates of p given by various studies. A significant 
feature of the figures in this table is that they are, with the exception of Kula (1985), either 
equal to 1.0 or very close to it. Four of the relatively high figures, i. e. Azar (2009), 
98 
Table 4.1 Utility discount rate (p) estimates 
Study Country Theoretical 
basis 
p (%) 
Arrow 1995 N/A Pure social time 
preference 
1.0 
Azar 2008 US CR and MR 1.5 
EC 2008 EU MR 1.0 
Evans 2004 FR MR 1.2 
Evans 2007 EU 15 MR 1.0 
Evans and Kula 2009 Cyprus CR and MR 1.0 
Evans and Sezer 2002 UK MR 1.0 
Evans and Sezer 2004 6 major countries CR 1.3 
Evans and Sezer 2005 EU 19 MR 1.0 
HM Treasury 2003 UK CR and MR 1.5 
Kula 1984 Canada and US MR 1.0 
Kula 1985 UK MR 2.2 
Kula 1987 UK MR 1.2 
Kula 2004 India MR 1.0 
Lopez 2008 9 LA countries MR 1.0 
Newberry Any CR 1.0 
OXERA 2002 UK Myopia & CR 1.5 
Pearce and Ulph 1999 UK MR 1.1 
Percoco 2008 Italy MR 1.0 
Scott 1989 N/A Myopia & CR 1.3 
Stem 2007 N/A CR 0.1 
Source: Own compilation 
Notes: 
MR: mortality rate 
CR: Catastrophe risk 
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HM Treasury (2003), OXERA (2002), and Scott (1989), are due to the fact that the figure 
includes both a positive pure time preference rate and a catastrophe rate. The fifth one by 
Evans and Sezer (2004) refers to the average of six countries. The three European 
countries have ap value of 1% each but the three non-European ones are assigned a 
high catastrophe rate of 1.5% for exceptional reasons stated in the previous paragraph. 
4.2.2 The growth rate of consumption, 
The rationale for including the growth rate of consumption in the discount rate is that 
marginal utility diminishes as consumption increases. So, as per capita consumption 
tends to increase over time, future generations will be richer than the current generation 
and therefore marginal utility of consumption falls. Thus the discount rate will depend 
upon the future growth rate and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (Potts 
2002) as well as the utility discount rate. This effect is represented by the second term in 
equation (4.1), E. g, that is, the product of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, E 
and the annual growth in per capita consumption, g. 
a) Alternative methods of estimating g 
A common method of representing g is to generate the expected growth rates of per 
capita consumption over the next few decades. This is done by considering the 
consumption (or the GDP) growth of the past few decades and then taking an average of 
these projected figures. There are however, four technical approaches to this standard 
method: 
1) One is to consider the past annual growth rates and then take an arithmetic average 
and the resulting growth rate would be the projected growth for future periods. 
2) The second is the same as the previous one but the geometric instead of arithmetic 
mean is used. The geometric average growth rate of consumption over N years is 
given by equation (4.3). 
(4.3) '_ (1+g)N 
CO 
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where 
CC = real per capita consumption in the final year of the data period 
Co = real per capita consumption in the first year of the data period 
g= the average growth rate 
N= the length of the data period in years 
Solving for g will give 
' -1 (4.4) g CO 
3) The third method is to employ a semi-log regression model given in equation (4.5) 
below 
(4.5) LnC=a+gt 
where 
C= per capita real consumption 
a=a constant 
t= the number of years in the data period 
g= the growth rate of per capita real consumption, 
and variable LnCC, the log of observed consumption values, is regressed on variable (t), 
the time. The resultant estimate for the coefficient g is the projected annual growth rate. 
4) Finally, the fourth method of estimating g is to calculate the 'required' rate of growth of 
consumption. This is done when the country for which the STPR is estimated is 
expected to converge economically with a country or group of countries at some future 
date. 
The actual calculation of the required growth rate is given by equation (4.6) 
(4.6) X=A(1+g)N 
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Taking logs and rearranging 
(4.7) g -- 
LnX - LnA 
N 
where 
A= the current real GDP per capita of the country concerned 
X= the projected real GDP per capita in the target country in N year's time 
g= the required growth rate of real GDP per capita in country A 
For example, the new entrants into the EU are expected to catch up with the more affluent 
members of the EU at some future date, after all this is the rationale behind the Cohesion 
Fund. Thus, taking the EU-15 as the norm and projecting the average growth rate of EU- 
15 to some future date, the 'required' growth rate for a new entrant would be based on its 
current GDP and this projected growth rate if the country is assumed to be capable of 
achieving 100% convergence with EU-15 by that date. Alternatively, if less than 100% 
convergence can be assumed the required growth rate would be lower accordingly. 
b) Empirical estimates 
Table 4.2 shows estimates of g provided by various studies for different countries. Kula 
(1984,1985 and 2004) prefers the regression method and estimates g using this method 
to be 2.3%, 2.8%, 2.0% and 2.4% for the US, Canada, the UK and India respectively. 
However, Pearce and Ulph (1999) argue that basing g on the expected growth of per 
capita consumption might be problematic. If leisure is substituted for consumption then g 
will be under- estimated. If, on the other hand, real per capita consumption fails to take 
into account the rising social costs of consumption, e. g. environmental damage, then g will 
be over-estimated. They suggest that taking very long-run growth rates will smooth out 
these considerations. Their estimate of g for the UK is 1.3% p. a. for the period of 1885-95 
and 2.2% p. a. for 1951-92. OXERA (2002) agrees with Pearce and Ulph (1999) and 
considers a long data period of 100-180 years for the UK. Making use of the calculations 
for long term growth rates of GDP in the UK by Maddison (2001), it suggests a value of 
1.3-1.6 for g. The UK government's latest Green Book (HM Treasury 2003) considers a 
shorter time period and also refers to Maddison (2001) in which the growth rate of output 
for the UK is estimated to be 2.1% for the period of 1950-98. However, the Green Book 
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also considers a survey by the Treasury itself, and suggests a figure of 2% for g for the 
UK. 
Table 4.2 Real per capita consumption growth rate (g) estimates 
Study Country g (%) 
Azar 2008 US 2.2 
EC 2008 NCF countries 
CF countries 
1.9 
4.0 
Evans 2004 FR 2.0 
Evans 2007 Euro Zone Cons. 2.09 
GDP 2.06 
Evans and Kula 2009 Cyprus 3.1 
Evans and Sezer 2002 6 major countries 1.8 
Evans and Sezer 2004 6 major countries 1.8 
Evans and Sezer 2005 EU-15 
2004 entrants 
2.2 
2.8 
HM Treasury 2003 UK 2.0 
Kula 1984 US 
Canada 
2.3 
2.8 
Kula 1985 UK 2.0 
Kula 2004 India 2.4 
Lopez 2008 9 LA countries 2.5 
OXERA 2002 UK 1.5 
Pearce and Ulph 1999 UK 2.2 
Percoco 2008 Italy Cons. 1.8 
GDP 2.1 
Scott 1989 UK 2.2 
Stem 2007 UK 1.3 
Source: Own compilation 
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Evans (2004) applies the geometric average method of equation (4.3) to the data period 
of 1970- 2001 and calculates g for France as 2%. Interestingly, Evans (2007), using the 
same method applied to the data period of 1970 -2004, calculates the average growth rate 
for both real consumption per capita and real GDP per capita for the Euro Zone as 2.09% 
and 2.06%, respectively. Evans and Sezer (2004) calculate the average growth rate of 
real per capita household consumption between 1970-2001 for six major OECD countries 
(Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) to be 2.1% for the European 
countries and 2.2% for the other three. In another study, Evans and Sezer (2005) 
calculate g for two different groups of EU countries. The figures for the EU-15 before 2004 
expansion range from 1% for Denmark to 3% for Ireland with an average of 2.18%; and 
for the four new entrants in 2004, namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, based on a shorter data period growth ranges from 1.4% for the Czech Republic 
to 4.6% for Poland with an average of 3.83%. 
Lopez (2008) without explicitly stating which method he is employing provides estimates 
of g-values for nine Latin American countries basing his calculations on the growth figures 
of GDP for the data period of 1961-2006. He points out two types of problems involved in 
taking such a long time period. One is that many of the countries concerned witnessed 
negative growth rates in per capita consumption in the 1980s with the exception of Chile 
and Colombia and thus the period covering the 1980s could be regarded as an outlier. 
The second is that due to the reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, the future 
growth prospects could be quite different from those suggested by the trend based on the 
past forty odd years. Consequently, he considers different scenarios under which the 
projected average value of g for the nine Latin American countries varies between 2.4% 
and 4.1%. 
Percoco (2008) states that the average growth rate of per capita GDP in Italy over the 
period 1980 to 2004 has been 2.1%, and adopts this figure for g for Italy. He also points 
out that if the average growth rate of per capita consumption over the same data period 
were used the value of g would be 1.8%. 
Evans and Kula (2009), instead of using the past growth rates for Cyprus, estimate the 
projected growth rates for the EU-15 between 2007 and 2035 and calculate the required 
growth rate for Cyprus on the assumption that North Cyprus will achieve 90% 
convergence with the EU-15 by 2035 while South Cyprus will achieve 100% convergence. 
The EU Guide to CBA of investment projects (EC2008) suggests that the best approach 
to the estimation of g would be to select an appropriate growth model for each economy 
104 
and then to estimate a long-term development path. However, contrary to its own 
suggestion, it opts for a value based on past annual growth rates. Thus, g varies between 
1.3% and 2.5% for NCF countries and between 3.5% and 4.5% for CF countries. 
4.2.3 Empirical estimates of STPR 
So what would be the appropriate STPR for public projects? Not surprisingly there is not a 
single rate emerging in the literature. However, there is convergence towards a fairly 
narrow band. Table 4.3 combines the empirical estimates of p and g that have been 
discussed above with the estimates of e discussed in Chapter 3 to display the STPR 
figures provided for various countries by a variety of studies. 
Kula (2004) uses regression analysis based on the FFF model to estimate a value for C, 
employs a mortality-rate based model to calculate the pure time preference rate, and a 
30-year time series data set to estimate an average growth rate for consumption and 
arrives at an estimated STPR of 5.2% for India. He argues that this is a reasonable result 
for India when one considers the fact that the interest rate on advances by commercial 
banks varies between 7-10%. Moreover, given the private sector profitability of 10-12%, 
he argues that following the British government's practice of halving the rate of profitability 
to arrive at a SDR, his figure of 5.3% for India is a reasonable one. In a later paper (Kula 
2006), he criticises the British government's reduced (HM Treasury 2003) rate of 3.5% for 
the SDR by arguing that the value of c is more likely to be around 1.6 and thus even with 
a conservative figure of 2.5% for the growth of income per capita and the government's 
own figure of 1.5% for the pure time discount rate, the SOR for the UK becomes 5.5%, 
which is much higher than the current official rate. 
Evans and Sezer (2004) criticise the inconsistency of approach within the EU. For 
example, in France the SDR based on the marginal product of capital was 8% in real 
terms while Germany had applied only a 3% rate based on financial market data. In their 
study, they assign a value of 1% for p for France, Germany and the UK and 1.5% for 
Australia, Japan and the US (see Section 4.2.1 above) and calculate the value of g as 
2.1% for the first three and 2.2% for the other three. In estimating c values they adopt the 
revealed social values approach and employ a taxed-based model making use of the 
concept of equal absolute sacrifice of satisfaction to produce a figure ranging from 1.3 to 
1.7. Based on these figures they estimate the average STPR for France, Germany and 
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Table 4.3 STPR estimates in various studies 
Study Country p 
(%) 
e g 
(%) 
STPR 
(%) 
Azar 2008 US 1.50 1.0 2.2 3.7 
EC 2008 Non CF countries 
CF countries 
1.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.5 
1.7 
3.0 
3.5 
5.5 
Evans 2004 France 1.2 1.3 2.0 3.8 
Evans 2007 Euro Zone 
CF countries 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
2.1 
4.0 
3.1 
5.0 
Evans and Kula 2009 Cyprus 1.0 1.3 3.1 5.0 
Evans and Sezer 2002 UK 1.0 1.6 2.3 4.7 
Evans and Sezer 2004 FR, GER, UK 
AUS('>, JAP, US 
1.0 
1.5 
1.4 
1.5 
2.1 
2.2 
3.9 
4.8 
Evans and Sezer 2005 EU 15 
2004 Entrants (4) 
0.9 
1.3 
1.6 
1.4 
2.2 
2.8 
3.5 
5.2 
HM Treasury 2003 UK 1.5 1.0 2.0 3.5 
Kula 1984 US 
Canada 
1.0 
1.0 
1.9 
1.6 
2.3 
2.8 
5.4 
5.5 
Kula 1985 UK 2.2 0.7 2.0 3.6 
Kula 2004 India 1.3 1.6 2.4 5.2 
Lopez 2008 9 LA countries 1.0 1.5 2.5 4.8 
OXERA 2002 UK 1.5 1.0 1.5 3.0 
Pearce and Ulph 1999 UK 1.7 1.0 2.2 3.9 
Percoco 2008 Italy 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.7 
Scott 1989 UK 1.3 1.5 2.2 4.6 
Stern 2007 UK 0.1 1 1.3 1.4 
Source: Own compilation 
Notes: 
(1) AUS = Australia 
(2) The actual formula used by Kula is STPR (1 + g)6 
(-J 
-1. Also figures given in the table are P 
rounded-up versions of those used by Kula. Thus the figures in the table are slightly higher than the 
original figures estimated by Kula 
106 
the UK to be 3.9% and the STPR for Australia, Japan and the US to be 4.8% (see Table 
4.3) 
Evans and Sezer (2005) extend their estimation of STPR to 19 EU countries divided into 
two separate categories, namely, the EU-15 and the Cohesion Fund (CF) countries (4). 
They estimate p to be 0.9 for EU-15 and 1.3 for CF countries. Their figure for g is 2.2% for 
the former and 2.8% for the latter. Their estimated values of a are based on the income- 
tax method and vary between 1.3 for Demark and 2.0 for Ireland. Based on these figures, 
the average value of STPR is 3.5% for the EU-15 and 5.2% for the four new entrants in 
2004. However, they also make the point that although the STPR differs across EU 
countries, the differences are not as large as those that exist between Germany (3%) and 
France (8%). They point out that if all rates were consistently based on STPR then the 
French discount rate would fall sharply to 3.2% and the German rate would be a 
percentage point higher 
In a later study Evans (2007) reiterates the desirability of a common approach to the 
application of the social discount rates. He also points out that the French government 
revised its SDR reducing it to 3.5% in 2005, and that there is now near convergence 
between three important European countries, namely, the UK, France and Germany. 
Percoco (2008) following Evans and Sezer (2002,2004 and 2005) employs both the FFF 
and the income-tax models to estimate F and produces two similar figures of about 1.3. 
His value of 2.1 % for g is based on the average growth rate of per capita GDP over a data 
period of 1980-2004 but he notes that if the consumption growth Instead of the growth of 
GDP were used the figure would be 1.8%. Using survey data and some interesting 
arguments (see Section 4.2.1) he assumes that the value of b would be zero and that the 
value of p based on mortality rates would be equal to I%. Thus, his estimate of the STPR 
for Italy varies between 3.69% and 3.83% depending on whether one uses the c value 
from the demand study or the income-tax model. He argues therefore that his estimated 
STPR is 1.2% -1.3% lower than the official discount rate of 5% set by the Ministry of the 
Economy based on European Commission (2002) Guidance. 
The EU Guide to CBA (European Commission 2008, Annex B, Table B. 2) provides 
estimates of p, a and g values for the CF and Non-CF countries individually and estimates 
the STPR value for each country, which ranges from 5.3% to 8.1% for the CF and from 
3.1 % to 4.1 for Non-CF countries. On this basis, it suggests a reference SDR of 5.5% for 
the CF and 3.5% for Non-CF countries for 2007-2013. 
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Lopez (2008), notwithstanding a discussion of the problems of structural breaks, using a 
long data period of 1961-2006, estimates g on the basis of growth rates of GDP of 9 LA 
countries and arrives at an average figure of 2.5%. He argues for a figure of 1% for p 
based on mortality rates; and using the income-tax method estimates an average value of 
1.5 for E. Thus, his average figure of STPR for 9 LA countries is 4.8%. 
Azar (2009) states that there are three methods of measuring the SDR in a country. One 
is the specification of a benchmark financial rate, the second is the STPR approach, and 
the third is the opportunity cost of private investment approach. He states that the first 
approach is the one followed by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) but his 
preferred method is the third one. However, he then argues that if one used the STPR 
approach to the determination of the social discount rate in the US, it would be 
appropriate, following Evans and Sezer (2002), to assign a value of 1.5% to p. He then 
departs from tradition and suggests a value of 1.0 for a based on a CAPM model (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3) of returns on stocks and dividends computed in an earlier paper 
of his (Azar 2008). Thus, he suggests that given that the US g is estimated to be 2.2%, 
the STPR value for the US would be 3.7%. He then proceeds to estimate the SDR for the 
US according to the opportunity cost approach on the assumption that markets are perfect 
and that public spending displaces private investment. His figure for SDR using this 
method is also 3.7%. 
Evans and Kula (2009) estimate both the STPR and the RWW (see Section 4.3.1) for 
Cyprus based on the division of the island into the North (Turkish) and the South (Greek). 
They allow a small percentage figure for the pure time preference rate, 6, and around 
0.77% for L based on death rates and thus assign a value of 1% for p. They estimate 
using the income-tax method an average c value of 1.3%. They concede that the recent 
growth rate of GDP on average has been over 6% for N. Cyprus and over 2% for S. 
Cyprus. However, instead of using a figure for g based on the past growth rates, they take 
the projected growth rates for the EU-15 between 2007 and 2035 and calculate the 
required convergence growth rate for both North and South Cyprus. On the assumption 
that N. Cyprus will achieve 90% GDP convergence with the EU-15 by 2035 while S. 
Cyprus will achieve 100% convergence, they estimate g to be 4.37% for N. Cyprus and 
2.65% for and S. Cyprus respectively, with an average of 3.08% for 'All Cyprus' (see 
Section 4.2.2 above). Based on these projections they estimate the STPR for N. Cyprus 
as 6.7% and for S. Cyprus as 4.5% which give an average figure of 5% for 'AII Cyprus'. 
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An interesting feature of Table 4.3 is that there is a direct correspondence between the 
estimates of STPR produced by Evans and Sezer (2005) and those stipulated by the EU 
Guide to CBA (EC 2008) since both suggest a value of 3.5% for EU-15 (or non-CF 
countries) while for the CF countries (or 2004 entrants) the former proposes 5.2% and the 
latter 5.5%. Another interesting feature of Table 4.3 is that, the STPR estimates, with the 
exception of Stern (2007), which is an STPR figure concerning the very long term, have a 
relatively narrow range of variation. The lowest figure is 3% produced by OXERA (2002) 
for the UK and the highest figure is 5.5% produced by Kula (1984) for Canada and also 
suggested by the EU Guide to CBA (EC 2008) for Cohesion Fund (CF) countries. 
Another feature of Table 4.3 is that Europe and America are fairly well represented but 
Asia only by three countries and Africa by none. There seems to be a gap in the STPR 
literature with respect to Africa. However, the developing countries of Africa and Asia 
appear to be favouring alternative approaches to discounting since there have been 
several studies to estimate an appropriate social discount rate using the SOC or the 
shadow price approach in Africa and Asia (Zhuang 2007). For example, Stem (1970) uses 
the shadow price approach suggested by Little and Mirrlees (1969) and a discount rate of 
10% to evaluate a project undertaken by the Kenya Tea Development Authority. UNIDO 
(1980) estimates the SDR to be 12% for public investment in Pakistan based on the 
social opportunity cost of capital. However, the study prefers to apply an IRR of 10% 
based on market prices but adjusts this by using shadow prices regarding specific 
projects. Harberger and Jenkins (2002) estimate for Papua New Guinea the social 
discount rate, which they call economic opportunity cost of capital, to be 12%. India also 
uses an SDR of 12% while the rate used by the Philippines is 15%, both based on the 
SOC approach. In China the suggested social discount rate based on the weighted 
average of social time preference and returns on capital is 8% for short- and medium-term 
projects and a smaller rate is suggested for long-term projects (Zhuang 2007). A study by 
World Food Programme (2010) regarding the long run costs and benefits of particular 
safety net programmes assumes a 5% discount rate for Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, 
Laos, Mozambique, Malawi, Cambodia and Zambia. Another study by Winter-Nelson 
(1996) on the topic of aggregate economic growth in Africa also assumes a 5% social 
discount rate for 18 African countries. 
Some international institutions also tend to favour the SOC approach to discounting. For 
example, in addition to UNIDO (1980) and World Food Programme (2010) mentioned 
above, the World Bank provides guidance on the calculation of the social discount rate in 
its Handbook on Economic Analysis of Investment Operations (Belli at al. 1998). The 
Handbook states that the discount rate should reflect not only the opportunity cost of 
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capital but also the consumption rate of interest and advises a discount rate between 10- 
12% for cost-benefit analysis. The Asian Development Bank (1997) also suggests an 
economic internal rate of return of 10-12% to be used for economic analysis for all 
countries and all projects. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank advises that a 
discount rate of 12% be used as a measure of the economic opportunity cost of capital. 
(See also Section 2.3.4b and Section 2.3.5 in Chapter 2). 
4.3 Regional welfare weights 
The theoretical issues regarding regional welfare weights were discussed in Chapter 2 
and it was established that the social welfare weight for a 'group' of people in a given 
'population' is given by: 
(4.8) W,, =MUe =YA 
E Ye 
ýa YB ý Y,, 
where 
WA = the SWW attached to group A (the weight for group B= 1) 
MUA = marginal utility of income of group A 
MUs = marginal utility of income of group B 
YA = per capita income in group A 
Ye = per capita income in group B 
C= the elasticity of marginal utility of income 
It should be noted that 'group' here can include countries and regions as well as any set of 
individuals that can be distinguished on the basis of income such as women, a particular 
age group or an ethnic group. Also, that B is the numeraire which may refer to another 
'group' or to the whole 'population'. For example, if A represented a region of a country, 
then YB could be either the per capita income in region B or the per capita GDP of the 
country. 
The theoretical and empirical issues regarding E were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. As 
for per capita income, the suitability of income to represent the wellbeing of an individual 
and the issue of equivalisation were discussed in Chapter 2. However, there is a further 
issue regarding the use of RWW which was touched upon in Chapter 2 but remains to be 
discussed. This is the issue of intra-regional income distribution. Most studies (see for 
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example, Weisbrod 1972, Cowell and Gardiner 1999, Kula 2002, Evans at al 2005, Evans 
and Kula 2009) use per capita GDP as the basis of welfare in estimating the RWW 
regarding inter-regional comparisons. However, these studies implicitly make the 
assumption that there are not significant differences in the intra-regional distribution of 
income between regions. If such differences are, in fact, significant, then the RWW would 
be estimated incorrectly. Normally, a region with a higher degree of income inequality 
should, ceteris paribus, be assigned a larger welfare weight. For example, even if region A 
has a lower per capita income than region B, it might end up with a lower regional weight 
than B if its distribution of income is much more equal than that of B. In short, the extent of 
the intra-regional dispersion of incomes enhances the regional weight attached to that 
region. Thus, if per capita GDP figures were to be used to compare the social welfare of 
two regions, they would need to be corrected for inequality within each region. 
One way of considering intra-regional income inequalities is to use an approach based on 
a concept attributed to Kolm (1969), which is the concept of 'equally-distributed equivalent 
income'. This concept relates to the Income level that is required, if incomes were equally 
distributed, to produce the same welfare as the 'unequally-distributed income' (Boarini et 
al 2006). Consider equation (4.9), 
1 
(4.9) EDEI[(n) l`(yl1-s JJ 
where 
EDEI = equally-distributed equivalent income 
Yi = equivalised disposable income of an individual in the ii" Income class of the 
distribution (e. g. docile, quintile, etc), and I =1,2...., n 
£= inequality aversion parameter (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3 for the relation 
between inequality aversion parameter and the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income) 
If, however, the income classes are not equal in size (deciles, quintiles are of equal size 
by definition), we need to introduce weights into equation (4.9) in order to take account of 
the relative importance of each class. Thus, equation (4.9) is modified as follows. 
All 
I 
(4.10) EDE1= CEw. Y1-8111-8 t1t /IJJ 
where 
w, = the relative size of ith class 
Equation (4.10) is similar to the Atkinson Index which was introduced in Chapter 3 (see 
Section 3.1.2). 
In the context of RWWwe would have the following. 
EDEI = equally-distributed equivalent income of the region concerned 
wj = the relative population weight for each income class or province within a 
region, 
Y; = per capita income of the 1th income class or province 
E= the inequality aversion parameter. 
It is clear that EDEI takes account not only of Inter-regional differences in average Income 
levels but also inter-regional differences in the relative dispersion of intra-regional income. 
The value of EDEI depends on three factors: the average income of the region, the 
degree of income dispersion within the region and the value of E, that is, the degree of 
aversion to inequality. For a given average income of the region, the EDEI figure will be 
lower, the higher is the intra-regional dispersion of incomes and the greater is the aversion 
to income inequality. In other words EDEI varies directly with average income of the 
region but inversely with the degree of dispersion within the region and the extent of 
aversion to inequality. 
One problem with the concept of EDEI is that it breaks down if the value of E is unity. This 
problem can be solved by simply using equation (4.11) instead of (4.10) for this special 
case only. 
(4.11) Log(EDEI )= Ew; 1og Y, 
A practical solution to the problem would be still to use equation (4.10) but letting the 
value of E be equal to 0.99 or 1.01 which would provide an answer very close to that of 
equation (4.11) [see Evans and Kula 2009]. 
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If we substitute the EDEI figures for the per capita income figures in equation (4.8) we 
obtain 
C EDEIB 
lý 
(4.12) RWW,, = EDE1,, 1 
which gives the regional welfare weight for region A vis-ä-vis region B, 
where 
RWWA = regional welfare weight attached to region A 
EDEIA = equally-distributed equivalent income of region A 
EDEIB = equally-distributed equivalent income of region B 
4.3.1 Empirical estimates of regional welfare weights 
As pointed out, all empirical studies with the exception of Sezer (2007) base the estimate 
of social/regional welfare weights on average (equivalised or otherwise) income. For 
example, Weisbrod argues that economists providing criteria for decision-makers 
regarding public expenditure should take into account not only the economic efficiency of 
projects but also their distributional impacts. Referring to the CBA regarding the Beaver 
Creek Project in Ohio, he criticises the assumption that the recreational benefits of the 
project are equally distributed among the recipients. He then, in an effort to illustrate how 
the distributional equity considerations can be incorporated into the CBA, divides the 
recipients into four groups according to ethnic background and income; namely, poor 
whites, non-poor whites, poor nonwhites and non-poor nonwhites, on the basis of 
population-weighted incomes earned on average by these groups. He then estimates the 
welfare weights for these groups and applies these weights to the original CBA to show 
how the ranking of the projects changes from that without the welfare weights. 
Kula (2002) in a pioneering study estimates regional welfare weights for 17 states of India 
for 1971/72,1981/82 and 1991/92 on the basis of per capita income and an E value of 
1.64 in accordance with equation (4.8). Thus, YA represents the per capita income of each 
of the 17 states and Ys the per capita income of India as a whole. In 1991/92 the poorest 
state Bihar had an average income which was 21% of the richest state Punjab. 
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Consequently, the welfare weight for Bihar, 2.92 was more than seven times as high as 
that for Punjab, 0.41. However, the study implicitly assumes that intra-regional distribution 
of income is similar in all 17 states. 
Evans et al (2005) also assume that the intra-regional dispersion of income is similar 
between the four countries of the UK and calculate, on the basis of per capita income and 
an a value of 1.60, welfare weights for each country using the per capita income of the UK 
as the numeraire. The poorest region, Northern Ireland is allocated a welfare weight of 
1.45, followed by 1.39 for Wales, 1.03 for Scotland and 0.97 for the richest region 
England. 
Sezer (2006) following a similar procedure to those above, provides welfare weights for 
seven regions of Turkey for 2001 based on per capita incomes and an 6 value of 1.25 
which is calculated using the tax-based method (see Chapter 3). The poorest region 
Eastern Anatolia is attached a welfare weight of 2.63 while Marmara Region, the richest 
one, has a regional weight of 0.64. Thus the poorest region with per capita income ($990), 
which is roughly one third of that of the richest region ($3050), has a welfare weight which 
is more than 4 times as high as that of the richest one. 
However, Sezer (2007) in another study regarding Turkey departs from tradition and does 
take into account the differences in the income distribution between different regions. This 
is done by using income figures based on the concept of equally-distributed equivalent 
income (EDEI) as opposed to straight per capita income as explained above. Therefore 
the relevant equation in the estimation of the regional welfare weights in Turkey becomes 
equation (4.12) as opposed to equation (4.8), and accordingly the welfare weight attached 
to a region vis-d-vis another region increases. That is, the use of EDEl as opposed to per 
capita income enhances the welfare weight of a relatively poor region if the intra-regional 
income distribution is also less equal in that region. 
Finally, Evans and Kula (2009) calculate regional welfare weights for Northern and 
Southern Cyprus. They state that they would rather use the EDEI figures as the basis for 
the calculation of regional welfare weights but the lack of relevant data forces them to 
employ per capita GDP in PPS figures instead. Their preferred estimate of £ is 1.3 based 
on the tax-method of calculation. They also calculate that average living standards based 
on PPS GDP in figures in 2007 are about 77% higher in S. Cyprus than they are in N 
Cyprus. Thus, employing equation (4.8) they estimate the welfare weight for N Cyprus to 
be 2.1. (S Cyprus = 1) 
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4.4 Concluding remarks 
The theoretical issues surrounding the concepts of SDR and SWW were covered in 
Chapter 2 and both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the elasticity of marginal utility 
of income, e, in Chapter 3. Thus, this chapter has focused on the empirical issues relating 
to the estimation of the components of STPR, such as the utility discount rate (p), the pure 
time preference rate (6), life chances (L), the growth rate of consumption (g) as well as the 
empirical work regarding the estimation of STPR itself. It established that the empirical 
estimates of STPR figures varied within a fairly narrow band of 3% and 5.5%, and also 
that there is a good degree of agreement between academics and the policymakers 
regarding the STPR in Europe. 
The chapter then moved on to explore the issues regarding the use of per capita income 
as the basis for welfare in estimating SWW, and to examine critically the empirical studies 
calculating regional welfare weights for various countries, the value of which ranging from 
0.41 to 2.63. 
Thus, both the theoretical and empirical issues regarding the SDR and SWW have now 
been covered. Consequently, Chapter 5 will focus on the estimation of the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption, c, for Turkey using two different methods, namely demand 
analysis for a want-independent good and the tax-based model as explained in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 5 Estimation of the Elasticity of Marginal 
Utility of Income (E) for Turkey 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the estimation of the elasticity of marginal utility of income (E) 
for Turkey using two different methods. Firstly, a suitable demand model such as CEM or 
AIDS (see below) will be employed in the context of the FFF (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.5.2) approach to estimate the income and compensated-price elasticities for a want- 
independent composite commodity, namely food, in order to calculate the value of E. 
Secondly, an income-tax model will be employed using the Turkish progressive tax 
system to estimate e. As was discussed in Chapter 3, a represents the societal weight 
attached to the inequality of income distribution (a high value of a indicating a greater 
weight attached to inequality), and it is reflected in a government's aversion to income 
inequality as revealed by the progressivity of the income tax structure. 
The results of these two methods will be evaluated to select an appropriate value for the 
elasticity of marginal utility of income (consumption) to be used in the calculation of the 
social discount rate and the regional welfare rates for Turkey. These key welfare 
parameters are then applied in long-term project evaluation which is the subject matter of 
Chapter 6. 
5.2 The FFF approach: the CEM and AIDS models 
The literature pertaining to the FFF approach to the estimation of 6 was explored In 
Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3 which included a detailed discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical considerations regarding this method. As was pointed out therein, empirical 
studies use a variety of demand models designed to estimate the income and the 
compensated price elasticities of demand for a preference-independent good, which, in 
turn, are used to calculate e. It was also Indicated that food was chosen as the 
representative of a preference-independent good best fitting the assumption of additive 
separability in the underlying utility function. Among the models based on demand for food 
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as the want-independent good, two appear to be most popular. One of these models is 
the Almost Ideal Demand Systems (AIDS) which is developed by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a and 1980b) and involves the estimation of complete demand systems regarding 
food (see, for example, Blundell at a/ 1993, Blundell 1988, Evans 2004b, and Percoco 
2008). The other is called the Constant Elasticity Model (CEM) which is based on a single 
equation system (see, for example, Evans 2005,2004a, Evans and Sezer 2002, Kula 
1985 and 1984 and Percoco 2008). It is relatively easy to test for symmetry and 
homogeneity in both models but the AIDS model is more flexible since it does not put any 
restriction on the elasticities and has the advantage of being easily extended to many 
product groups. 
The answer to the question of which is the most appropriate model specification depends 
on which model produces the best co-integrating relationship between the relevant 
variables (see below). Before explaining the co-integration techniques employed and 
interpreting and commenting upon the results, however, it would be useful to set out the 
theoretical structure of each model explicitly. 
5.2.1 The CEM and the demand for food 
The CEM involves regressing the dependent variable 'food' on the independent variables 
'total consumption' and the 'relative price of food'. Formally, 
(P lY 
(5.1) Fg, = AC8 IFI 
ýFU 
PNF J 
where 
F87 = household expenditure on food expressed per capita and at constant 1987 prices 
C87 = household expenditure on all goods and services expressed per capita, and at 
constant 1987 prices 
P 
an index of the relative price of food to non-food (1987 =100) PNF 
PNF = an index of the price of non-food (1987 = 100) 
U= the error term 
117 
Taking logs we obtain 
(5.2) LnF87=LnA+r7LnC87+yLn(.. LF 
) 
+BLnPNF+LnU PNF 
where 
q= expenditure (income) elasticity of demand ([ED) 
y= compensated own price elasticity of demand (PED) 
9 =compensated cross-price elasticity of demand (CPED) 
Equation (5.2) indicates that the log of expenditure on food per capita is regressed on the 
log of household consumption expenditure per capita and the log of the relative price of 
food. The log of the price of non-food is included as a test for homogeneity. 
If the model specification is correct we would expect the parameters q and y to be 
statistically significant with the correct signs. That is, rº should be positive and y negative, 
and normally both numerically less than unity. Moreover, if the assumption of 
homogeneity holds, then we would expect 9 to be both statistically and numerically 
insignificant. 
5.2.2 The AIDS model and the demand for food 
The AIDS model of the demand for food contains the same independent variables as 
those of the CEM but the dependent variable is the share of food in household 
consumption expenditure. 
Formally, 
lC 
(5.3)SF87=ACä CPFJ PdU PNF 
Taking logs on the right hand side 
(5.4) SF87 =LnA+bLnC81+cLnl --PF-) +dLnPNF+LnU PNF 
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where 
SF87 = budget share of expenditure on food expressed at constant 1987 prices 
Equation (5.4) indicates that the budget share of food is regressed on the log of per capita 
household consumption, the log of the relative price of food and the log of the price of 
non-food. 
However, in this model the income and the price elasticities are not represented by the 
parameters b, c and d, but are calculated according to the following formulae: 
(5.5) IED=rý=1+ 
ý 
(5.6) PED=y= c 
SF 
(5.7) CPED=B=-( 
Sc-d F) 
In other words, the interpretation of the coefficients is different from that in the CEM. Here 
b, c and d, represent a factor by which the budget share of food changes as household 
consumption, the relative price of food and the price of non- food change, respectively. 
Thus, we would expect these coefficients to have a negative sign since the budget share 
of food should decline as household consumption (income) and the relative price of food 
increases. 
5.2.3 The data 
The data used for the estimation of £ using the FFF method (see Appendix A) are 
provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) made available through the Internet (see 
TürkStat 2010a). TSI publishes a time series of expenditure on GDP, which contains the 
subsections of household consumption expenditure and expenditure on food, at both 
current prices and constant 1987 prices on a quarterly basis covering the period 1987 - 
2007 (first three quarters). The data published by the TS1 are estimated according to 
European System of Accounts (ESA) 1995. 
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The data series for the non-food category is obtained by simply subtracting per capita 
expenditure on food from per capita household consumption expenditure. The budget 
share is calculated by simply dividing the per capita expenditure on food by per capita 
household consumption expenditure. The food price index is obtained by dividing per 
capita expenditure on food at current prices by that expressed at constant prices. The 
price index for non-food is obtained using the same procedure. Then these series are 
converted into their natural log values -except the budget share- to obtain the variables 
used in the CEM and the AIDS models. These are 
LnF87 = per capita real expenditure on food expressed in natural logs 
SF87 = the budget share of food 
LnC87 = per capita real consumption expenditure expressed in natural logs 
Ln( 
PF )= 
the relative price of food in natural logs l PNF 1 
LnPNF = the price of non-food in natural logs 
5.3 The cointegrating approach to the demand for food and E 
Before we employ the CEM and the AIDS models to obtain the relevant elasticities in 
order to calculate the value of E, we must first investigate and report the time-series 
properties of the data. More precisely, we must determine whether the time series we are 
using is stationary or not. A time series variable is said to be (weakly) stationary if its 
mean and variance are fixed and its covariance only depends on the lag of the two time 
periods but not on the actual time at which the covariance is calculated. This is also 
known as covariance stationarity. The regression method of OLS using time series data 
assumes that the underlying time series is stationary, i. e. variables are 1(0). Using time 
series data on the assumption that it is stationary when in fact it is nonstationary would 
result in inconsistent OLS estimators since the assumption of fixed variance is violated. 
Also the diagnostic tests such as t and F statistics will not have their standard limiting 
distributions. Consequently, the coefficients of the regressors may appear to be 
statistically significant when in fact they are not. This situation is referred to as spurious 
regression (Dougherty 2007). 
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However, it is generally accepted that many economic variables are non-stationary, that 
is, they are usually of the type of 1(1) and occasionally I(k) where k>1 (Gujarati 2003 and 
Harris 1995). Does this mean we cannot use the regression analysis to estimate the 
relevant elasticities in a FFF model? Fortunately, it does not, since it is still possible to 
use regression even if the time series data are nonstationary provided that a cointegrating 
relationship exists between the variables concerned. Put differently, when two or more 
nonstationary variables are related to each other in a long-run equilibrium, the resultant 
residuals will be stationary which will make it possible to apply regression analysis albeit 
not the simple OLS. Thus it is important to establish whether variables in a specified 
model are stationary or not. 
5.3.1 Test for stationarity 
There are several ways of determining whether a time series is stationary or not. One of 
them is graphical analysis. It is possible to observe the presence or absence of an upward 
or downward trend in a time series by simply plotting it against time. The presence of any 
trend will provide an intuitive indication about the non-stationarity character of the series. 
Another method is to calculate the autocorrelation function (ACF) which is given by the 
ratio of the covariance of the series to the variance at a given lag, say k. Thus, we have 
(5.8) S2K =b 
where 
DK = the autocorrelation coefficient, -1 <C<1 
Ok = covariance at lag k 
(Do = variance 
Then the statistical significance of OK can be tested, on the basis of its sampling 
distribution being normal, for the null hypothesis of "k =0. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis would indicate a non-stationary time series. 
A more formal and probably the most popular method of detecting nonstationarity is the 
unit root test (Dougherty 2007, Gujarati 2003 and Harris 1995). The standard unit root 
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test, which is also referred to as the Dicky-Fuller (DF) test, is based on the following 
model: 
(5.9) X, =A +B2Xr_, +/33t+ur 
where 
X, = is a time series variable 
t= time 
u( = error term. 
So 
if ß, = 0, ß2 =I and 63 =0 
then, X, is nonstationary [or difference-stationary since (AX, = X, - X, _, = u, 
) will be 
stationary] and is also referred to as pure random walk. 
If ß, 00, ß2 and ß3=0 
then, Xt is a random walk with drift and therefore nonstationary. 
If ß100, ß2=0 and ß300 
then Xt is nonstationary with a deterministic trend or trend-stationary since detrending will 
make the series stationary. 
Finally, if A100, ßz =1 and P300, 
then Xt is nonstationary and referred to as a random walk with drift and deterministic 
trend. 
The DF test and the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test (the latter is an extension of the 
former to situations where the error term is serially correlated, which is corrected by 
adding enough lagged difference terms) are based on the tau (r) statistic which is a 
version of the t test. 
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If we subtract X, _, 
from both side of equation (5.9) we obtain 
(5.10) AX, =83, +(/. 3, -1)X, _, +/33r+u, 
The tau test is conducted by setting the null hypothesis of nonstationarity against the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity, that is 
Ho: (ß2 -1)=0 
H, : (ß2 -1) <0 
Note that if the null hypothesis is not rejected then we would have 02 =1 which would 
indicate a form of random walk (Gujarati 2003). 
5.3.2 Results of the unit root tests 
The results of the stationarity tests on the variables used in the CEM and the AIDS 
models obtained by using the statistical package Microfit are given below in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The ADF tests for the variables of the CEM and the AIDS models 
Constant, no trend Constant and trend 
Significance level 1% 5% 1% 5% 
Critical (Z) values -3.53 -2.90 -4.08 -3.48 
Variables ! Estimated (T) values 
LnF87 (7) -0.45 -1.15 
--__. -_-- LnC87 (7) -0.33 -2.02 
LnRP (1) -5.20 -5.55 
LnPNF (1) -3.59 -5.58 
SF87 (1) -0.37 -1.52 
As explained above, both the CEM and the AIDS models have the same regressors, 
namely, (LnC87), (LnRP), and (LnPNF); but the regressand in the CEM is the real amount 
of expenditure per capita on food (LnF87), while in the AIDS model, it is the share of food 
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in consumption per capita (SF87). As can be observed from Table 5.1, the null hypothesis 
of nonstationarity holds, even at the 1% significance level, for the dependent variable in 
both models as well as for the first regressor, namely, (LnF87), (SF87), and (LnC87). The 
optimum lag lengths for these three variables, chosen according both Schwarz Bayesian 
(SB) and the Akaike Information (AI) criteria, are (7), (7) and (1) respectively. Thus we 
assume that these three variables are all 1 (1). 
In the case of the two price variables, however, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity has 
to be rejected and therefore we assume that (LnPR) and (LnPNF) are both 1(0). 
5.3.3 The ARDL approach to cointegration 
It is generally accepted that a linear combination of a mixture of variables, some with unit 
roots and some without, will be nonstationary (Harris 1995). More precisely, a linear 
combination of a mixture of 1(0) and I(1) variables will itself be 1(1). Since the variables in 
our model are exactly of this nature, both the CEM and the AIDS equations will 
themselves be 1(1) and therefore carry the risk of spurious correlation. However, if a long- 
run equilibrium relationship exists between the variables then the variables concerned are 
said to be cointegrated and therefore it would be possible to employ regression analysis to 
obtain the estimates of the relevant parameters (see Section 5.3). 
Two of the most popular approaches to cointegration are Vector Autoregressive 
Regression (VAR) and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models. The former is 
preferred if all the variables in the model are 1(1). If, however, the variables are a mixture 
of 1(0) and 1(1), then the most suitable model Is ARDL which would provide estimation of 
super-consistent long-run parameters (De Vita & Abbott 2004, Pesaran 1997 and Pesaran 
& Shin 1995). The additional advantage of the ARDL model is its flexibility with respect to 
lag structure (Evans 2005 and 2008). 
a) The statistical evidence 
Table 5.2 below provides the results and the supporting statistics for the CEM model and 
Table 5.3 does the same for the AIDS model. As can be observed from the comparison of 
the two tables, in the ARDL approach to cointegration, the CEM outperforms the AIDS 
model in some respects but the latter produces better results in others. 
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Table 5.2: Supporting Statistics for the CEM 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial Correlation CHSQ (4) = 5.3071 [. 257] F(4,54) = 1.0280 [. 401] 
Functional Form CHSQ (1) =. 031089 [. 860] F(1,57) _ . 023638 [. 878] 
Normality CHSQ (2) =. 80138 [. 670] Not applicable 
Heteroscedasticity CHSQ (1) = 3.7723 [. 052] F(1,73) = 3.8661 [. 053] 
Error Correction Model 
ecm(-1) 
Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
-. 55692 . 14876 -3.7438 [. 000] 
Estimated Long Run Coefficients 
i __. _. J
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
LnA -1.3509 0.19052 -7.0907 [. 000] 
__. ___ -_ _ ---____ -" --- ----- LnC87 ri = 0.6982 0.12612 5.5361 [. 000] 
Ln (PF IPNF) y=-0.2041 0.07353 -2.7762 [. 007] 
LnPNF 0=-0.01229 0.00589 -2.0878 [. 041] 
Notes: The statistics in the table refer to the regression analysis based on the equation below 
LnFx, =LnA+r7LnC,, +yLnl 
Pfý 
J+BLnP^, F. +LnU l P, IF 
The 95% confidence intervals for the two elasticities for 59 degrees of freedom are given below. 
For q: 0.6982 ± t0025 (s. e) = 0.6982 ± (2.00) (0.1261) = 0.6982 ± 0.2522, i. e. (0.45) - (0.95) 
For y: 0.2041 ± to 025 (s. e) = -0.2041 ± (2.00) (0.0735) =-0.2041 ± 0.1470, i. e. (-0.35) - (-0.06) 
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Table 5.3: Supporting Statistics for the AIDS model 
Test statistics 
Serial Correlation 
Functional Form 
Normality 
Heteroscedasticity 
ecm(-1) 
Regressor 
LnA 
LnC87 
Ln (PF /P, vF) 
LnPNF 
Diagnostic Tests 
LM version F version 
CHSQ(4) = 6.1208 [0.190] F(4,49) = 1.0886 [0.373] 
CHSQ(1) = 0.32796 [0.567] F(1,52) = 0.22839 [0.635] 
CHSQ(2) = 1.1886 [0.552] Not applicable 
{ CHSQ(1) = 0.24593 [0.620] F(1,73) = 0.24016 [0.626] 
Error Correction Model 
Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
1-0.40628 0.17258 -2.3541 [0.022] 
Estimated Long Run Coefficients 
-_-- Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio (Prob) 
0.20886 0.065872 3.1707 [0.003] 
b= -0.13262 0.043795 -3.0282 [0.004] 
c= -0.066207 0.032744 -2.0220 [0.048] 
d= -0.0034039 0.0020841 -1.6333 [0.108] 
Notes: The statistics in the table refer to the regression analysis based on the equation below 
SFK7 = LnA+bLnCK, +cLnl 
PF J+ dLnPP. F + LnU l PNF' 
Elasticities 
(-0.1326 / 0.3688) = 1+ (-0.3595) = 0.64 
b1+ 
IED = j7 = l+ 
(SF) 
PED =y= 
SF 
= -0.0662 / 0.3688 = -0.18 
CPED=B=-(c-d)=-(-0.0662+0.0034)/0.3688 =0.17 
SF 
J 
The 95% confidence intervals for the two parameters of b and c for 54 degrees of freedom are 
given below. 
For b: -0.1326 ± to 025 (s. e) = 0.1326 ± (2.00)(0.0438) _ -0.1326 f 0.0876, i. e. (-0.2202) - (-0.0450) 
For c: -0.0662 ± to 025 (s. e) _ -0.0662 ± (2.00)(0.0327) _ -0.0662 t 0.0654, i. e. (-0.1316) - (-0.0008) 
Therefore the confidence intervals for the elasticities are 
For n [1+(-0.2202 / 0.3688)] - [1 +(-0.0450) / 0.3688] = (0.40) - (0.88) 
For y [-0.1316 / 0.3688] - [-0.0008 / 0.3688] _ (-0.360) - (-0.002) 
126 
The optimum lag structure, selected according to three different criteria, namely, the 
Schwarz Bayesian (SBC), the Akaike Information (AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQC) 
criteria, of the ARDL model based on equation (5.2) is (8,0,0,5) with respect to the 
variables in the order which they appear in the equation. The optimum lag structure, 
selected according to the same criteria, for equation (5.5) is the (8,5,0,5) 
Both models pass the diagnostic tests regarding homoscedasticity, normality, functional 
form and absence of serial correlation. However, the CEM performs better with respect to 
the tests for normality, correct functional form and absence of serial correlation while the 
AIDS model outperforms the CEM with respect to homoscedasticity. 
Both models also pass the t-test regarding the validity of the error correction model 
indicating a cointegrating relationship between the demand-for-food variables. The 
equilibrium adjustment speed is just under two quarters for the CEM and just over two 
quarters for the AIDS model. 
As for the coefficients on the income and relative price variables in the long run 
relationship for the demand for food, these are shown, together with supporting statistics, 
for both models in the section 'Estimated Long Run Coefficients' in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
respectively. The income coefficient. is significant with the correct sign in both models but 
the statistical significance is stronger in the case of CEM. The coefficient for the relative 
price variable also has the correct sign in both models, however, its significance is 
supported at 1% level in the CEM but only at 5% in the AIDS model. As far as the 
confidence interval at 95% significance level is concerned, the results appear to be very 
similar in percentage terms for the income elasticity for both models; for the price 
elasticity, the CEM appears to perform slightly better. 
As for the assumption of homogeneity, it is well supported in the AIDS model since the 
coefficient of (LnPNF) appears to be insignificant even at the 10% level and the numerical 
value is very small. In contrast, the assumption of homogeneity is not strongly supported 
in the CEM since its numerical value is higher -but still quite small- and only becomes 
insignificant at the 1% level. 
It is noted, of course that, although the coefficients of the variables LnC87 and Ln(PF/PNF), 
namely, q and y, are themselves the income and the compensated price elasticities in the 
CEM, b and c in the AIDS model are not the elasticities per se, but the coefficients on 
which the calculations of the elasticities are based, as indicated in the last section of Table 
5.3. A comparison of the relevant elasticities in both tables reveals that they are quite 
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close, since the values for the compensated price elasticity in the CEM and the AIDS 
models are 0.20 and 0.18 respectively. The corresponding figures for the income elasticity 
are also fairly close with values of 0.70 and 0.64. 
b) The implied £ values 
It has been established in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2 that the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income (consumption) is calculated as follows: 
(5.11) s_77(I-wr7) 
7 
where 
e= the elasticity of marginal utility of income (consumption) 
w= the share of food in household consumption 
and q&y are the income elasticity and the compensated own price elasticity of demand 
for food, respectively. 
Therefore, substituting the estimated values of q&y from Table 5.2 into equation (5.11) 
we obtain 
(5.12) s= 
rý(1-wýý 
= 
0.6982ý1-(0^3688ý(0.6982ýý 
y 0.2041 
= 2.54 
Similarly, substituting the estimated values of q&y for the AIDS model into equation 
(5.11)weget 
(5.13) s= 
17(1 
ywr7) 
' 
0.64[1-(0.3688)(0.64)] 
= 2.72 
0.18 
Thus, we have 
e=2.54 for the CEM, and 
c=2.72 for the AIDS model. 
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As can be observed they are different but rather close and average out as c=2.63. This is 
well within the range of the s values estimated in the demand-for-food studies, as 
indicated in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3, but relatively high in the ranking in terms of the 8 
values obtained in more recent demand studies. 
5.4 The income-tax approach to the estimation of e 
In this approach a simple model can be employed to estimate E. The model, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3, is based on two key assumptions. One is that the structure of 
the income tax rates of a country is at least implicitly based on the principle of equal 
absolute sacrifice of satisfaction, and the other is that the underlying social utility function 
is iso-elastic. Thus, an estimate of E can be obtained according to the formula set out in 
equation (5.14) below. 
(5.14) s 
In [1 _t (Y)] 
=T ýYý 
in 1- Y1 
where 
t (Y) = the marginal tax rate 
T(y) 1Y= the average tax rate 
In order to estimate the value of a for Turkey according to this model, OECD (2010) data 
on personal income taxation have been applied to equation (5.14) above. The Turkish 
personal income tax system has been made gradually less progressive over recent years. 
There were six different marginal tax rates ignoring the social security contributions 
(SCC), namely 15%, 20%, 25% 30%, 35% and 40% applying to six different income 
brackets in 2004. Then the top marginal rate was abolished in 2005 and the highest 
threshold was reduced from YTL 140 000 to YTL 78 000 accordingly. In 2006 there was a 
further adjustment involving only four different marginal income tax rates, namely, 15%, 
20% 27% and 35%. This is the current situation regarding personal income taxation in 
Turkey (see Table 5.4). 
129 
The calculated figures relating to equation (5.14) together with the associated E values are 
given in Table 5.4. The calculations are based on the data provided by the OECD (2010) 
regarding income tax in different countries. 
Table 5.4: Estimated E in the tax model for Turkey 
Y' 
(YTL) 
Y 
(YTL) 
t T/Y - Log((1-t) -Log (1- T/Y) E 
Less than 7 800 3 900 0.150 0.150 -0.162519 -0.162519 1.000 (0.300) (0.300) (-. 356675) (0.356675) (1.000) 
7 800 -19 800 13 800 0.200 0.172 -0.223144 -0.188742 1.182 (0.350) (0.322) (-0.430783) (-0.388608) (1.109) 
19 801 - 44 700 32 250 0.270 0.215 -0.314711 -0.242072 1.300 
(0.420) (0.365) (-0.544727) (-0.454130) (1.199) 
44 701 - 94700 69 700 0.350 0.273 -0.430783 -0.318829 1.351 
(0.500) (0.423) (-0.693147) (-0.549913) (1.260) 
1.208 
(1.142) 
Source: OECD (2010), Table 1 and Table 4 
Notes: 
1) There are no income taxes in Turkey other than those of the central government. 
2) There is a single rate of 15% for SSC which starts at YTL 7482.60 (the minimum wage set for 
2008). There is also a ceiling at YTL 48637.80, i. e. for earnings above this amount the SSC is 15% 
of the ceiling. 
Column one shows the taxable income bands based on the statutory thresholds set for 
2008, the latest year for which the data are available. A figure of YTL 94700 is chosen to 
enable us to have a band and therefore a mid-point at the upper end of the distribution. It 
is calculated pro rata regarding the two previous income bands. Column two shows the 
midpoints of the income bands on which the calculations are based. The marginal tax 
rates (t) are given in column three. These are the central government statutory personal 
income tax rates for wage income. The information in column three is applicable for a 
single person without dependants. The average tax rates are given in column four. Their 
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calculation is based on the information given in columns two and three. The figures in 
brackets are the tax rates plus the social security contributions rate, 15%, which is uniform 
throughout the income distribution (see notes for Table 5.4) 
The last column shows the value of E for each income band and the figure 1.208 is the 
average E value. The value of E when SSC are included goes down to 1.142 because the 
inclusion of the SSC reduces progressivity. 
It is possible to argue that estimates of a based on income tax rates without SSC adhere 
more to the principle of equal absolute sacrifice of satisfaction since after all the rationale 
for the latter is quite different from that for the former. From the govemment's perspective, 
SSC are imposed to finance health care which is a need-based rather than income-based 
benefit. Thus, one could argue that estimating the value of a entirely on the basis of 
income tax rates, would be a more appropriate method since it would be more In keeping 
with the underlying principle involved. 
Referring back to Chapter 3, Table 3.1 would reveal that our estimate of E=1.208 is at the 
lower end of the range of the estimated values. 
5.5 A comparison of results 
This chapter has exclusively been devoted to the estimation of a value for the all- 
important parameter in the STPR formula as well as the welfare weights, namely E, by 
using two different methods that are commonly employed in many studies, i. e. the FFF 
approach and the tax model. 
The FFF approach tries to elicit information from consumer behaviour and is based on the 
household demand for preference-independent consumer goods, e. g. food. (The 
assumption of preference-independent has been discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2). 
In this method the income elasticity and the compensated own-price elasticity of demand 
for food are estimated which are used to estimate a value for c. It is possible to choose 
from a variety of demand models using the FFF approach. However, the two chosen in 
this study, which are also popular in the literature, have certain advantages over others. 
The constant elasticity model (CEM) is based on a single equation system in which it is 
fairly easy to test for symmetry and homogeneity. The Almost Ideal Demand Systems 
(AIDS), however, involves the estimation of complete demand systems regarding food. An 
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ideal feature of the AIDS is that it possesses most of the properties usually thought 
desirable in conventional demand analysis; "... it aggregates perfectly over consumers, ... 
it has a functional form which is consistent with known household-budget data, it is simple 
to estimate largely avoiding the need for non-linear estimation; and it can be used to test 
the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry through linear restrictions on fixed 
parameters" (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b, p 312). However, the justification for the 
particular specification indicated by either model comes from the presence of a 
cointegrating (a long run equilibrium) relationship between the variables. A popular 
approach to cointegration, i. e. the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, has 
been employed which has shown that such a relationship existed. Consequently, the 
income elasticity and the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for food were 
estimated accordingly. The estimated values for these parameters indicated not only that 
there is little to choose between them statistically, but also that they are rather close. 
The tax model is based on the social values of governments as revealed in specific 
economic policy measures. The empirical approaches to the estimation of a employ 
different methods, with varying tax rate definitions and different measures of appropriate 
average tax rates. A common approach is to interpret a as an income inequality aversion 
parameter from government's perspective and then measure its value according to the 
degree of progressivity in a country's income tax schedule. This is the approach adopted 
in this study and a model based on the Turkish personal income tax system was used to 
estimate a value for E. 
Table 5.5: The E values 
Model 1 17 
--- 
YwE 
CEM 0.6982 - 0.2041 0.3688 2.54 
AIDS 0.64 - 0.18 0.3688 2.72 
Average 2.63 
Tax model 1.21 
Source: Own compilation 
As has already been pointed out in section 5.3.3 the estimated values for a from the two 
models employed in the demand-for-food method average out to be 2.63 whilst the 
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corresponding value for E in the income-tax method is 1.21 (see Table 5.5). This fairly 
wide but not unusual gap (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2) is partly due to the 
fact that the progressivity of the Turkish income tax system has declined in recent years 
thus having a dampening effect on the value of E. Nevertheless, the figures for the C 
values obtained from the demand models are above the average of the figures given in 
other empirical studies using the same model (see, for example, Blundell at al 1993, 
Evans 2004b, Kula 2004, Percoco 2008) which report E values ranging from 1.28 to 1.89, 
if one ignores the earlier studies of the 1970s (see Chapter 3, Table 3.1). However, the 
figures obtained from the tax model are in line with other empirical studies using either the 
tax model or the demand model, (for example, Cowell and Gardiner 1999, Evans 2005, 
Percoco 2008 and Evans and Kula 2009) whose E values vary between 1.0 and 2.0. 
The implications of these E values for the discount rate and the regional welfare weights 
applied in the CBA of long-term social investment projects in Turkey will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Discount Rate and Welfare Weight 
Measures for Turkey 
6.1. Chapter overview 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 covered the theoretical and empirical issues regarding the social 
discount rate (STPR) and the regional welfare weights (RWW). This chapter will be 
devoted to the empirical estimation of these two aggregates for Turkey. 
A formula for STPR was derived in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.5) as in equation (6.1) 
(6.1) (1+STPR)=(1+p)(1+g)e 
Taking logs, this term can be expressed as 
(6.2) STPR = p+e. g 
where 
c= the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
p= the utility discount rate 
g= the growth rate of per capita consumption 
Since the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (c) for Turkey has already been 
estimated in Chapter 5, what needs to be done to calculate the STPR for Turkey here is to 
determine a suitable value for the utility discount rate (p) and the growth rate of 
consumption, (g). 
As for the regional welfare weights, RWW, the theoretical issues surrounding RWW were 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3. It was established therein and reiterated in Chapter 
4, Section 4.3, that the welfare weight for a region is given by 
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EE 
(6.3) W,, = 
MUA 
= 
Y, Y) 
MUD Y"--' Y, 
where 
WA = the welfare weight for region A relative to region B 
MUA = marginal utility of income in region A 
MUB = marginal utility of income in region B 
YA = per capita income in region A, 
Ye = per capita income in region B 
E= the elasticity of marginal utility of income 
In the above formulation YB represents another region. It is of course possible to take the 
national average as the numeraire in which case YB would represent per capita income of 
the country as a whole. 
Although this method of estimating RWW for different regions allows for differences in per 
capita income between the regions, it ignores such differences that might exists within 
each region. This issue was taken up in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, and the concept of 
equally-distributed equivalent income (EDEI) was introduced. EDEI takes account of not 
only inter-regional differences in average income levels but also intra-regional differences 
in the relative dispersion of income. Consequently, the formula in equation (6.3) was 
replaced by the formula in equation (6.4). 
(6.4) W4 =( 
EDEIB 
EDEL, 
J 
Since the theoretical and empirical issues regarding c were discussed in Chapter 3, and 
Chapter 5 was devoted to the empirical estimation of t for Turkey, this chapter will focus 
on the estimation of the regional welfare weights as well as the STPR for Turkey. 
6.2 Estimation of STPR 
In this section we will determine the values of p and g for Turkey and then, together with 
the previously established preferred empirical estimate of e, calculate a best estimate of 
the Turkish STPR, using equation (6.2). 
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6.2.1 The utility discount rate, p 
The theoretical and empirical issues regarding the utility discount rate were discussed in 
Section 2.3.5 of Chapter 2. It was established therein that it is possible conceptually to 
separate the utility discount rate (p) into two different components: the pure time 
preference rate (S) and the rate of decrease in life chances (L). 
(6.5) p=b+L 
Determining the value of the utility discount rate (p) is somewhat controversial since the 
value of 5 cannot be estimated empirically and therefore depends on value judgment. 
Similar consideration would apply to life chance (L) if it were taken to represent the 
catastrophe risk (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5). 
Many studies ignore the pure time preference rate (ö) and provide a value for p by 
quantifying life chances based on mortality rates in a country (see, for example, European 
Commission 2008, Evans 2007, Evans and Kula 2009, Evans et a/ 2005, Kula 1984 and 
2004, Pearce and Ulph 1999, Percoco 2008). A few studies do stipulate a value for 5 
(see, for example, Azar 2009, Evans 2004b, HM Treasury 2003, OXERA 2002 and Scott 
1989) as well as for catastrophe risk, L, (Evans and Sezer 2004, HM Treasury 2003 and 
Evans and Kula 2009) based on subjective judgment. The most common practice in the 
literature is to determine a value for p by quantifying life chances usually based on data 
regarding death rates. In the case of several studies, as previously cited, this figure would 
also include a value for 5 based on subjective judgment. This will be the procedure 
followed here. 
It is, following Kula (1984), argued that individuals discount their future utility by the 
probability of being alive at a given future date. The calculation of such probability for an 
average individual is based on crude death rates. Table 6.1 displays crude death rates for 
selected countries obtained from the data published by the World Bank (WB 2010). It can 
be seen that the death rate for Turkey averages out as 0.6%. The CIA World Factbook 
also gives the death rate for Turkey as 6.1 per thousand (CIA 2010). At first glance, this 
figure would appear to be rather low for a country such as Turkey. However, it is not all 
that surprising when one considers the fact that the median age of Turkish population is 
28.8 (TSI 2010b). 
As for the pure time preference rate, b, the literature suggests a figure between 0.1 % and 
0.5%. If we are to select an average based on the figures suggested by the literature, then 
136 
a figure of 0.3% for S seems to be appropriate. Consequently, the round figure 1% for p is 
to be used in the calculation of the STPR for Turkey. 
Table 6.1: Death rate, crude (per 1000 people), selected countries 
Country Name 
........... _  _....... ... _.... __... _............ _ . 
Brazil 
2000 
. __.. ___.. _. . 
6.39 
2001 
_....... _- ........... 
6.37 
2002 
...... ...... _
6.36 
2003 
_.... __... __..... _... 
6.35 
2004 
 ... .........  _ 
6.34 
2005 
... .............. _ . 
6.34 
2006 
................. _...... 
6.35 
2007 
. __.... _  _ .. 
6.36 
2008 
6.38 
Mexico 4.66 4.64 4.64 4.67 4.73 4.80 4.78 4.81 4.85 
Nicaragua 5.23 5.13 5.04 4.96 4.90 4.84 4.79 4.74 4.70 
Norway 9.80 9.70 9.80 9.40 9.00 8.92 
F 
8.85 8.91 8.75 
Oman 2.93 2.86 2.81 2.76 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.69 2.70 
Pakistan 8.02 7.85 7.69 7.54 7.40 7.27 7.15 7.03 6.92 
Turkey 5.94 5.87 5.82 5.80 5.80 5.82 5.86 5.91 5.95 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
7.61 
16.41 
7.61 
15.98 
7.62 
15.50 
7.65 
15.01 
7.68 
14.51 
7.70 
14.02 
7.70 
13.55 
7.69 
13.10 
7.67 
12.67 
Ukraine 15.30 15.30 15.30 16.01 16.04 16.60 16.20 16.40 16.31 
United Arab Emirates 1.57 1.55 1.54 1.53 1.53 1.52 151 1.51 1.50 
United Kingdom 10.20 10.20 10.40 1020 9.80 9.68 9.44 9.42 9.44 
United States 8.70 8.50 8.50 8.44 8.34 8.26 8,10 8.16 8.09 
Uruguay 9.20 9.40 9.40 9.35 9.26 9.39 9.39 9.39 9.40 
Uzbekistan 5.50 5.31 5.42 5.32 5.04 5.37 5.27 5.26 5.30 
Vanuatu 6.25 6.06 5.86 5.68 5.51 5.35 5.22 5.09 4.98 
Venezuela, R. B. 4.91 4.95 4.98 5.01 5.03 5.06 5.07 5.09 5.11 
ietnam 5.43 5.38 5.34 5.33 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.37 5.39 
Source: WB (2010) 
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6.2.2 The estimation of the growth rate of income, g 
Several different methods of projecting g were considered in Chapter 4. The main issue 
here is the length of the data period. Relatively recent data might avoid the structural 
beaks and exclude the distant irrelevant past but might also fail to include relevant cycles 
which would be desirable for the estimation of the average figure. A suitably long period of 
data, on the other hand, would perhaps include several cycles but have the disadvantage 
that the consumption growth patterns might have changed during this period. 
One method for the estimation of growth rates would be to calculate the geometric 
average which is based on equation (6.6). 
I 
(6.6) g= 
Y 
-1 
0 
where 
g= the growth rate of GDP 
Yt = the end-year GDP 
Yo = the base-year GDP 
N= number of years in the data period 
OECD (2010b) provides real per capita GDP figures in US $, in PPS for the 1970-2009 
period with year 2000 as the base year. Based on these data, the average growth rate for 
Turkey is estimated to be 2.1% (see Table 6.2). 
Unfortunately, similar data are not available for consumption. However, an average figure 
for consumption growth for such a long period might not make much sense due to the 
likely changes in consumption patterns (see above). Instead, a shorter time period is 
considered for which data are available. The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat 2010a) 
provides figures for per capita real consumption as well as for GDP on a quarterly basis. 
Thus, the average annual growth rate of per capita real consumption for the data period of 
1987-2006 is estimated to be 2.0%. If the GDP figures are used, then the growth rate is 
estimated to be 2.3% for the same data period (see Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2 Growth rates: geometric average 
Data period Variable Method g, % 
1970-2009 GDP$ GDP N ) 
-I 
2.1 
g GDPn 
1987-2006 GDPTL 
_ 
GDP, " ) 2.3 
g GDP 
1987-2006 CTL C' 1" 2.0 
g =( -I COJ 
Notes: GDP$ = per capita real GDP in US$, PPS, 2000 
GDPn = per capita real GDP in TL, 1987 
Cn = per capita real consumption in TL, 1987 
Source: Own compilation 
The per capita growth of consumption and GDP figures for Turkey as displayed in Table 
6.2 are very close to each other. However, they appear to be rather low for an emerging 
economy. The reason is that they are average figures which hide fairly wide fluctuations 
over a period of time. For example, the growth rates for per capita real GDP were as high 
as 8.2% in 1976,7.6% In 1987,8% in 2004 and 7.1 % in 2005. Conversely, it has also 
plunged into negative figures in times of crises; being, for example, as low as -6.9% in 
1994, -7% in 2001 and -5.8% in 2009 (see OECD 2010b) 
An alternative method is the regression method in which the logged value of real per 
capita consumption (income) is regressed on time, as shown by equation (6.7): 
(6.7) LnC=a+gt 
The logged values of quarterly per capita consumption have been regressed on time in 
accordance with equation (6.7). According to the results obtained from the OLS method, 
the value of g is 0.47%, and the associated t-ratio is 8.2269. However, the R2 is not very 
high and there seems to be a problem of serial correlation (For full statistical results, see 
Appendix B). Nevertheless, the annual growth rate of per capita real consumption based 
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on this method would be roughly four times as high as this, i. e. approximately 2%, which 
is very close to the figure obtained by the geometric average method. 
The final method to consider is the 'required' growth rate of consumption (or GDP). It may 
be relevant to calculate a 'required' growth rate for Turkey with a reference to either EU- 
15 or EU-27 as the target group of countries since Turkey has a candidate country status 
for full membership of the EU and thus eligible for EU funds (see chapter 1, Section 1.1). 
According to this method, we first calculate an average growth rate of the per capita GDP 
of the target country, say EU-27, based on the past growth rates (see equation 6.6). Then 
the GDP of the target country is projected, based on this estimated average growth rate, 
to some future date that is broadly in line with the average investment horizon of projects, 
say 25 years' time from now, according to equation (6.8). 
(6.8) X=A(1+g)v 
where 
A= the current real GDP 
X= the projected real per capita GDP 
g= average growth rate of real per capita GDP 
N= the projection period in years 
Then we find the answer to the question: what would be the required growth rate for the 
GDP of country A (Turkey) to catch up with the GDP of the target country (EU-27) in 25 
years' time? The answer is provided by equation (6.9) below (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.2.2). 
Taking logs of equation (6.8) and rearranging 
(6.9) gz 
LnX - LnA 
N-1 
Table 6.3 provides information on the required growth rates for Turkey. OECD (2010b) 
provides data on per capita GDP of member countries expressed in US$ In PPS. Based 
on such data, the average growth rate for EU-27 (over the period of 1970-2009) and EU- 
15 (over the period of 1995-2009) is 1.5% and 2.1% respectively (column 3 in Table 6.3). 
The average investment horizon for the EU projects that are financed out of the Structural 
Funds budget for 2007-13 is 25 years. If this horizon covers the period beginning from the 
140 
mid-point of the budget period (2010) then the target year is 2035. If we base our 
projection on the year for which the most up-to date figures exist, i. e. 2009, then the 
projection period is 27 years. The average per capita GDP in 2009 for the EU-15, the EU- 
27 and Turkey were $29715, $23691 and $10986 respectively. Index numbers regarding 
these GDP figures based on the per capita GDP of EU27 in 2009, i. e. $23691 = 100, are 
given as A in column 2 of Table 6.3. Column 6 gives the projected index numbers (X) for 
per capita GDP calculated according to equation (6.8), and the final column gives the 
required growth rate calculated according to equation (6.9) and expressed as a 
percentage. 
Table 6.3: Required growth rates 
A g 1+g (1+g) X LnX LnA V ON 
EU-27 100 0.015 1.015 1.499 149.9 
EU-15 125 0.021 1.021 1.753 219.1. 
Turkey 46 100% of EU-27 149.9 5.010 3.829 0.045 4.54 
Turkey 46 90% of EU-27 134.9 4.904 3.829 0.041 4.14 
Turkey 46 80% of EU-27 119.9 4.787 3.829 0.037 3.68 
Turkey 46 100% of EU-15 219.1 5.390 3.829 0.060 6.00 
Turkey 46 90% of EU-15 197.2 5.284 3.829 0.056 5.60 
Turkey 46 80% of EU-15 175.3 5.166 3.829 0.051 5.15 
Source: Own compilation 
Notes 
A= Index values based on GDP of EU27 in 2009, i. e. $23691 = 100 
g= growth rates calculated according to equation (6.6) 
X= the projected GDP (index values) according to equation (6.8) 
Ln = natural log 
V= (LnX-LnA)/26 
g (%) = the required growth rate 
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Based on these figures several scenarios have been considered the results of which are 
shown in the last column of Table 6.3. For example, if we assume that Turkey's per capita 
GDP will catch up completely with the average GDP of the EU-27 countries by 2035, it 
should grow annually by 4.5% on average. The assumptions of 90% and 80% 
convergence reduce the required growth rate to 4.1 % and 3.7% respectively. If, however, 
convergence with EU-15 is considered, then the required growth rates are higher than the 
previous case, ranging from 5.2% to 6.0%. 
6.2.3 Social time preference rate for Turkey 
The estimated values for p (1 %) and g in (Tables 6.2 and 6.3) can be put together with the 
estimated a values from Table 5.5 in Chapter 5, Section 5.5 to calculate STPR using 
equation (6.2). A range of STPR values for Turkey are presented in Table 6.4 
If the income-tax based estimate of E, i. e. 1.2, is combined with the growth rates of 
Turkish GDP or consumption, based on the past growth rates, the STPR values tend to be 
rather low and varying within a narrow range of 3.4% to 3.7%. If the income-tax based 
estimate of c is, instead, combined with the required growth rates then the value of the 
STPR vary between 5.5% and 8.3%. Alternatively, if the average growth rate of GDP 
(2.21%) is combined with the demand-model estimates of E, then the STPR is 6.6% for 
CEM and 7.1% for the AIDS model. However, if the required growth rate figures are used 
together with the E values obtained from the CEM and AIDS models, then the STPR 
exceeds 10%. 
There is a fairly wide variation in the estimated values as indicated in Table 6.4. The 
variation in the estimated STPR is mainly due to the variation in the £ values and the 
relatively wide range of growth rates considered. However, as it was discussed in Chapter 
5, the figures for the E values obtained from the demand models are above the average of 
the figures given in other empirical studies using the same model while the figures 
obtained from the tax model are in line with other empirical studies using either the tax 
model or the demand model. Thus, the estimated E value that is most appropriate for the 
calculation of the STPR for Turkey would appear to be equal to 1.2. Therefore, only the E 
values that appear in the first six rows of Table 6.4 are the relevant figures. Accordingly, 
the corresponding STPR values would vary within a narrower band of 3.4% and 8.3%. 
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Table 6.4: The range of STPR (= p+g g) values 
P 
N 
Model E Model g 
% 
STPR 
`0 
1 Tax 1.21 
Consumption 
1987-2006 2.00 3.42 
I Tax 1.21 
GDP 
Geom. avg. 1970-2009 2.21 3.67 
1 Tax 1.21 80% of EU-27 3.68 5.45 
1 Tax 1.21 100% of EU-27 4.54 6.49 
1 Tax 1.21 80% of EU-15 5.15 7.23 
1 Tax 1.21 100% of EU-15 6.00 8.26 
1 CEM 2.54 
GDP 
Geom. avg. 1970-2009 2.21 6.61 
1 CEM 2.54 80% of EU-27 3.68 10.35 
1 AIDS 2.72 
GDP 
Geom. avg. 1970-2009 2.21 7.01 
1 AIDS 2.72 80% of EU-27 3.68 11.00 
I AIDS 2.72 100% of EU-27 4.54 13.35 
I 
CEM & AIDS 
avg. 2.63 
GDP 
Geom. avg. 1970-2009 2.21 6.81 
1 CEM & AIDS 
avg. 
2.63 80% of EU-27 3.68 10.68 
I Overall avg. 1.92 
GDP 
Geom. avg. 1970-2009 2.21 5.24 
1 Overall avg. 1.92 80% of EU-27 3.68 8.07 
Source: Own compilation 
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As for the appropriate growth rate according to the possible scenarios considered in the 
previous section, 100% convergence with the EU-15 average by 2035 would require an 
average annual growth rate of 6%, while 80% convergence would require 5.2%. 
However, the same rates of convergence with the EU-27 average would require growth 
rates of 4.5% and 3.7% respectively. Thus, the required minimum average annual growth 
rate for the Turkish per capita GDP for the next 25 years or so is 3.7% and the maximum 
is 6%. 
Some might argue that even this range is somewhat ambitious since the experience of 
past 30 years points to a more modest range of 2% - 2.3%. However, this figure also 
includes the negative rates due to several severe economic crises during the past few 
decades. If a greater degree of stability in the Turkish economy can be achieved in the 
future, then the growth rate required for convergence with the EU-27 is not all that 
ambitious. In fact, if one considers the more recent performance of the Turkish economy, 
the range of 3.7-4.5% itself appears to be rather modest since the average growth rate of 
per capita GDP (PPP) was 7.7% between 2000 and 2009 (Index Mundi 2010). Moreover, 
according an IMF (2011) report, the growth rate of the GDP of Turkey is expected to be 
45.3% between 2011 and 2016 over-shadowing its neighbours and several European 
countries. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2011) also reports that Turkeys growth 
performance will surpass that of the EU27 In the future and predicts that the average 
annual growth of the per capita GDP of Turkey to be 3.6% between 2011 and 2030. More 
significantly, it notes that greater improvements in the policy environment could produce 
substantially better results. Finally, an econometric study (Beyazit 2004) using a random 
walk model estimates that the growth rate of GNP in Turkey has a long term trend of 
approximately 4.3% per annum. Consequently, the growth rate in per capita GDP of 
Turkey within the range of 3.7- 4.5% does not seem to be too Implausible. 
The implication of such a range of growth rates is that the appropriate STPR for long term 
investment projects, if full convergence with the EU-27 Is to be achieved, would be 6.5%. 
However, a more realistic aspiration for the Turkish economy is perhaps 80% 
convergence which will require only 3.7% growth, which is well within the range of 
predictions discussed above. Consequently, the Implied STPR value by this growth rate 
would be 5.5%. This is, in fact the same rate as that recommendation by the European 
CBA Guide for the Cohesion Fund countries (European Commission 2008). 
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6.3 Estimation of Regional Welfare Weights 
Equation (6.3) tells us that the welfare weight for a region depends on the per capita 
income of that region in relative terms and the value of E. The possible empirical values of 
E were estimated in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.5), and the choice of an appropriate E value 
was considered in the previous section. Thus all that is needed here is the estimation of 
the relevant income figures for a given region. 
6.3.1 RWW based on per capita income 
For estimation purposes, the Level-1 regions have, in this study, been aggregated into six 
main regions by combining the neighbouring regions of Level-2 classification (see Chapter 
1, Section 1.3.3 and Table 1.3). Thus, Marmara Region combines Istanbul, Western 
Marmara (Batt Marmara) and Eastern Marmara (Do§u Marmara) regions of Level-2. 
Similarly, Black Sea Region consists of Western Black Sea (Bata Karadeniz) and Eastern 
Black Sea (Dogu Karadeniz), whilst Central Anatolian Region Is made up of Western 
Anatolia (Bate Anadolu) and Middle Anatolia (Orta Anadolu), and finally Eastern Anatolian 
Region combines North-eastern Anatolia (Kuzeydogu Anadolu), Middle-eastern Anatolia 
(Ortado§u Anadolu) and South-eastern Anatolia (Güneydogu Anadolu). However, Aegean 
(Ege Bölgesi) and Mediterranean (Akdeniz Bölgesi) regions remain as they are in the 
Level-2 classification. 
As was explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3, there are sharp differences between 
regions in Turkey in terms of per capita income, poverty levels and other indicators of 
welfare. Table 6.5 provides per capita GDP figures at the regional level indicating that 
average living standards are much higher in the western regions of the country than the 
eastern regions. 
For example, Marmara region enjoys an average standard of living which is 44% higher 
than the Turkish average. Similarly, Istanbul is the richest sub-region at Level-2 with an 
average standard of living which is 55% above the Turkish average. In contrast, the 
Eastern Anatolia region has an average standard of living which is only 46% of the 
Turkish average with the sub-region of North-eastern Anatolia (TR B2) having an average 
standard of living which is only 35% of the Turkish average. Thus, the inter-regional 
differences in per capita income appear to be rather large in Turkey and they get larger as 
one travels to the east. 
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Table 6.5: Regional distribution of GDP per capita in Turkey, 2006 
REGIONS TL TR=100 
R Turkey 9628 100 
R 1-2-4 Marmara Region 13908 144 
TRIO Istanbul 14914 155 
R21 ekirda , Edirne, Kirkiareti 12504 130 
R22 Balikesir, anakkaie 8248 86 
R41 Bursa, Eski ehir, Bilecik 13509 140 
R42 Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova 13862 144 
R3 Aegean Region 10169 106 
R31 Izmir 12099 126 
R32 Aydin, Denizli, Mu la 9868 102 
TR33 Manisa, Afyon, Kütah a, U ak 8048 84 
R6 Mediterranean Region 7962 83 
R61 Antalya, Isparta, Burdur 11110 115 
R62 Adana, Mersin 7661 80 
R63 Hatay, Kahramanmara , Osmaniye 5629 58 
R 8-9 Black Sea Region 7382 77 
R81 Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartin 10247 106 
R82 Kastamonu, nkiri Sinop 6906 72 
R83 Samsun, Tokat, orum Amas 6794 71 
R90 Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümü hane 7004 73 
R 5-7 Central Anatolian Region 9467 98 
R 5-7 Central Anatolian Region (without Ankara) 6834 71 
R51 Ankara 13047 136 
R52 Kon a Karaman 7115 74 
R71 Kirikkale, Aksaray, Ni de Nev ehir KI ehir 6705 70 
R72 Kayseri, Yoz at 6683 69 
R A-B-C Eastern Anatolian Region 4470 46 
RA1 Erzurum Erzincan, Bayburt 5416 56 
RAZ n, Kars, I dir Ardahan 3867 40 
RB1 Malatya, Elazi Bin öl, Tunceli 5583 58 
RB2 Van, Mu $, Bitlis, Hakkari 3392 35 
RC1 Gaziantep, Adi man Kills 5098 53 
RC2 anliurfa, Diyarbakir 4183 43 
RC3 Mardin, Batman, $imak, Slirt 4159 43 
Source: Compiled from TürkStat (2011) 
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We can, based on the formula of equation (6.3), calculate welfare weights for the different 
regions of Turkey. Table 6.6 shows the welfare weights based on per capita GDP for the 
main regions of Turkey. Column two gives the per capita GDP, column three shows the 
per capita GDP for each region relative to the per capita GDP for Turkey as a whole and 
column four displays the welfare weights on the basis of c=1.2, the choice of which was 
discussed in Section 6.2.3 above. As can be observed, the poorest main region, the 
Eastern Anatolian Region, has a weight that is almost four times as high as the richest 
Marmara Region. 
Table 6.6: RWW based on per capita GDP, e =1.21 
Regions Y, * YTR RWW 
TURKEY 9628 (Ym) 1.000 1.000 
Marmara Region 13908 0.692 0.64 
Aegean Region 10169 0.947 0.94 
Central Anatolian Region 9468 1.017 1.02 
(Without Ankara) (6834) (1.41) (1.52) 
Mediterranean Region 7962 1.209 1.26 
Black Sea Region 7382 1.304 1.38 
Eastern Anatolian Region 4470 2.154 2.53 
Notes: Y, = per capita GDP of a region, 2006 
YTR = per capita GDP of Turkey 
Y 
YTR 
TR _ Y 
s r! 
rx1 RWW= 
Source: Own compilation 
147 
An interesting aspect of Table 6.6 is that the Central Anatolian Region has a weight lower 
than those of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea regions despite the fact that most of its 
sub-regions are not necessarily any richer than the sub-regions of the latter two main 
regions. The reason for this is that the Central Anatolian Region includes Ankara as one 
of the sub-regions, and it is the capital and the second big city of Turkey and thus has a 
relatively high per capita income. If Ankara as an outlier is taken out of the Central 
Anatolian Region, then the weight attached to the Central Anatolian Region becames the 
second highest with 1.52. 
Table 6.7 provides information about how sensitive the welfare weight figures are to 
variation in the value of E. The infra-regional variation in RWW with respect to r values 
ranging from 1.2 to 2.6 for the Aegean and the Central Anatolian regions (with Ankara) is 
relatively small, i. e. 7.4% and 2.9% respectively. The reason is, of course, that the weight 
for these regions is close to unity. However, as one moves towards regions with weights 
significantly different from unity, the variation gets increasingly larger. 
Table 6.7: RWW (based on per capita GDP) for different E values 
Region 
RWW 
r=1.21 
RWW 
s=1.50 
RWW 
a=1.92 
RWW 
e=2.63 
TURKEY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Marmara 0.64 0.58 0.49 0.38 
Aegean 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.87 
Central Anatolian 
(without Ankara) 
1.02 
(1.52) 
1.03 
(1.67) 
1.03 
(1.93) 
1.05 
(2.47) 
Mediterranean 1.26 1.33 1.44 1.65 
Black Sea 1.38 1.49 1.67 2.01 
Eastern Anatolian 2.53 3.16 4.36 7.52 
Source: Own compilation 
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For example, it is 31% for the Mediterranean region, 41% for Marmara Region, 46% for 
Black Sea Region and almost 200% for the Eastern Anatolian Region due to the high 
weight attached to this region. This indicates the important role played by the elasticity of 
marginal utility of income in the estimation of income based welfare weights. 
More significantly, the interregional variation in RWW with respect to different c values is 
much greater compared to intra-regional variation. For example, the weight for the poorest 
Eastern Anatolian region is around four times as lare as the richest Marmara region when 
the weights are based on t=1.21. However, the weight for the poorest region becomes 
almost twenty times as large as that of the richest region if the weights are based on C= 
2.63. This emphasises the importance of the value of F in the estimation of welfare 
weights. 
6.3.2 Regional welfare weights based on equally-distributed 
equivalent income (EDE! ) 
As was discussed briefly in Section 6.1 above and in greater detail in Chapter 4, Section 
4.3, welfare weights based on per capita income do not take into account the differences 
in the intra-regional income dispersion between regions. It is argued that welfare weights 
based on the EDEI measure would overcome this difficulty. 
The formula for EDEI was derived in Chapter 4 and can be expressed as follows: 
I 
(6.10) EDEý_(EwYi"ý1t-E 
where 
EDEN = equally-distributed equivalent income of broad region I 
wj= the relative population weight for each sub-region within broad region i, 
Yj = per capita income of the j"' sub-region, and 
E= the income inequality aversion parameter (or the elasticity of marginal utility of income) 
After obtaining the EDEI for each region according to equation (6.10), it is easy to 
calculate the regional welfare weights by using the formula in equation (6.4). 
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Table 6.8 shows the estimated welfare weights for the six main regions of Turkey on the 
basis of the inequality aversion parameter = 1.2, using the EDEI for Turkey as a whole 
(YTR) as the numeraire. It can be seen that the Eastern Anatolian Region has the highest 
weight of 2.32, since it is the poorest region, while the richest Marmara Region has the 
lowest weight of 0.59. This indicates that the welfare level of the poorest region is almost 
four times as low as that of the richest region in Turkey. 
Table 6.8: RWW based on EDEL for c =1.21 
YrR E 
Reg ion Y, y e 
N 
yi 
TURKEY 8782 1.0000 1.00 
Marmara 13678 0.6421 0.59 
Aegean 9953 0.8824 0.86 
Central Anatolian 8862 0.9910 0.99 
(without Ankara) (6819) (1.2879) (1.36) 
Mediterranean 7610 1.1539 1.19 
Black Sea 7262 1.2093 1.26 
Eastern Anatolian 4382 2.0040 2.32 
Notes: Y, = EDEI of ie1 region 
YYR = EDEI of Turkey 
E 
LTIR 
( = regional welfare weights / 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 6.9 shows the EDEI-based RWW for different E values which displays similar 
ranking and pattern to those in Table 6.8 for the reasons explained in Section 6.3.1 above. 
Table 6.9: RWW based on EDEI for different a values 
Region 
RWW 
s=1.21 
RWW 
a =1.50 
RWW 
s=1.92 
RWW 
a=2.63 
TURKEY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Marmara 0.59 0.51 0.43 0.31 
Aegean 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.72 
Central Anatolian 
(without Ankara) 
0.99 
(1.36) 
0.99 
(1.46) 
0.98 
(1.63) 
0.98 
(1.95) 
Mediterranean 1.19 1.24 1.32 1.46 
Black Sea 1.26 1.33 1.44 1.65 
Eastern Anatolian 2.32 2.84 3.80 6.22 
Source: Own compilation 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the estimation of the social discount rate and the regional 
welfare rates for Turkey. The estimate of z obtained in Chapter 5 and the estimates of p 
and g derived in this chapter have been used to calculate various STPR figures for 
consideration. The chosen value for the STPR for Turkey is 5.5% which is well in line not 
only with comparable studies in the literature (Evans 2007, Evans and Kula 2009, Evans 
and Sezer 2005, Kula 1984 and 2004 and Lopez 2008) but also with the recommendation 
of the European CBA Guide of 5.5% for the Cohesion Fund countries (European 
Commission 2008). It could be argued that the appropriate income measure to use In the 
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estimation of the STPR would be equivalised income but such data, unfortunately, are not 
provided by Turkish Statistical Institute. For future research more detailed household 
survey data would be a requirement. 
As for the RWW, the estimated values of welfare weights based on per capita income are 
not significantly different from those based on EDEI due to the data not being 
disaggregated enough with respect to intra-regional dispersion of income. However, the 
RWW do display significant sensitivity to variation in value of E. 
It is argued that the EDEI method is superior to the GDP method in at least one respect 
since it considers the intra-regional income dispersion as well as the inter-regional 
dispersion. However, this method becomes really useful when disaggregated income data 
at the household level exist. For Turkey such data are not currently available. It is also 
argued that the c value of 1.2 obtained from the tax model is perhaps even more 
appropriate in the estimation of the regional welfare weights since the aversion to income 
inequality by the government (on behalf of society) Is more relevant than consumer 
behaviour in this context. 
The next and final chapter will contain a summary of findings, a discussion on the 
government policies regarding the social discount rate and regional development, and the 
policy implications of the chosen STPR and RWW for Turkey. 
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Chapter 7 Policy Issues 
7.1 Chapter overview 
The main objective of this study has been the estimation of the social discount rate, i. e. 
the STPR, for long term projects and the derivation of the regional welfare weights (RWW) 
for Turkey as well as the evaluation of the implications of these two measurements for 
government policy. The significance of the STPR and RWW arises because economic 
welfare depends on growth and growth in turn depends on investment. Any investment 
decision, on the other hand, will involve the twin issues of efficiency and equity. This study 
is concerned with the equity dimension of investment decisions and has focused on the 
spatial (interpersonal) and intergenerational equity. Spatial equity is the distribution of 
benefits and costs between different groups of people in the same time period whereas 
intergenerational equity is the distribution of benefits and costs between generations. The 
former is considered in the context of the RWW and the latter in the context of the 
discount rate. 
In this chapter we will summarise and evaluate the results obtained in Chapter 6 in the 
light of the research objectives set out in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.1. We will discuss the 
choice of discount rate and its implications for the long term public projects in Turkey as 
well as for the EU-Turkey relationship in the context of Turkey's candidacy for full 
membership of the EU (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). We will also evaluate the welfare 
weights estimated and discuss their policy implications for the allocation of public funds In 
the context of Turkish regional policy with reference to the EU regional policy rules. 
7.2 Summary of findings 
In this section the main findings of the study with respect to the social discount rate and 
regional welfare weights will be summarised leaving the discussion on the policy 
applications of these two measurements to the next section. 
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7.2.1 Findings on the social time preference rate 
In Chapter 2 we discussed the theoretical issues surrounding the social discount rate and 
pointed out that, although the final decisions regarding economic choices are taken by 
policy-makers, it is important that they are aware of the issues and the trade-offs and have 
the necessary information to make informed decisions. It was also pointed out that CBA 
analysis is regarded as a method which provides technical information and clarifies such 
trade-offs and that a positive social discount rate is an integral part of that process. More 
specifically, there appears to be general agreement (see, for example, Evans 2007, Evans 
and Sezer 2005, Kula 2004, Percoco 2008, Rambaud and Torrecillas 2006, and 
Spackman 2008, as well as the European Commission 2008 and HM Treasury 2003) that 
the social time preference rate (STPR) is superior to its alternatives such as the market 
bond rate and the social opportunity cost of capital or shadow pricing, and thus is the most 
appropriate method of discounting and should be used in discounting both intra- and inter- 
generational public projects. It is indeed the preferred method by both national 
governments and international bodies such as HM Treasury (2003) and the European 
Commission (2008). 
Consequently, a formula for the calculation of the STPR was derived using an inter- 
temporal choice model regarding consumption as expressed in equation (7.1) 
(7.1) STPR = p+s. g 
Chapter 3 was devoted to the discussion of the theoretical and empirical issues relating to 
an important component of the STPR (and indeed that of regional welfare weights too), 
namely, the elasticity of marginal utility of income (s), due to its special place in both the 
literature and the actual formulation of the STPR and the RWW. An Important point of 
discussion in Chapter 3 was that the STPR relates to the correspondence between the 
concept of the elasticity of marginal utility of income and the concept of aversion to 
income inequality which were both represented by E. Chapter 3 also included a discussion 
on the alternative methods of estimating E and established that the most commonly used 
methods of estimating E are the demand-for-food analysis and the income tax models. 
Moreover, it was argued that these two methods of estimating e were, in the light of the 
experiences of the Turkish economy during the past thirty years and the considerations of 
data availability, also the most appropriate methods of estimation for Turkey as well. In 
fact, employing these two methods, several estimates of E were provided in Chapter 5, 
which varied from 1.21 by the tax method to 2.63, the average of the CEM and the AIDS 
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models, i. e. the two demand models. It was further argued in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3 that 
the a values obtained from the demand models appeared to be out of line with other 
similar empirical studies while the figures from the tax model were in line with other 
empirical studies and therefore the estimated c value that is most appropriate for the 
calculation of the STPR for Turkey would appear to be equal to 1.21. Nevertheless, some 
sensitivity analysis involving higher and lower values of a would be desirable. 
As for the other two components of the STPR, empirical studies providing estimates for 
the utility discount rate (p) and the growth rate of consumption (g) were evaluated in 
Chapter 4. It was then established that most empirical studies attribute to pa value 
varying between 0.1% and 1.5%, and to ga value between 1.5% and 4%. However, in 
Chapter 6, where an appropriate STPR for Turkey was derived, it was argued that the 
most appropriate value for p would be 1%. Similarly, several possible values were 
considered for g and it was concluded that in the context of a desired target of 80% 
convergence of the Turkish economy with the EU-27 in the next 25 years, the appropriate 
value for g would be 3.7% (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3). 
Consequently, it was established that the chosen value for the STPR for Turkey would be 
5.5% which is the same as that recommended by the EU Guide to CBA of investment 
projects for the Cohesion Fund countries (European Commission 2008). Therefore, 
Turkey might as well apply the same guideline rate as that of the EU. 
7.2.2 Findings on regional welfare weights 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3 and reiterated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, that 
the important variables making up the welfare weight for a region are the per capita 
income and the elasticity of marginal utility of income and that the formula for the 
calculation of the RWW is as follows: 
( ls 
(7.2) WAYJ 
lA 
where 
WA = the welfare weight for region A relative to region B 
YA = per capita income in region A, 
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YB = per capita income in region B, the numeraire (WB =1) 
E= the elasticity of marginal utility of income or the coefficient of relative aversion to 
income inequality 
The theoretical issues surrounding RWW such as the choice of the underlying utility 
function, the properties of the related social welfare function, the suitability of income to 
represent the wellbeing of an individual and the issue of equivalisation were also 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3. However, the issue of intra-regional income 
dispersion was left to Chapter 4, Section 4.3, where the concept of equally-distributed 
equivalent income (EDEI) was introduced. The reason for introducing EDEI is the fact that 
the RWW as expressed in equation (7.2) is based on the distribution of per capita income 
among regions but ignores the differences in the antra-regional income distribution 
between regions or more precisely makes the assumption that the intra-regional income 
distribution is the same for all regions. Thus, the welfare weight for a region is now based 
not on the relative per capita income of the region as in equation (7.2) but on the relative 
EDEI as in equation (7.3). 
(7.3) RWW,, _ 
where 
I EDEIB s 
EDEI,, 
) 
RWWA = regional welfare weight attached to region A 
EDEIA = equally-distributed equivalent income of region A 
EDEl8 = equally-distributed equivalent income of region B, the numeraire. 
The second variable in the formula for the RWW, namely the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income or the income inequality aversion parameter (E) has already been referred to in 
Section 7.1.2. 
The empirical evidence in the literature regarding the RWW was examined In Chapter 4 
by critically evaluating the studies which have provided estimates of the regional welfare 
weights for various countries. It was established that in all of the studies considered but 
one, the RWW were based on per capita income, the exception being that by Sezer 
(2007) who used EDEI as the basis. 
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The RWW for Turkey were estimated in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 on the basis of both per 
capita income and EDEI. Both measures indicated that the poorest region has a welfare 
weight almost four times as large as that of the richest region. Moreover, the sensitivity 
analysis therein indicated that there is some variation in the intra-regional welfare weights 
with respect to the value of e and that the degree of variation increases as the value of the 
weights move away from unity. However, the sensitivity analysis also indicated that the 
variation in the inter-regional welfare weights are much more responsive to the variation in 
the value of E than the variation in the intra-regional weights is (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.3). 
7.3 Policy issues regarding the social discount rate 
In this section we will first set out the policy framework regarding the social discount rate 
in Turkey and then discuss this framework and the current practices involving the 
implementation of SDR with respect to the evaluation of long term projects, i. e. with a 
horizon of 20-30 years. 
7.3.1 The framework 
As was explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.4, the SPO is the government body charged 
with the formulation and implementation of public investment policies in Turkey. The 
general principles of these policies are set out in the five-year plans but specific policies 
are determined by government directives, guides and announcements published by the 
SPO. There are also special commissions charged with the responsibility of gathering 
information, undertaking research and developing appropriate policies. 
Until the mid-1970s, the main method used in the allocation of funds to public sector 
projects was the CBA and the main approach used to calculate labour cost, exchange rate 
and the discount rate was the shadow-price approach. This method was abandoned after 
1975 in favour of a market rates approach due to lack of reliable data and thus the 
evaluation of public projects after 1975 was based on market prices (GÖkgöz and cinar 
2010). This approach became even more entrenched after 1980 when interventionist 
economic policies were replaced by more market oriented approach (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4). 
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Despite this development, the SPO and the five-year plans, although no longer enjoying 
the same prestigious status they once had, have still remained as the major instruments in 
the formulation and implementation of public investment policies. The seventh five-year 
plan, covering the period of 1996-2000, was the first one to contain an explicit chapter on 
investment policies. The plan stated that in considering the funding of the continuing 
projects, priority be given to those which use existing resources most effectively, have 
already achieved significant progress towards completion and have significant impact on 
the completion of other projects. Most importantly, it stipulated that in the selection of new 
projects, procedures be rationalised by using techniques of financial, economic and social 
analysis (see SPO 2010a). The eighth and the ninth five-year plans, covering years 2001- 
2013, and the associated directives and guides have, however, been prepared with a view 
of compliance with the acquis communautaire of the EU. Although they maintain the 
criteria set out in the seventh plan, they also include targets and priorities which are 
necessitated by the process of membership of the EU such as developing policies to 
reduce regional inequalities (see Section 7.4). 
7.3.2 The evaluation of policies 
It was pointed out in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 that the formulation and the Implementation of 
SDR with respect to the evaluation of long term projects in Turkey lacks coherent and 
consistent policies despite the existence of development plans going back to the 1960s. In 
the past, different criteria have been used at different times. For example, in the 
evaluation of some public projects, the criterion of private sector profitability has been 
used and therefore the relevant discount rate has been the market rate of interest based 
on time-deposit interest rates. At other times the choice of projects has been based on 
whether similar projects have been successful in the past. However, projects have also 
often been funded on the basis of political considerations. 
These inconsistencies and lack of coherence were also present in the application of the 
discount rate. The SDR would differ according to not only whether the financial or the 
economic and social analyses were implemented but also the way the project is financed. 
Most importantly, despite references in the five-year plans and associated documents to 
the necessity of subjecting public sector projects to financial, economic and social 
analyses, there has been no mention of a specific SDR. For example, a directive issued 
by the SPO (2009) stipulates that priority will be given to those projects that contribute to 
the realisation or the acceleration of the programmes which have been undertaken in the 
context of EU membership. The directive also prioritises certain investments projects, 
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such as the South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the East Anatolia Project (DAP), and 
Konya Plain Project (KOP) that are important in the context of regional development on 
which the EU programmes put a particular emphasis; but it is pointedly silent on the issue 
of a specific SDR. One possible exception is the Guide for the Preparation of Public 
Information Technology and Communication (ITC) Projects (SPO 2010b), which states 
that in the allocation of funds to the public ITC projects certain criteria will be applied. 
Such criteria may include whether the project has a supporting viable feasibility study; 
whether it is based on effective technical, financial, economic and social analysis; and 
whether it has already obtained external financing. Interestingly, it also states that the 
discount rate to be used in the financial and economic analysis of the ITC projects is 10%. 
However, there is no rationale or even a discussion provided for this particular rate, nor is 
it indicated that this rate is also applicable to other public sector projects. 
Consequently, it can be said that there is an urgent need for the formulation of appropriate 
policies regarding the determination and the implementation of the SDR in the evaluation 
of long term projects in Turkey. 
7.4 Policy issues regarding regional development 
As has been stated in Chapter 1, section 1.3 Turkey faces serious problems regarding 
regional development since there are significant differences in the level of development 
between different regions in Turkey in terms of per capita income as well as other 
indicators of development such as unemployment levels, demographic indicators, 
education levels and provision of health services (Pinar & Arikan 2003). For example, the 
average poverty rate for the western regions of Istanbul, West Marmara, and the Aegean 
is 8.7% whereas this rate for the eastern regions of North East Anatolia, Central East 
Anatolia and South East Anatolia is 39.6% (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3, Table 1.4). 
7.4.1 The framework 
As in the case of the SDR regarding the evaluation of long term public projects, the SPO 
and the five-year plans together with the associated guides and special committees are 
the main institutions that are responsible for the development and the implementation of 
regional policies in Turkey. 
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The issue of regional inequality was acknowledged right from the beginning of the planned 
period and the reduction of such inequality was one of the main objectives of the first five- 
year plan and indeed of the subsequent plans right up to the present day along with the 
objective of the maximisation of national income. For example, the first two five-year 
plans, covering the period of 1963-72, acknowledged the difference in the volume of 
economic activity and per capita income between regions and introduced the concept of 
Priority Development Regions (PDR), known as KOY, with the establishment of 22 PDR in 
1968. South-east Anatolia is mentioned explicitly as a Priority Development Region and 
Keban dam is cited as a significant public project to help this region. These plans also 
stipulated that regional development plans be prepared for, Antalya, cukurova and 
Zonguldak regions; that among similar public projects those located in these regions be 
given priority; and that the private sector be encouraged via subsidies to invest in these 
regions (SPO 2010a). 
The subsequent five-year plans focused, particularly after 1980 in accordance with the 
market approach to economic problems, on incentives given to private investment as a 
policy to reduce regional differences. They proposed the instigation of regional 
development projects especially for the Eastern and South-eastern regions and stipulated 
that 'regional action plans' be prepared for each province of these two regions. The 
Southern Anatolian Project (GAP), which consists of 22 dams regarding hydroelectric and 
irrigation schemes and 19 hydro-electric power stations, was initiated in 1989 and 
subsequently other projects designed to help the social and cultural development of the 
region were also undetaken. However, political instability and the problem of ethnic strife 
combined with macroecnomic instability rendered the 1990s as 'lost years' during which 
both national and regional development were rather constrained (Filiztekin 2008). 
The latest two five-year plans, the eighth and the ninth, covering years 2000-2013, have 
been prepared with a view of compliance with the acquis communautaire of the EU. Thus, 
they stress the importance of economic balance between the regions, improvement In the 
quality of life, equal opportunity, and a greater degree of participation of local and regional 
authorities as well as NGOs in the political decision-making process. The ninth plan 
stipulated that suitable strategies, which would make good use of the economic and social 
potential and the dynamics of the regions and provinces, be developed. However, it also 
recognised the fact that regions and provinces do not have the required infrastructure and 
hence the capacity to implement such strategies. It, therefore, suggested the 
establishment of Regional Development Agencies based on the EU model in order to 
enhance the capacity of the regions on the one hand and to enable the local Institutions to 
assume the ownership of the regional plans and projects on the other (SPO 2010a). 
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Since the 1980s the main economic approach to regional policy in Turkey has been 
neoclassical in character and therefore greater emphasis has been put on private sector 
involvement in regional development. In order to encourage suitable private investment, 
several laws were passed by the parliament providing various incentives for private 
projects. These incentives can be grouped into four main categories: cash incentives, tax 
incentives, land grants and energy cost support (Pinar and Ankan 2003). Incentives as 
part of regional policy have been in existence since 1913 ((; iloglu 2000). However, the 
first package of incentives specifically designed to encourage investment in East and 
South-east Anatolia was introduced in 1998. It provided total exemption from 
Income/Corporation Tax and the allocation of free land for those investment projects 
employing ten or more people and located in one of the 21 provinces of the Eastm and 
Southern Anatolian regions (Act of Parliament 1998). In 2004, a change was made to this 
scheme by increasing the minimum number of employees to thirty but extending the 
incentives to include not just tax exemption but also exemption from employers' social 
security contibutions, free land allocation and energy cost reduction. Moreover, the 
number of provinces benefiting from the scheme was increased to 36 by the introduction 
of a new criterion of eligibility. The new criterion stated that the scheme was extended to 
any province with a per capita income of $1500 based on the figures of 2001 provided by 
the Turkish Statistical Institute. With another change a year later, the scheme was 
extended to 49 provinces and thus more than half of all 81 provinces were made eligible 
(Act of Parliament 2004). 
7.4.2 Evaluation of regional policy in Turkey 
The development of coherent and viable regional policies and the effective 
implementation of these policies are important issues for Turkey. The main reason for this 
is the Kurdish problem which requires radical and region-based policies, appropriate 
strategies and effective mechanisms. Another reason is Turkey's candidacy for full 
membership of the EU, since regional policy constitutes one of the most important policy 
areas in the EU as set out in Chapter 21 of the acquis communautaire on Regional Policy 
and the Co-ordination of Structural Instruments. For the period 2007-13, the planned 
expenditure on regional policy constitutes the second largest item In the EU budget with 
an allocation of E348 billion (Europa 2010a). The EU regional policy is rather important to 
Turkey not only for 'its finacial implications, i. e. Turkey is eligible for EU pre-accession 
funding (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1), but also for the fact that Turkey is under obligation to 
undertake, during the accession negotiations, the infrastructural and institutional reforms 
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as required by the EU regional policies. These reforms involve regional decentralisation 
and the establishment of democratised regional governance structures (Beleli 2005). 
It is clear from the statistical evidence submitted in Chapters 1 and 6 and from several 
studies on this subject (see, for example, Elvan et at 2005, Filiztekin 2008, Pinar and 
Ankan 2003 and so on) that regional development policies have been generally 
unsuccessful so far. Some argue that this failure is due not to the policies themselves but 
the fact that they have never been properly Implemented or not even implemented at all. 
For example, despite the fact that the ninth five-year plan required the establisment of 
Regional Development Agencies, only two such agencies (Izmir and Cukurova) were 
established by the end of 2008 and both were in reletively well-off areas (Filiztekin 2008). 
Others argue that the policies themselves are inappropriate for regional development in 
Turkey because they are usually imposed by international institutions and that policy- 
makers and bureaucrats in Turkey have not been creative enough in producing 
appropriate regional policies (Do§ruel 2006). 
There are two main historical reasons for the relative failure of Turkish regional policies. 
One is the fact that maximum growth of national income and thus sectoral considerations 
have also been an important objective in parallel to the objective of reducing regional 
inequalities (SPO 2008). Some would say that the former have always had priority over 
the latter (Ertugal 2005a). The other, more importantly, Is that the policy-making and 
implementation process with respect to regional development is highly centralised with no 
local institutions with the ownership of or the power to supervise any policy Initiative at the 
regional level. This is typical of Turkish political structure in which most of the political 
power is concentrated in the capital, Ankara. There are local authorities at the provincial 
level but they are financed mainly by the central government thus do not have much 
independent power to exercise. As for the regional institutions, they simply do not exist 
(Elvan. at al 2005). One exception to this picture is the Southern Anatolian Project (GAP). 
The setting up of the Regional Development Administrtions was specifically for the 
administration and implementation of the GAP at the local level for the Southeast 
Anatolian region. 
The centralist nature of the Turkish approach to regional development is in contrast to the 
partnership principle of the EU regional policy which requires multi-level governance in the 
implementation of the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF). This has presented a challenge to the 
traditional approach to regional policy in Turkey. The response has been a number of 
changes in regional policy. One such change is the adoption of the European system of 
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Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) in order to achieve consistency in 
gathering and presenting statistical data in the context of regional development. Another 
was the preparation of the Preliminary National Development Plan (PNDP) aimed to draw 
up the guidelines of economic and social cohesion policy for 2004-2006. Yet another one 
was passing of a law establishing Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) for 26 new 
regions in 2005. Nevertheless, partly due to lack of political will with respect to the policy 
of decentralisation for fear that they may undermine territorial integrity and encourage 
Kurdish separatism (Reeves 2005), and partly because they have not been implemented 
properly, these measures have proved to be largely inadequate. 
However, it can also be said that, a degree of 'Europeanisation' has taken place in Turkish 
regional policy especially since the approval of Turkey's status as a candidate country for 
the membership of the EU in 1999. Since then, the failure of the past policies and the 
necessity of a fresh look at the regional issues have been acknowledged. Thus, it would 
appear that the EU accession process has provided an opportunity to install the concept 
of 'region' Into the regional policy and take the necessary steps to instigate the required 
infrastructural institutions for viable regional development (Ertugal 2005a). Ironically, the 
Kurdish question, or rather the desire to find a solution to the problem, is also partially 
responsible for this process which has culminated in the 20 minor and major changes to 
the Turkish Constitution in the past decade or so. In short, Turkey has made some 
considerable progress towards compliance with the acquis but still has some way to go for 
full integrity with the European institutions (European Commission 2010 and 
Congressional Research Service 2010). 
Given the conclusion in Section 7.3.2 that there is an urgent need for the formulation of 
appropriate policies regarding the determination and the implementation of the SDR and 
the importance and therefore the reform of regional policy in the context of eligibility for 
the EU funds as discussed above, the next section aims to provide technical information 
that could be used in the development of such policies. 
7.5 Practical application of the SDR and RWW in Turkey 
In this section, we will discuss the possible use to which the estimated values of the STPR 
and the RWW for Turkey can be put. It is worth reiterating that the primary concern of this 
study is the estimation of values for the STPR and the RWW for Turkey to be used in the 
application of CBA to long term projects in Turkey rather than the operation of CBA per 
se. In this context the aim is not only to provide the national and international evaluators 
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with information that could be useful in the application of CBA to long term projects but 
also to take both social efficiency and equity criteria into account in the appraisal of public 
projects and the evaluation of policy options. 
7.5.1 The social discount rate 
In Section 7.3.1, it was indicated that there is no discussion regarding the choice of a 
social discount rate set by the SPO in the five-year development plans or associated 
publications in Turkey. There are of course references to the necessity of financial, 
economic and social analysis in the evaluation of public projects and hence references to 
long term government bonds, matket rates of interest and the international rate of interest 
depending on the source of finance of such projects. However, such references do not 
amount to a coherent and consisitent policy statement regarding the setting of an 
appropriate discount rate and there has been no officially declared discount rate except 
for the 10% rate stated by the SPO for the public ITC projects (see Section 7.3.1). This is 
in contrast with the European practice where several European countries have set an 
explicit discount rate based on the STPR approach (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). 
The preferred STPR for Turkey in this study is estimated as 5.5%. This estiamate is 
significant in several aspects. First, the figure of 5.5% is the same as the recommendation 
of the European CBA Guide for the Cohesion Fund countries and therefore would prove to 
be helpful in the applications by Turkey for IPA funds currently and for the Structural and 
Cohesion funds after accession. Moreover, it would appear to be the only academic 
estimation of the STPR employing the most recent techniques used in the literature and 
thus it fills an important gap in the literature regarding SDR with respect to Turkey. Finally, 
given the lack of a coherent official policy regarding the discount rate applicable to public 
projects, it would provide a useful guide for the policy-makers in Turkey regarding the 
application of economic analysis to long-term public projects. Although the SPO does 
recommend a 10% discount rate to be used in the financial and economic analysis of the 
ITC projects, the rate is highly sector-specific, the SPO provides no justification, nor any 
discussion, for the figure itself, and 10% is well out of line with the rates applied in Europe. 
7.5.2 The regional welfare weights 
The application of welfare weights is, however, less straightforward since it is more 
controversial due to the fact that it involves equity issues. Some economists argue that 
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distributional issues should be left out of CBA altogether, some argue that they should be 
considered but through shadow pricing, and yet others argue that they should be explicitly 
taken into account through the use of the distributional weights (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.1). However, from the policy application point of view, the UK government makes an 
explicit reference to the use of distributional welfare weights in its expenditure policy in the 
Green Book (HM Treasury 2003). The recent EU Guide to CBA of investment projects 
also refers to the explicit use of the welfare weights based on income differences (see 
European Commission 2008, Annex E). 
In this study the expressed view is that the SDR based on STPR deals with the efficiency 
issue as well as with the issue of inter-temporal equity but leaves out the issue of spatial 
(interpersonal) equity based on income differences. Consequently, the study provides 
estimates of regional welfare weights for Turkey. The next issue is the practical 
application of welfare weights to CBA in evaluating long term public projects so that 
proper account of both efficiency and equity criteria is taken. 
a) Equity-adjusted net present value (NPV*) 
Following Potts (2002), we can use the concept of NPV as a measure of project worth in 
order to rank projects that compete for limited funds. 
(7.4) NPV=ýB 
C 
r=0 (1+r)t 
where 
NPV = standard net present value of project where benefits, operational costs and capital 
costs are all taken into account. 
Br = project benefits in year t 
Cr = project costs in year t 
r= the discount rate 
n= the life of the project in years. 
Thus, NPV and associated measures deal with the efficiency of projects. However, equity 
issues can also be explicitly taken into account through the incorporation of welfare 
weights into equation (7.4). Thus we would have the following equation 
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NPV* 
17 8; l "" ' 
(1+r)t 
%.... i _, _rý 
where 
Kpv " Kt 1 
(1+r)t 
NPV* = equity adjusted NPV of the project concerned 
wi = regional welfare weight 
OCr = operating costs 
K= capital costs 
Kpv = 
" Kt 
Please note that 
Cr=OCt+Kt 
Equation (7.5) can be expressed more conveniently as 
(7.6) NPV* = wl (NPY)-(1-w1)Kpv 
The procedure described above is a way of Incorporating the regional welfare weights into 
the NPV method of ranking projects. However, comparing projects with different overhead 
costs and with different time horizons does not make much sense. Thus, what we need Is 
a measure which would give the annual equity-adjusted NPV per unit of capital outlay. 
This can be obtained by modifying equation (7.6) as follows. 
NPV* 
- 
w(NPV) (1-wýý 
ýý ýý 
nK nK n pv PV 
t-='-O 
[ l+rýt 
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where 
NPV 
= the expected annual rate of equity-adjusted premium return (in relation to the 
nKpy 
relevant discount rate) on capital 
Suppose, for example, that the SPO in Turkey is presented with ten projects to evaluate 
for funding and further assume that four of the projects impact on the richest Marmara 
Region, three on the poorest Eastern Anatolian Region, and the other three on the middle- 
income Central Anatolian Region. The first step would be to calculate the NPV of each 
project according to equation (7.4) and then apply the regional welfare weights according 
to equation (7.6) to obtain NPV*. Finally, the annual equity-adjusted premium return on 
capital is obtained by dividing through by the product of the life-span of the project in 
years and the present value of capital cost, i. e. (n K. ) [equation (7.7)j. 
Table 7.1 is constructed for illustrative purposes to indicate how the ranking of the projects 
changes with the incorporation of the regional welfare weights into the NPV method and 
the derivation of the annual equity-adjusted return on capital. 
Column 2 provides illustrative NPV figures and Column 3 shows EDEI-based regional 
welfare weights as estimated in Chapter 6 with c =1.2 (see Table 6.8). Column 4 Indicates 
the life-time of project in years and Column 5 provides net present value of capital costs 
for each project. Column 6 provides the estimated figures for the annual rate of 
unadjusted return on capital (ARUR) which are calculated by dividing the NPV figures in 
Column 2 by the product of life-time of project in years, n, and the net present value of 
capital costs, K,,, i. e. Columns 4 and S. Column 7 Indicates the ranking of the projects 
with respect to ARUR values. Column 8 shows the equity adjusted NPV figures which are 
calculated according to equation (7.6), and Column 9 shows the figures of the annual rate 
of equity-adjusted return on capital (AREAR), which are calculated by dividing the figures 
in Column 8 again by the product of (nKp°) in accordance with equation (7.7). Finally, 
Column 10 ranks the projects with respect to their AREAR values. 
In this illustrative example, ranking the. projects according to ARUR values indicates that 
the richest Marmara Region has three projects in the top five and the poorest Eastern 
Anatolian region has only one. However, after applying the regional welfare weights to the 
net present values, the ranking changes such that the top five projects include the three 
from the poorest region and none from the richest region as indicated by Column 10. 
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Table 7.1 An example of equity adjusted NPV expressed as an annual rate of 
return on capital 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Region NPV RWW n Kp, ARUR Rank NPV* AREAR Rank* E 000 ¬000 % E 000 % 
Marmara 12600 0.59 30 5040 8.3 6 5368 3.6 9 
Marmara 11000 0.59 30 3850 9.5 3 4912 4.3 8 
Marmara 10050 0.59 26 3300 11.7 1 4577 5.3 7 
Marmara 9500 0.59 26 4200 8.7 5 3883 3.6 10 
Central 11300 0.99 30 5750 6.6 10 11130 5 6 6 Anatolian . 
Central 8800 0.99 20 3800 11 6 2 8674 11 4 4 Anatolian . . 
Central 
Anatolian 8100 0.99 28 4000 7.2 7 7979 7.1 5 
Eastern 12500 2.32 28 6250 7.1 8 37250 21.3 2 Anatolian 
Eastern 9600 2.32 30 4500 7.1 9 28212 17 4 3 Anatolian . 
Eastern 9300 2.32 25 4000 9.3 4 26196 35 6 1 Anatolian . 
Source: Own compilation 
Notes: 
NPV = standard net present value of project 
RWW = regional welfare weights as estimated in Chapter 6 (RWW =1 for Turkey as a whole) 
n= life-time of project in years 
Kp° = present value of capital costs 
ARUR = annual rate of unadjusted return on capital, i. e. ARUR = 
NPV 
nKPV 
Rank = ranking according to ARUR 
NPV* = equity adjusted NPV [see equation (7.6)] 
AREAR= annual rate of equity-adjusted return on capital [see equation (7.7)] 
Rank* = ranking according to AREAR 
b) Equity-adjusted Internal rate of return (IRR*) 
It is possible that one wishes to employ the method of internal rate of return (IRR) to the 
selection of the projects (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5), Then this can be done by setting 
equation (7.6) to zero and solving for r* (equity-adjusted internal rate of return). Thus, 
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(7.8) NPV* = wl (NPV)-(1- wi )Kpv =O 
Note that if w> 1, then NPV must be negative at r* by an amount that depends on the 
extent to which w exceeds unity and the size of the last term (KP, ), i. e. capital costs 
associated with the project. In this case, r* exceeds the standard unadjusted internal rate 
of return (IRR). 
If w=1, then NPV = NPV* = 0, and this gives the standard Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
There is no equity adjustment in this particular case. So, IRR* = IRR. 
If w<1, then NPV must be positive by an amount reflecting the extent to which w is below 
1 and the value of KPVpv (IRR* < IRR). 
Using IRR*, projects should be ranked for funding purposes according to the extent to 
which IRR* exceeds the appropriate discount rate reflecting the minimum required rate of 
project return (which may differ across projects). 
However, one needs to be careful in the application of regional welfare weights due to the 
spill over effects referred to in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. For example, the South-eastern 
Anatiolian Project (GAP) is a mega project involving several dams being built for irrigation 
and hydroelectric power generation. In fact, it is a cluster of several projects which has 
distributional impacts across several regions in the eastern part of the country and some 
in the western regions as well. Therefore, in the application of CBA to such a project, the 
appropriate welfare weight would be the weighted average of the relevant regional welfare 
weights on the basis of the distribution of benefits. However, such a big project would also 
produce positive and negative externalities which would need to be considered. For 
example, although the project has not been completed yet, it has already caused a 
change in the ecological balance of several regions with completely new flora and fauna 
being introduced with important implication for farming communities. Conversely, many 
villagers have had to be relocated in order to make room for new reservoirs which resulted 
in migration into areas not associated with the project. Thus, where such mega projects 
apply, not only these positive and negative impacts should be weighted on a pro rate 
basis but also a full economic and environmental impact analysis is required. 
In applying the welfare weights, care should also be taken where the location of a project 
and the location of the beneficieries differ. In such a case, the relevant region would, as 
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stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.2, be the region of the beneficieries rather than the one 
where the project is located. 
Another issue relates to the practicality of applying the RWW. Some might argue that, if 
the aim of the government is to reduce poverty, this can be done by using the UNIDO 
approach (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5) where "... the income flows arising from the 
project are identified, and income weights or shadow prices are placed on the incomes 
going to different groups. " (UNIDO 1980, p 4). More explicitly, the approach is based on 
the identification of different beneficiaries (income groups) at micro level and applies a 
shadow price to each beneficiary in order to calcualte the NPV of a project and, if 
necessaray, ranks the projects accordingly, whereas the RWW approach focuses on the 
re-ranking of the projects according to weighted NPVs. Thus, the RWW approach 
provides the decision maker in the allocation of funds to different projects with a guideline 
as to how to differentiate between different regions. If there are certain benefits and costs 
of the project that are not entirely income related such as environmental impacts, then 
the application of shadow prices rather than welfare weights would be more appropriate. 
However, it is worth noting that the two approaches relate to different policy decisions. 
The UNIDO approach is useful for the practitioner at micro level either to accept (or reject) 
a project or to distinguish between projects on the basis of NPV, whereas the RWW are 
useful to the policy maker at macro level in deciding regional priorities in the allocation of 
funds among different projects. 
Despite the qualifications discussed above, it would still be beneficial to incorporate 
regional welfare weights into the CBA of investment projects in Turkey. The procedure 
would provide a particularly useful guideline to the policy-makers at the central 
government level in deciding how to allocate public funds among the proposals submitted 
by different regions since the RWW together with an appropriate discount rate take into 
account both equity and efficiency criteria in the appraisal of social investment projects. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study has been to provide estimates of the social discount rate (SDR) to 
be used in the evaluation of public sector projects and of regional welfare weights (RWW) 
to facilitate the implementation of regional development policy in Turkey. It should be 
stated that this study has been primarily concerned with the issues of the SDR and the 
RWW rather than the operational aspects of CBA and thus focused on the estimation of 
the STPR and the RWW for Turkey. Nevertheless, it has included a discussion on how 
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these estimates can be used to derive equity-adjusted NPV and IRR measures for 
application in social CBA. 
In order to achieve the stated objective of this study (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5), first, the 
theoretical issues surrounding the derivation of the social discount rate and the 
distributional welfare weights were discussed in Chapter 2. This was done in the context 
of the relationship between per capita incometconsumption and diminishing marginal 
utility (MU) and the properties of social valuation functions. 
The theoretical and policy significance of the concept of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income (E) in the estimation of both the STPR and the RWW necessitated the allocation of 
a whole chapter to this topic. Thus, Chapter 3 explored the theoretical issues surrounding 
this concept in detail such as the correspondence between this concept and that of the 
aversion to inequality of income. It also critically evaluated the different methods of 
measuring the value of E. It considered four different categories of methods, namely, 
survey methods, the life-time consumption model, the demand model based on want- 
independent consumer goods such as food, and the income-tax model based on revealed 
social value. After critical evaluation of these methods it was decided that survey methods 
are not very suitable for eliciting Information regarding E and hence not favoured in the 
literature, and that data limitations weakens the case for the life-time consumption type of 
approach. Thus, it was decided that the demand-for-food model and the income-tax model 
would be the most appropriate approaches to estimate the value of E to be used In the 
calculation of the social discount rate and the regional welfare rates for Turkey to be 
applied in long-term project evaluation. 
Chapter 4 focused on the empirical issues relating to the estimation of the components of 
STPR, such as the utility discount rate (p), the pure time preference rate (b), life chances 
(L), the growth rate of consumption (g) as well as the empirical work regarding the 
estimation of STPR Itself. It was established that the empirical estimates of STPR figures 
provided in the literature varied within a fairly narrow band of 3% and 5.5%, and also that 
there is a good degree of agreement between academics and the policymakers regarding 
the use of the STPR in Europe. The chapter then moved on to explore the issues 
regarding the use of per capita income as a basis for welfare comparisons, and to the 
evaluation of the empirical studies calculating regional welfare weights for various 
countries. 
Having covered the theoretical and the empirical aspects of the relevant literature 
regarding the SDR and SWW, Chapters 5 and 6 were devoted to the actual estimation of 
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the relevant parameters for the calculation of the STPR and the RWW for Turkey. 
Specifically, Chapter 5 focused on the estimation of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
income (E) by using two different approaches. The first one is based on demand for a 
want-independent good, also known as the FFF model in which the income elasticity and 
the compensated price elasticity with respect to demand for food are estimated. In this 
approach two separate models have been employed searching for the best result. The 
results obtained from experimenting with a CEM equation and an AIDS model produced 
fairly close estimates with those from CEM being marginally superior. The second 
approach is the income-tax model based on the assumption of equal absolute sacrifice 
which used the Turkish progressive income tax system. The results obtained from this 
approach appeared to be well in line with other empirical studies and thus the estimated E 
value obtained from the tax model seemed to be the most appropriate for the calculation 
of the STPR for Turkey, which is approximately 1.2. 
Chapter 6 provided the estimates of the remaining parameters, namely the pure time 
preference rate (p) and the growth rate of consumptionfincome (g) that are needed for the 
calculation of the STPR and thus provided an appropriate figure for the STPR for Turkey. 
The appropriate value for the pure time preference rate is considered to be I% and the 
value for the required rate of growth of consumption 3.7%. Therefore the value of STPR is 
calculated as 5.5% which is the same figure as that recommended by the European 
Commission (2008) for the Cohesion Fund countries. Chapter 6 also provided the 
estimated values for RWW for six regions of Turkey using the EDEI method as the basis 
of income differences, which appear to be consistent with the estimates provided 
elsewhere in the literature. It is argued that the EDEI method is superior since it takes Into 
account the differences between regions with respect to intra-regional income dispersion 
as well as the inter-regional dispersion. However, the impact of the antra-regional Income 
dispersion would be even more strongly felt If income data disaggregated at the 
household level existed. 
In a wider context, distributional issues and an appropriate discount rate for public projects 
have been a part of welfare economics in general and of CBA In particular across 
generations (Ekstein 1958, Sen 1961, Musgrave 1969, Harberger 1978, and 1984, Arrow 
1995, Stem 1977 and 2007). More recently several European governments have explicitly 
adopted policies relating to the SDR and social welfare weights (see for example HM 
Treasury 2003, Evans 2007, the European Commission 2008, Percoco 2008 and 
Spackman 2008). Therefore, the issue of an appropriate SDR and a set of RWW is 
particularly Important for Turkey. This is because Turkey has a candidate status of and is 
currently negotiating for the membership of the EU; and she is yet to develop coherent 
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and consistent policies with respect to both the application of social discount rate and the 
implementation of regional policies. Consequently, this study fills an important gap both in 
the academic literature and in terms of technical information in the context of appropriate 
policies regarding long term project evaluation and regional development. Nevertheless, 
there is a need for further research preferably using panel data for further refinement of 
the measures of STPR and the EDEI-based estimates of the RWW for Turkey. However, 
this would require more comprehensive time series and cross-section data on income and 
expenditure disaggregated at the household level 
As for the policy issues, it should be stated that although the final decisions regarding 
economic choices are taken by the policy-makers, it is important that they are aware of 
the issues and the trade-offs and have the necessary information to make informed 
decisions (see Section 7.2.1). In this context, estimated values of both the STPR and the 
RWW for a particular country can be useful in the formulation of relevant policies. 
However, it is not the intention of this study to present the findings in general and the 
estimates relating to the SDR and the RWW in particular in a prescriptive manner. It is not 
the function of the economist to state what should be done but only to point out the 
consequences of a particular action by providing technical information for the policy- 
maker. Thus, it is hoped that the findings of this study will shed some light on the issues of 
discounting social projects for regional development purposes in Turkey and facilitate the 
formulation of appropriate policies in these areas. Therefore, the lack of coherent and 
consistent policy regarding the formulation and the Implementation of both the SDR with 
respect to the evaluation of long term projects and regional policy in Turkey renders the 
findings of this study all the more significant. The preferred approach to the setting of a 
social discount rate by many European governments (see Section 7.4.1) is the STPR 
approach and the suggested STPR by this study is well in line with that recommended by 
the European Commission (2008) for the CF countries. Thus, this estimate could be made 
use of by the government of Turkey in its guidance to the application of CBA to long term 
public projects. Similarly, the estimates of the RWW presented in this study could provide 
the government with useful information in relation to how European funds can best be 
allocated to projects to achieve an optimal welfare outcome. 
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Appendix A: Time series data used in the demand models 
Time CONS (nom) FOOD nom CONS (real) FOOD (real) POP 
198701 9875307 4037141 10,793,036 4,1761865 52370000 
198702 11257231 4704329 11,492,853 4,565,687 52370000 
198703 14203271 6426551 14,644 339 6,922,212 52370000 
198704 15682732 5799372 14,088 313 5,302,629 52370000 
198801 15706077 6013859 11,429,200 4,302,866 53268000 
198802 18696759 7133513 11,887,984 4,592,698 53268000 
198803 23779091 10273141 16,028,703 7198 337 53268000 
198804 23868239 8689989 13,292,107 5,230 606 53268000 
198901 25552668 9952202 10,592,816 4,044 827 54192000 
198902 32209948 12758019 11,559,154 4,623,546 54192000 
198903 42568317 18332869 15,246,152 7,248 989 54192000 
198904 48809330 19238208 13 706,870 5,109,751 54192000 
199001 49298899 18379266 12,478,301 4,551,632 55120000 
1990Q2 62134351 25557759 13,746,821 5,084,235 55120000 
199003 78007043 34909707 16,756,208 7,637.164 55120000 
199004 80122181 28608284 14,821 944 5,312,047 55120000 
199101 79816802 30526730 12 769160 4,652,866 56055000 
1991Q2 95248644 35958166 13,700,305 5 166 824 56055000 
199103 133911981 54869250 17,676,008 7990 495 56055000 
1991Q4 135893390 49059591 15 220845 5,633,568 56055000 
199201 140743852 52267943 13,285,283 4,964.219 56986000 
199202 162346138 62072387 14,208,805 5,449,779, 56986000 
199203 221876756 87667018 18 031970 8126 995 56986000 
199204 235289112 79397723 15 755486 5,623,075 56986000 
199301 235502393 87754549 14,157,806 5 . 315,103 57913000 
199302 294318283 108884437 15860 244 5,775,467 57913000 
199303 418409116 177870063 19,421,202 8,346,988 57913000 
199304 421109343 151249065 17105 489 5966 464 57913000 
199401 424556686 166804775 14,788,892 5504 595 ' 58837000 
199402 572976555 215840512 14 038130 535, 5: 374, 56837000 
199403 802611186 335655824 18196 245 8.468.858 58837000 
199404 906118043 345957528 15,938,972 5665 875 58837000 
199501 998050029 422897687 14,008,759 5,330,961 59756000 
199502 1200932766 488586038 15,527,878 5,973,653 59756000 
199503 1626735956 716904488 19,678,108 8,758,053 59756000 
199504 1632183913 641187130 16,796,609 6,059,609 59756000 
199601 1750823819 701725177 15 551824 5,724,853 60671000 
199602 2164779394 808864876 16,998,127 6,233,240 60671000 
199603 2996843229 1264211971 20902 718 8,994,865 60671000 
1996Q4 3025250531 979217321 18,160,914 5.799.411 60671000 
199701 3260486262 1206275694 18 831959 5,723=32=7: 61582000 
199702 4267599558 1573808354 18 661,991 6.488.857 61582000 
199703 5915474632 2320603321 22,766,786 8,974,992 61582000 
199704 6175535486 2012764418 191359,557 _ 5,792,164 61582000 
199801 6800737683 2686592842 18,275,676 5,816,498 62464000 
199 
199802 8210354424 3099410905 18 555,044 6,118,236 62464000 
199803 10752271654 4580295485 23 055,207 9,355 720 62464000 
199804 10359191064 3821606409 181227,421 5,656,839 62464000 
1999Q I 10035552963 4087258260 17,317,801 5,837,086 63366000 
199902 12722499045 4811435286 18 386,771 6,369,616 63366000 
1999Q3 16661767842 7057907476 22,376,322 9,461,794 63366000 
199904 16507941277 5692089912 17,996 013 5,779,641 63366000 
2000Q1 17021329380 6222786507 18,012,918 5,898,800 64259000 
200002 21444004659 7414063909 19,233,563 6,602,225 64259000 
200003 26534209317 10819576103 24,531,000 10 028,882 64259000 
200004 24098247765 8131607671 18,996,090 5,792,277 64259000 
2001Q1 22792519201 8679908890 17,474,105 5,928,485 65135000 
200102 29686323291 10027052227 18 928,161 __ 6,272 323 65135000 
2001 Q3 38567122676 14843027637 
_22,112,226 
9 520 896 65135000 
200104 37467051912 12183802856 , 16,841,367 5,585 865 65135000 
200201 35701255353 12744973946 17149 884 5,884 782 66009000 
200202 43369194205 14164610584 17,464,230 6,253,058 66009000 
200203 54950224893 20982360766 22,698,772 9,775,757 66009000 
200204 50399526368 15868666536 17,580 686 5,685,988 66009000 
200301 48929588873 16807399192 18,493,074 6144 762 66873000 
200302 55932624421 18914356695 17,963,988 6,506,518 66873000 
200303 71783625746 29089693693 24,016 316 10,336,298 66873000 
200304 62940060946 19068699537 19,388,897 5,743,775 66873000 
200401 59746289268 20644383615 20,792,525 6,471,681 67734000 
200402 68382524073 20890069096 21,263,082 6,675,998 67734000 
200403 83845084272 31167444329 25,758,328 10 333 930 67734000 
200404 72657418951 21268637969 20,082,815 6 051 904 67734000 
200501 68209034446 22431967117 21,636,873 6,687,507 68852000 
200502 78038341336 21666881908 22,092,359 7,246,849 68852000 
200503 95700179986 33423928767 28,435,662 11449 286 68852000 
200504 86613033352 23925189169 23,429,255 6,580,104 68852000 
200601 79698344216 25946327296 23,394,369 7,127,180 69421000 
200602 95692815644 23687616565 24,642,956 7,648.499 69421000 
200603 111280895031 37438600808 29,090,532 11,586,134 69421000 
200604 96085006743 25603642975 23,455,898 6 592 891 69421000 
200701 89803134470 29082356239 23,888,483 7,391,817 70256000 
200702 102767199388 26474366338 24,466,371 7,927,062 70256000 
200703 122833135589 43662366887 30124 556 11 757,465 70256000 
Source: TOr kStat (2010a) and TOrkStat (2010 c1. 
Notes 
CONS (nom): Private final consumption expenditure at current prices 
FOOD (nom): Expenditure on food at current prices 
CONS (real): Private final consumption expenditure at constant prices of 1987 
FOOD (real): Expenditure on food at constant prices of 1987 
POP: Population figures 
200 
Appendix B: Consumption growth regression results (Chapter 6) 
.......................... Coefficient 
Dependent variable is X1 
83 observations used for estimation from 1987Q1 to 2007Q3 
Regressor 
INT 
X2 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
-1.4396 0.027350 -52.6361 [. 000] 
0.0046535 0.5656E-3 8.2269 [. 000] 
Estimated Long Run Coefficients 
R-Squared 
S. E. of Regression 
Mean of Dependent Var 
Residual Sum of Squares 
Akaike Info. Criterion 
DW-statistic 
Test statistics 
A: Serial Correlation 
B: Functional Form 
C: Normality 
0.45521 R-Bar-Squared 0.44848 
0.12346 F-stat. F(1,81) 67.6811 [. 000] 
-1.2442 S. D. of Dependent Variable 0.16625 
1.2347 Equation Log-likelihood 56.8607 
54.8607 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 52.4419 
1.7754 
Diagnostic Tests 
LM version F version 
CHSQ (4) = 59.0262 [. 000] F(4,77) = 47.3956 [. 000] 
CHSQ (1) = 0.005447 [. 941] F(1,80) = 0.0052510 [. 942] 
CHSQ (2) = 3.6440 [. 161] Not applicable 
D: Heteroscedasticityi CHSQ (1) = 0.012500 (. 911J F(1,80) = 0.012201 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
[. 912] 
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